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Preface i 
Preface 
For 57 years, the Centre for Rural Development at the Humboldt-Universität zu 
Berlin has annually trained 20 postgraduates to become professionals equipped 
with excellent knowledge and skills in the field of development cooperation. 
Three-month empirical research projects conducted in cooperation with 
German or international development agencies form an integral part of this one-
year course. Participants work in interdisciplinary teams supervised by 
experienced team leaders and carry out innovative, future-oriented research on 
development problems that prevail on the ground on a local or national scale. This 
strengthens global knowledge and provides partner organisations in the host 
country with strategies and tools. Here it is vital to involve a wide range of actors 
in the process, which includes surveys and consultations at household, expert and 
policy level.  
Most studies are linked to rural development themes and have a socio-
economic focus, such as the enhancement of agricultural livelihoods or the design 
of regimes to manage natural resources sustainably. Up to now our partner 
countries have either been developing or transformation countries, and 
occasionally fragile states. In the future, however, studies will also be conducted in 
the global north, since the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are global 
concerns. New methodologies have been introduced in some studies, e.g., 
production of handbooks or guidelines. Further priorities are evaluations, impact 
analysis and participatory planning. In these cases the respective host country 
serves as a test region. 
Throughout the years, SLE has carried out more than 200 cooperation projects 
in over 90 countries. The results are published in this series. 
The present study on conflicts, participation and co-management in Lobéké 
National Park in Cameroon was carried out in cooperation with the KfW (German 
Development Bank) and FTNS (Foundation pour le Tri-National de la Sangha). 
 
We wish you a stimulating read. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Grimm    Dr. Susanne Neubert  
Dean of the Faculty of Life Sciences  Director of the Centre for Rural  
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin   Development (SLE) 
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Executive summary iii 
Executive summary 
Protected areas safeguard the planet’s natural resources from depletion and 
exploitation, and directly contribute to Sustainable Development Goal No. 14 ‘Life 
under Water’ and No. 15 ‘Life on Land’. These goals are anchored in the 2010 
Aichi-Biodiversity Targets and the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) of 
1993.  
However, protected areas have shown to create tensions between 
conservation goals and anthropogenic land-use – especially so in impoverished 
rural settings. While most protected areas not only intend to protect flora and 
fauna but also aim at preserving local livelihoods, they, by their very nature, 
restrict traditional resource use and curtail popular livelihood sources such as 
subsistence hunting. Resultant conflicts between park residents and park 
personnel are a common theme affecting protected area governance across the 
globe.  
On top of that, many parks and natural reserves are severely underfunded, and 
have weak monitoring and enforcement capacities. Multi-national wildlife 
trafficking networks exploit the power vacuum to poach commercially valuable 
species.  
Lobéké National Park (LNP) is emblematic for the aforementioned governance 
challenges. First, the local population lives largely in conditions of extreme 
poverty, and the park can contribute only little to socio-economic development. 
As a result, adjacent communities have a predominantly negative perception of 
the park which puts additional constraints on their livelihoods. Second, 
concessions of private companies in the park’s buffer zone cause unclarity and 
tensions regarding land use and land rights, and further curtail local resource use. 
Third, high levels of both large- scale and small-scale poaching contribute to 
continued species loss. Fourth, the park rangers (‘eco-guards’) have been accused 
of using violence and committing human rights violations against residents. 
The study aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the current 
governance challenges of Lobéké National Park with a focus on participation of 
the local population and park-people conflicts. It provides feasible 
recommendations for stakeholders, which aim at guaranteeing a more efficient 
and equitable governance of the park and its buffer zone. Stakeholders of the 
study include actors from the international, national and local level. 
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Background 
Lobéké National Park is a UNESCO world heritage site in the Southeast of 
Cameroon. It forms part of the wider Tri-National de la Sangha, a protected area 
that spans across three countries in the Congo-Basin: Cameroon, Central African 
Republic and the Republic of the Congo. The park has a total size of 215,000 ha 
and is co-managed by the Cameroonian Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) 
and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Financial assistance to Lobéké 
National Park is provided predominantly by the Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund 
(FTNS), which is partially funded by the KfW Development Bank. 
The buffer zone around the park (596,000 ha) is comprised of different 
concession zones that are designated either for community use or managed by 
private enterprises (logging companies, hunting safari companies and one mining 
company). Roughly 23,000 people live in the 28 villages adjacent to Lobéké 
National Park. The majority of the local population belongs to the Baka, which is 
considered an indigenous people by the Cameroonian state.  
Study Design 
This study relies on Elinor Ostrom’s theory of common-pool resource 
governance. Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone are conceptualised as a 
common-p0ol resource as they are rich in natural resources (wild-life, timber, 
ivory, minerals, medicinal plants, etc.), but face difficulties in regulating access 
and overexploitation. Mascia et al. (2017) offer a typology of governance domains 
to assess the success of conservation in marine protected areas. This typology has 
been adapted for the purpose of the study to include four dimensions, which were 
the focus areas of the research: park management, participation, local livelihoods, 
and conflicts. 
Methods 
The primary research goal is a comprehensive analysis of the current situation 
and existing governance challenges. The phase of data collection was split 
between six weeks in the Cameroonian capital, Yaoundé, and six weeks in the 
Lobéké area. The research team also travelled to the Tri-National de la Sangha 
national parks in the Central African Republic and the Republic of the Congo for 
comparative analysis.  
The study took an explorative approach and employed qualitative research 
methods: 15 expert interviews with stakeholders in Yaoundé, 40 semi-structured 
interviews with local stakeholders, 10 community meetings, 21 focus group 
discussions and 8 transect walks. Furthermore, the research team used two visual 
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and interactive methods: PhotoVoice (20 interviews) and the Theatre of the 
Oppressed (10 plays), when working with the local population and eco-guards. 
Over the course of six weeks in the field, the research team interacted closely with 
stakeholders living in Lobéké’s buffer zone and could make several participant 
observations that facilitated the understanding of local conditions.  
Accounting for the explorative character of the study, an iterative strategy of 
content analysis was employed. Empirical data obtained through the various 
methods was categorised into key topics during the stay in Lobéké. Where 
possible, data was triangulated with academic literature, policy reports and spatial 
data generated with the use of the Geographic Information System (GIS). Finally, 
preliminary results were mirrored back to stakeholders in two workshops on the 
local and the national level respectively. 
Main Findings 
Park Management 
The management of Lobéké National Park lacks the administrative and financial 
capacity to effectively safeguard wildlife and biodiversity within the confines of the 
park. Its primary responsibility to monitor biodiversity and enforce rules established 
in the management plan is troubled by a lack of qualified staff, managerial conflicts, 
and insufficient financial funding. Poaching in the Lobéké area has not decreased, 
and measures to combat illegal hunting are inadequate or absent. 
Lobéké National Park is co-managed by MINFOF (planning and decision-
making authority) and WWF Cameroon (implementing partner giving financial 
and technical advice). The MINFOF-employed ‘Conservator’ is head of the Park 
Management, WWF is represented by the Programme Manager.1  
The park management faces several challenges. First, the park’s five 
management units (Administration and Finance, Surveillance, Ecological 
Monitoring and Research, Co-Management and Eco-Development, and 
Ecotourism) are severely understaffed, and positions are filled with unqualified 
personnel. In combination with frequent absences of the Conservator, the lack of 
adequate staff hinders the effective implementation of management procedures 
and retards important decision- making processes.  
                                                        
1 The distinction between the two entities is often hard to make for the local population, leading to 
confusion, for example when people complain to WWF about the behaviour of MINFOF- employed  
eco-guards. 
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Second, and related to the first point, the working and living conditions of park 
staff, particularly of the eco-guards, are inadequate: housing conditions are poor, 
leaves of absence to visit families are too short (guards are recruited from all parts 
of Cameroon) and bonuses are not paid as promised. As a result, working in 
Lobéké is unattractive and perceived as a “punishment”.  
Third, conflicts between the two management entities MINFOF and WWF 
Cameroon and their financing partner FTNS make the park management 
inefficient and ineffective. Since mandates and responsibilities are not clearly 
defined and adhered to, FTNS is increasingly changing its role from a financier to 
an implementing organisation. The managerial conflicts put into question the 
current management set-up and open discussions on alternative solutions, e.g. 
the idea of a new ‘super-structure’ in the form of a Cameroonian national level 
agency.  
Fourth, the national park does not generate any revenues and is severely 
underfunded. Despite its rich wildlife, eco-tourism is practically non-existent in 
Lobéké with only 96 visitors in 2016. The main reasons for lack of tourist influx are 
the contentious political instability in the border region, the park’s limited 
accessibility and its poor touristic infrastructure. Djembe, a tourist-site in the East 
of the park, is dysfunctional, and current visa regulations hamper touristic circuits 
across the Tri-National de la Sangha protected area. 
Currently, LNP is entirely dependent on external funding, mainly provided by 
the Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (81%), but also by international NGOs (15% – 
channelled through WWF Cameroon) and MINFOF (4% – covering the employee 
salaries). FTNS funds are supplied by the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) via the KfW Development Bank and the 
French Development Agency (AFD). From 2009 to 2018, LNP received not more 
than 1.86 million EUR through project financing, 75% of it as of 2016. The majority 
of financing (58%) is used to cover administrative costs and infrastructure. Most 
community related activities that were explicitly budgeted for could not be found 
on site.  
Fifth, the park’s main operational activity, anti-poaching, is not effective. The 
park management has to address two types of poaching in and around the 
national park: large-scale poaching relies on professionally organised networks 
and targets endangered species such as elephants. Small-scale poaching is carried 
out by local residents and is a transgression of ‘usage rights’. The usage rights 
allow the local population subsistence hunting of common species and the 
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consumption of bushmeat for proteins as long as clearly defined rules (e.g. type of 
species, hunting equipment used, designated zones) are adhered to.  
The management tries to respond to these two types of poaching by applying 
a two-fold strategy: on the one hand, its “soft- power”- approach focusses on 
awareness-raising campaigns on usage rights and illegal forest exploitation. On 
the other hand, its “hard- power”- approach relies on armed patrols by eco-guards 
in the park’s core zone (and to a lesser extent in its buffer zone). However, the 
research found that both approaches are in great need of improvement. The soft- 
power approach is largely ineffective, as its design is top- down, fails to integrate 
local needs and does not address the root causes of poaching (poverty and lack of 
employment, alternative food sources). While the hard- power approach has 
mixed evidence of effectiveness, it could benefit from a stronger involvement of 
the local population as is common practice in other TNS parks. An integration of 
locals in anti-poaching measures is expected to increase local support for 
conservation efforts and will likely foster a respectful relationship between the 
local population and eco-guards. 
Sixth, logging and mining in LNP’s buffer zone pose a threat to biodiversity 
and may jeopardise the park’s status as UNESCO world heritage site. The research 
found that besides private enterprises exploiting resources in their concessions, 
both illegal logging and mining take place in the vicinity of the park. However, 
there are no explicit strategies by the park management to deal with these 
threats. 
Participation 
The management plan and Cameroonian forest law provide several participatory 
mechanisms, such as revenue-sharing, community zones and stakeholder platforms. 
However, the research indicates that the bulk of participatory mechanisms are not or 
only partially functional: local communities are not adequately integrated into the 
management of the park, the park’s community zone is ineffective, revenue- sharing 
mechanisms are inefficient and inequitable, and the delegation of power to local 
communities via community- based resource management is troubled by weak 
capacities, lack of transparency and control, elite capture, social stratification within 
“communities”, and neglect of local needs. In addition, there is evidence that the 
information and consultation process about the establishment of the park and the 
related zoning and gazetting process of its buffer zone were deficient. As a result, the 
local population has little opportunity to participate in the governance of LNP and its 
buffer zone, and current levels of participation do not comply with international 
standards.  
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LNP’s management plan and Cameroonian forest law emphasize both the 
instrumental and the normative value of participation and provide several 
mechanisms to increase local participation in resource governance.  
However, the gap between theory and actual practice is huge. First, it appears 
that the local population was not appropriately informed about the establishment 
of the park nor involved in related land- use planning. Accounts of local 
communities indicate that adequate consultations following the principle of Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) – as stipulated in the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples- had neither taken place when Lobéké National Park 
was established, nor when the zone was declared UNESCO heritage site. This is in 
line with findings of other studies. Furthermore, the zoning process of the buffer 
zone largely neglected local needs and did not involve Baka communities. As a 
result, the current regulatory framework of concessions in the park’s buffer zone 
fails to adequately protect customary use rights.  
Second, the research found that the participatory elements in the governance 
of the park fail to foster equitable participation of local communities. First, the 
management plan outlines multi-stakeholder platforms as a means to integrate 
the interests and expertise of local stakeholders. However, these platforms meet 
irregularly, if at all, and do not sufficiently represent the local population. Second, 
employment of locals by the park management is only sporadic. As a result, there 
is no integration of local knowledge in current conservation practices. Third, the 
park’s Community Zone fails in its main function, namely to grant the local 
population (constrained) usufruct rights to forest resources. While laudable in 
theory, its implementation is severely flawed: residents must obtain a costly 
permit in the headquarters of the park management to get admission, and access 
is only granted for maximum two weeks during a short period of the year. In 
addition, the siting of the zone in the park’s West makes it virtually inaccessible 
for people from villages in the North and the South of the park, and most 
communities do not even know of its existence.  
On top of that, shortcomings of participatory mechanisms in the park’s buffer 
zone were revealed. Neither the redistribution of annual forestry fees from 
logging companies nor the collaborative convention between local communities 
and private companies (“Mambélé Convention”) appear to function in an 
effective, equitable, and efficient manner. The direct management of forest 
resources and revenues by local communities through community hunting zones, 
community forests and carbon zones were also found to be deficient.  
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There are three Community Hunting Zones (ZIGCs) in the buffer zone, which 
are managed by committees of community representatives (COVAREF). These 
zones grant the local population the right to subsistence hunting. COVAREFs can 
also take the decision to lease the zones to hunting safari companies to gain 
financial revenues. This is currently the case in all three ZIGCs. However, there is 
strong evidence that the commercial interests of safari companies take precedent 
over the usage rights of the local population: safari companies keep residents 
from subsistence hunting in the ZIGCs. Furthermore, the taxes paid by the 
companies are rarely channelled back into local communities, as the COVAREF 
are troubled by issues of non- transparency, lack of control, and elite capture. 
Baka and women are misrepresented in the COVAREF and have little opportunity 
to influence decisions- making processes.  
Areas of the non-permanent forest zone close to villages have been 
designated as community forests, and their main purpose is to generate funds for 
community projects by exploiting and commercializing timber. They are managed 
by a communally appointed steering board. Evidence of their effectiveness is 
mixed. On the one hand, community members felt empowered and eager to 
manage the forest zones. On the other hand, the participatory promise of 
community forests is challenged by ‘elite capture’, limited capacity and restricted 
access and exclusion of the Baka population. Furthermore, the siting of the forests 
is reportedly done in Yaoundé and does not appear to be well communicated with 
the respective communities: the geographical limits of the community forests 
often misrepresent the demographic distribution of people living around the park, 
and the zones contain agricultural fields and low-quality wood.  
 In a more recent development, carbon zones for emission trading under the 
international REDD+ mechanism have been established in four community 
forests. In these areas, logging, agriculture and hunting are prohibited, and NTFP 
collection requires authorization. Steering boards of community forests have high 
expectations of REDD+, and consider it a fair conservation strategy. However, 
renumeration has not arrived yet, and local communities might lose another 
usage zone to conservation without receiving any benefits.  
Livelihoods 
Adjacent communities to Lobéké National Park significantly depend on forest 
resource use and land access for their livelihoods. However, the park and concessions 
granted by the Cameroonian state to private companies severely limit the space 
available to residents to pursue common livelihood activities such as subsistence 
hunting, collection of non- timber forests products (NTFP), and agriculture. Despite 
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the high risk to exacerbate local poverty, the park management and private 
companies do little to counter these restrictions and have largely failed to offer local 
people alternative livelihood strategies.  
The main livelihood activities of both Baka and Bantu groups living in the 
park’s buffer zone are hunting, collection of Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs), 
agriculture, husbandry, and fishing. These activities are predominantly carried out 
for subsistence and to a lesser degree for income generation.  
While cacao crops and NTFPs were found to have the highest potential for 
commercialization, high investment costs, lack of knowledge, restricted access to 
land, lack of value chains (for NTFPs) and insufficient market access (for both) 
limit substantial yields. Therefore, cacao plantations and the collection of NTFPs 
are economically not rewarding. 
Other minor income sources for the local population are charcoal production, 
working as harvest hands, small-scale commerce, and artisanal mining. 
Sporadically, residents are employed by park management for inventory and 
tourism. The Mongokele Mining Company and four hunting safari companies offer 
mostly short-term or seasonal employment to local workers. The biggest formal 
employers in the buffer zone are the three logging companies CTSC, SEFAC and 
the Vicwood-Thanry Group employing roughly 770 workers, however only a 
fraction of their workers can be considered ‘local’.  
Local associations and cooperatives have been established to promote 
alternative or complementary livelihoods and to collectively overcome some of 
the challenges to income generation. However, interviews with their members 
revealed insufficient support from the park management and local authorities. 
Financial investments, adequate equipment, access to local markets and 
vocational trainings were identified as the most pressing needs. 
In the park’s buffer zone, local communities’ access to land and forest 
resources is extremely insecure. Concessionaries severely restrict the exercise of 
customary use rights, exacerbating local poverty.  
Furthermore, the majority of localities in the buffer zone lack access to basic 
infrastructure, including medical assistance, educational facilities and clean 
drinking water. Despite the park management’s pledge to support socio-
economic development and provide basic infrastructure, the research team 
encountered little evidence thereof. Two logging companies, Vicwood-Thanry 
Group and SEFAC, engage in community development projects but their 
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involvement is volatile and limited to the proximate surroundings of their 
sawmills.  
Conflicts  
The research team identified four main conflicts that hinder the effective and 
equitable governance of Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone. The fundamental 
conflict revolves around a perceived antagonism between conservation and socio- 
economic development. The neglect of local needs alongside continuous levels of 
extreme poverty has fuelled resentment over conservation costs. Symptomatic of 
this conflict are perceived threats by wildlife to human safety (human-wildlife 
conflict) and disputes between law enforcement agents and residents. The former is 
depicted as the most pressing issue by most residents, as wildlife encroachment is 
understood as a permanent threat to local food security. Experiences of direct 
violence among the local population and the eco-guards has created a general 
atmosphere of fear and mistrust, hindering collaboration. In addition, inner- 
community conflicts between Baka and Bantu groups challenge equitable 
community development and affect the needs and aspirations of indigenous people.  
1. Value conflict between conservation and development 
The majority of local residents holds negative perceptions of conservation and 
understands it as a threat to their livelihoods. While acknowledging the 
importance of conservation in safeguarding natural resources, the local 
population expressed feeling neglected and demanded socio-economic 
development. Interlocutors called upon the Cameroonian state and the park 
management to cover their basic needs. The lack of meaningful participation in 
the governance of Lobéké National Park and the buffer zone contribute to the 
perception of the park as a ‘foreign project’. To garner support among the local 
population for the national park, the park management ought to turn greater 
attention to the socio-economic needs of adjacent communities.  
2. Human-Wildlife Conflict 
There is a very high-risk perception of Human Wildlife Conflict in the buffer 
zone, and participants frequently reported crop damage caused by elephants, 
chimpanzees, gorillas and smaller monkeys. Following research participants, 
frequency and intensity of Human-Wildlife Conflict has increased over the past 
years. There are few effective non-lethal measures residents can take to prevent 
crop damage and chase animals from their fields. Filing complaints for 
compensation is not an option for local farmers: bureaucratic procedures are 
cumbersome and often local authorities simply ignore the complaints. The lack of 
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appropriate prevention and mitigation strategies contributes to a feeling of 
helplessness and anger among the local population. The park management is yet 
to elaborate a holistic response strategy. The study suggests a thorough analysis 
of the real impact and risk perception of Human-Wildlife Conflict around Lobéké. 
Such an analysis provides the basis for generating effective responses jointly with 
the local population. 
3. Law enforcement and local population 
Experiences of direct violence between both conflict parties, the local 
population and eco-guards, have created an atmosphere of fear and mistrust. In 
its essence, this conflict is about the implementation of usage rights of the local 
population. On the one hand, interlocutors claimed that eco-guards keep them 
from doing legal subsistence hunting, confiscate equipment and bushmeat, and 
resort to violence. In the Theatre of the Oppressed, participants portrayed the 
eco-guards as violent and unreasonable. On the other hand, representatives of 
the park management and eco-guards stated they were merely applying 
Cameroonian anti-poaching law in full respect of human rights in an increasingly 
militarized environment.  
The response of the park management to this conflict is insufficient. The 
complaint mechanism set up by WWF Cameroon and the national NGO CEFAID is 
not working effectively and needs to be revised. The frustration of eco-guards 
with their living and working conditions was revealed as a contributing factor to 
the conflict. Finally, the research team found that some hunting safari companies 
are increasingly taking law enforcement in their concessions into their own hands, 
bypassing the eco-guards and reportedly disrespecting customary use rights of 
the local population. 
4. Baka – Bantu relationship 
The social dynamics between Baka and Bantu have a strong influence on the 
governance of Lobéké National Park, its buffer zone and conversation policies and 
ought to be considered by the park management and policymakers with great 
attention. The contentious relationship between the two groups has historic 
roots, commonly described as a dichotomy between ‘modern Bantu villagers’ and 
‘indigenous Baka forest people’. 
During the research, Baka participants expressed a feeling of marginalisation 
and discrimination by their Bantu neighbours, whereas the Bantu interlocutors 
painted a picture of harmony and blamed the Baka’s inherent “backwardness” for 
their lower socio-economic standing. The vast majority of Baka manifested their 
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desire for more socio-economic integration into village communities and basic 
infrastructure (schools, hospitals, formal employment), while maintaining a close 
relationship to the forest as their cultural heritage. This study argues to move 
beyond the conventional dichotomy of ‘modern – traditional’ when designing 
development programs addressing the Baka population. Simultaneously, holistic 
development approaches ought to integrate the Bantu as a target group to avoid 
reinforcing separation between the two groups. 
Conclusion  
Using the conceptual framework based on Ostrom’s common-pool resource 
theory helps to shed light on four important dimensions of protected area 
governance and revealed some of the challenges that Lobéké National Park is 
facing.  
The findings of this study highlight three core points.  
First, conservation without consideration of local needs is bound to fail. This is 
not a ‘new’ insight, but a long- standing policy narrative dating back to Rio de 
Janeiro 1992 (McShane and Wells, 2004:3). Subsequent demands for the 
integration of conservation and development are based on the realisation that the 
two policy goals are mutually dependent: development without regard for the 
environment is unsustainable and hurts local livelihoods, while conservation 
without development leads to alienation and land- use conflicts – and “ultimately 
defeats itself” (ibidem: viii). The theory predicts that development and 
conservation mutually support each other.  
This report however shows that the integration of development and 
conservation is a challenging task. While the management plan harbours great 
ideas to integrate local development and conservation objectives, this study 
shows that the discrepancy between management design and implementation is 
striking. Participatory mechanisms such as revenue-sharing, community managed 
hunting zones, a community zone inside the park or complaint mechanisms look 
great on paper, but do not function properly in reality.  
This does not mean that the ideas are wrong. To the contrary – this report 
supports other studies emphasizing that the involvement of local resource users in 
protected area governance is not only normatively desirable, but also vital for 
ensuring effective conservation (Hayer and Ostrom, 2005). When local 
communities feel that Lobéké national park is ‘theirs’, it is likely that conflicts 
become less frequent and severe, rules and regulations are more adhered to and 
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levels of poaching decrease (also see Husain et al, 2018: 449; Twinamatsiko et al., 
2014).  
Yet, the gap between theory and practice urges to have a closer look at the 
variables that hinder effective implementation of these laudable instruments. 
Following this study’s findings, the main causes for their failure are weak 
administrative capacities, elite capture, neglect of local needs and unrealistic 
assumptions about the equity of local ‘communities’.  
Second, the focus on local needs should not neglect the threats posed by the 
“global”: large- scale poaching and resource extraction by private companies in 
LNP’s buffer zone constitute serious threats to biodiversity. Moreover, much 
resentment over conservation is actually caused by insecure land access and 
unequal resource allocation in the park’s buffer zone. The poor regulation of the 
commercial activities of private companies has perverse implications. For 
example, while residents’ livelihood and survival strategies such as subsistence 
hunting are severely restricted and punishable, foreign profit- oriented safari 
companies can untroubledly defend their business-interests against local resource 
users.  
These problems can hardly be cured by the park management itself. Instead, it 
is necessary that the commercial activities in the park’s buffer zone are better 
regulated, and that local livelihood needs are considered. This is not a new insight 
either – LNP’s management plan emphasizes the importance of an “integrated 
management” of its buffer zone, and explicitly refers to the “landscape approach” 
(“approche paysage”). However, it appears that the attempts to transform this 
approach from mere buzzword to lived practice are dysfunctional: multi- 
stakeholder platforms are meeting irregularly, and there is no evidence of 
“collaborative planning” or “adaptive management” procedures. Again, weak 
administrative and financial capacities and lack of leadership appear to be the 
main obstacles.  
Finally, the research found that the weak presence of the state in the Lobéké 
region has an impact on how the local population perceives the park. The absence 
of many essential government services and authorities has created an expectation 
towards private actors (WWF as well as private companies) to cover basic needs 
and provide infrastructure. A stronger involvement of the Cameroonian state is 
desirable. As conservation is a global objective with primarily local costs, German 
and international development programs ought to significantly contribute to local 
development by providing the necessary technical expertise and financial 
resources.  
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Recommendations  
After analysing the data gathered, discussing the results with stakeholders on 
the local and national level and investigating best practice examples from 
available literature, the research team put forth a total of 37 policy 
recommendations for improving the governance of Lobéké National Park and its 
buffer zone. Recommendations address specific stakeholders and are grouped 
into four broad categories, given a priority of either ‘high’, ‘moderate’ or ‘low’. 
They include best practice examples where possible. Many of the 
recommendations build on processes or mechanisms that have already been 
established but need improvement. The recommendations address four aims:  
▪ Aim 1: LNP’s park management is more efficient and effective – Total:  
9 recommendations  
▪ Aim 2: Conservation efforts involve the local population and do not harm, 
but support local people’s livelihoods – Total: 12 recommendations 
▪ Aim 3: Conflicts surrounding LNP are decreased and sustainably managed – 
Total: 12 recommendations 
▪ Aim 4: The buffer zone of LNP is sustainably managed and respects and 
protects the usage- rights of the local population – Total:  
4 recommendations 
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Zusammenfassung 
Schutzgebiete sollen die biologische Vielfalt des Planeten wahren und somit 
zu den Zielen Nr. 14 „Leben unter Wasser“ und Nr. 15 „Leben an Land“ der 
AGENDA 2030 beitragen. Diese Ziele sind auch in den 2010 Aichi-Biodiversitäts-
Zielen und im Übereinkommen über biologische Vielfalt (CBD) verankert. 
Da die meisten Schutzgebiete jedoch keine völlig ungenutzten Areale sind, 
führen Nutzungsbeschränkungen zur Durchsetzung des Schutzes häufig zu 
Konflikten zwischen Interessensgruppen — insbesondere in armen ländlichen 
Gebieten. Während zwar die meisten Schutzgebiete neben Naturschutzzielen 
auch lokale Lebensgrundlagen langfristig sichern sollen, schränken sie genau 
diese – naturgemäß –gleichzeitig ein, wie z.B. die Subsistenzjagd. Konflikte 
zwischen der betroffenen Bevölkerung und der Parkverwaltung sind vor allem 
dann vorprogrammiert, wenn es nur wenige alternative Einkommensquellen gibt.  
Zusätzlich sind Schutzgebiete in Entwicklungsländern in der Regel stark 
unterfinanziert, so dass sowohl Überwachung als auch Rechtsdurchsetzung häufig 
lückenhaft sind. Multinational agierende Wilderer-Netzwerke nutzen dies zur 
Wilderei kommerziell wertvoller Arten aus.  
Der Nationalpark Lobéké (LNP) in Kamerun ist fast schon Sinnbild der 
genannten Herausforderungen. Die lokale Bevölkerung lebt größtenteils in 
extremer Armut, und da der Park die Subsistenzjagd einschränkt und gleichzeitig 
nur wenig zur sozioökonomischen Entwicklung der Dörfer beiträgt, wird er von 
der betroffenen Bevölkerung auch überwiegend negativ wahrgenommen. 
Kommerzielle Aktivitäten privater Unternehmen in der Pufferzone verschärfen 
den Unmut über die Nutzungsbeschränkungen. Auf der anderen Seite sind die 
Rechtsdurchsetzung und Strafverfolgung nicht effektiv genug, um den 
fortschreitenden Artenverlust aufzuhalten. Die Konfliktlage hat sich längst 
umgedreht: Parkwächtern (Eco-Guards) werden Menschenrechtsverletzungen an 
der lokalen Bevölkerung vorgeworfen, wenn sie diese bei Jagdaktivitäten 
ertappen, seien diese nun regelkonform (in bestimmten Arealen oder bei der Jagd 
auf bestimmte Spezies) oder auch nicht. 
Diese Studie bietet eine umfassende Analyse der aktuellen Herausforderungen 
des Nationalparks Lobéké und gibt Empfehlungen an Akteure auf internationaler, 
nationaler und lokaler Ebene, um eine effizientere und gerechtere Verwaltung des 
Parks und seiner Pufferzone zu ermöglichen.  
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Hintergrund 
Der Lobéké-Nationalpark liegt im Südosten Kameruns. Er ist Teil des 
trinationalen Schutzgebiets und UNESCO- Weltnaturerbes „Tri-National de la 
Sangha“ (TNS), das sich über drei Länder im Kongo-Becken erstreckt: Kamerun, 
die Zentralafrikanische Republik und die Republik Kongo. Der Park hat eine 
Gesamtfläche von 215.000 ha und wird vom kamerunischen Ministerium für 
Wälder und Fauna (MINFOF) und dem World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
gemeinsam verwaltet. Die finanzielle Unterstützung des Nationalparks Lobéké 
wird überwiegend vom Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (FTNS) geleistet, der 
teilweise von der KfW-Entwicklungsbank finanziert wird. 
Die Pufferzone des Parks (596.000 ha) umfasst verschiedene 
Konzessionszonen, die entweder für die Nutzung durch die Gemeinschaft 
bestimmt sind oder von privaten Unternehmen verwaltet werden (Holz-, Jagd- 
und ein Bergbauunternehmen). In den in der Pufferzone ansässigen 28 Dörfern 
leben rund 23.000 Menschen. Die Mehrheit der einheimischen Bevölkerung 
gehört zum Volk der Baka, das vom kamerunischen Staat als indigenes Volk 
anerkannt wird.  
Studiendesign 
Diese Studie stützt sich auf die Theorie von Elinor Ostrom zur Verwaltung von 
Kollektivgütern (Common Pool Resource Governance, CPRG). Der Nationalpark 
Lobéké wird als Allmendegut konzipiert, da er reich an natürlichen Ressourcen ist 
(Wildtiere, Nutzholz, Elfenbein, Mineralien, Heilpflanzen usw.), doch aufgrund 
schwieriger Zugangsregulierung und starker Nutzungsrivalität Probleme der 
Übernutzung aufweist. Aufbauend auf Ostrom’s Allmende-Theorie geben Mascia 
et al. (2017) eine Typologie von Governance-Bereichen an, welche den Erfolg von 
Schutzgebieten sichern soll. Diese Typologie wurde für diese Studie angepasst 
und bezieht vier Dimensionen ein, nach denen die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit 
strukturiert wurde: Parkmanagement, Partizipation, lokale Lebensgrundlagen 
(‚livelihoods‘) und Konflikte. 
Methoden 
Die umfassende Analyse der aktuellen Situation und konkrete 
Herausforderungen für die Good Governance des Lobéké Nationalparks war 
primäres Forschungsziel. Die Datenerhebung umfasste jeweils sechs Wochen in 
Yaoundé und in Lobéké. Außerdem reiste das Forschungsteam zum Vergleich in 
die TNS-Parks in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik und der Republik Kongo.  
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Die Studie basiert auf qualitativen Methoden: 15 Experteninterviews in 
Yaoundé, 40 halbstrukturierte Interviews mit lokalen Stakeholdern in Lobéké, 10 
Gemeindetreffen, 21 Fokusgruppendiskussionen und 8 „Feldbegehungen“ wurden 
unternommen. Darüber hinaus wurden zwei visuelle und interaktive Methoden 
eingesetzt: PhotoVoice (20 Interviews) und Soziodrama (10 Theaterstücke). Im 
Laufe der sechs Wochen vor Ort arbeitete das Forschungsteam eng mit 
verschiedenen Interessengruppen zusammen und konnte hierdurch auch mit 
„teilnehmenden Beobachtungen“ das Verständnis der örtlichen Gegebenheiten 
erhöhen. 
Unter Berücksichtigung des explorativen Charakters der Studie wurde die 
Inhaltsanalyse iterativ durchgeführt: die Daten wurden bereits in Lobéké in 
Schlüsselthemen kategorisiert, die noch während der Recherche sukzessive 
überprüft und dann modifiziert wurden. Die Daten wurden mit Politikberichten, 
Literatur und selbst erhobenen GIS-gestützten Geodaten gegengecheckt 
(trianguliert). Schließlich wurden die vorläufigen Ergebnisse Stakeholdern auf 
lokaler und nationaler Ebene in interaktiven Workshops gespiegelt und 
gemeinsam Empfehlungen entwickelt.   
Ergebnisse 
Parkverwaltung 
Das Management des Nationalparks Lobéké verfügt nicht über die 
administrativen und finanziellen Kapazitäten, um Flora und Fauna des Parks 
wirksam zu schützen: Mangel an qualifiziertem Personal, Führungskonflikte und 
unzureichende finanzielle Mittel erschweren die effektive Überwachung und 
Durchsetzung der im Managementplan festgelegten Nutzungsregeln. Wilderei stellt 
ein großes Problem dar, doch Strategien zur Bekämpfung illegaler Jagd sind 
unzureichend oder fehlen. 
Der Nationalpark Lobéké wird von MINFOF (Planungs- und 
Entscheidungsbehörde) und vom WWF Kamerun (Durchführungspartner für 
finanzielle und technische Beratung) gemeinsam verwaltet. Der von MINFOF 
berufene „Konservator“ ist Leiter des Parkmanagements, der WWF wird durch 
den „Programme Manager“ vertreten. 
Das Parkmanagement steht vor mehreren Herausforderungen. Erstens sind 
die fünf Managementeinheiten des Parks (Verwaltung und Finanzen, 
Überwachung, Monitoring und Forschung, Co-Management sowie Ökotourismus) 
unterbesetzt. Anwesende Mitarbeiter vor Ort weisen nicht die Qualifikationen 
auf, die für ihre Positionen erforderlich sind. In Kombination mit häufigen 
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Abwesenheiten des Konservators behindert der Mangel an qualifiziertem Personal 
die effektive Umsetzung von Verwaltungsverfahren und verzögert 
Entscheidungsprozesse. 
Zweitens sind die Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen des Parkpersonals, 
insbesondere der Eco-Guards, mangelhaft: die Wohnbedingungen sind desolat, 
die Urlaubszeiten für Familienbesuche zu kurz (Eco-Guards werden aus allen 
Teilen des Landes angeheuert) und Boni werden nicht wie versprochen 
ausbezahlt. Folglich sind Arbeitsstellen in Lobéké nur wenig attraktiv; tatsächlich 
werden sie von einigen Eco- Guards als Bestrafung wahrgenommen. 
Drittens lähmen latente Konflikte zwischen den beiden Management-Partnern 
MINFOF und WWF Kamerun Entscheidungs- und Ausführungsprozesse des 
Parkmanagements. Da Mandate und Verantwortlichkeiten offenbar nicht klar 
definiert sind bzw. in Disput stehen, ändert der Finanzierungspartner FTNS seine 
Rolle zunehmend vom Finanzier zu einer Durchführungsorganisation, was die 
Konflikte weiter verschärft. Der Disput der Co-Management-Partner stellt den 
aktuellen Managementaufbau in Frage und eröffnet Diskussionen über alternative 
Verwaltungsstrukturen (wie z.B. die Idee einer neuen "superstructure" in Form 
einer Schutzgebiets-Agentur auf nationaler Ebene).  
Viertens generiert der Nationalpark keine Einnahmen und ist stark 
unterfinanziert. Obgleich der Park eine reiche Tier- und Pflanzenwelt aufweist, 
lockt er nur wenige Touristen an: mit nur 96 Besuchern im Jahr 2016 ist Tourismus 
quasi nicht vorhanden. Hauptgründe für den mangelnden Zulauf an Touristen sind 
die politische Instabilität in der Grenzregion, die schwierige Zugänglichkeit des 
Parks und der Mangel an touristischer Infrastruktur. Djembe, ein ehemals 
attraktiver touristischer Standort im Osten des Parks, ist zerstört, und geltende 
Visabestimmungen behindern touristische Kreistouren im Schutzgebiet Tri-
National de la Sangha. 
Zurzeit ist Lobéke Nationalpark vollständig von externen Finanzmitteln 
abhängig, die hauptsächlich vom Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (FTNS, 81%) 
stammen. Geringe Anteile werden von internationalen NGOs (15% über den WWF 
Kamerun) und MINFOF (4% für die Gehälter der Mitarbeiter) bereitgestellt. FTNS-
Mittel werden vom Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung (BMZ) über die KfW-Entwicklungsbank und die französische 
Entwicklungsagentur (AFD) gewährt. Von 2009 bis 2018 erhielt LNP nicht mehr 
als 1,86 Mio. EUR aus Projektfinanzierungen, 75% davon 2016. Der Großteil der 
Finanzierung (58%) wird zur Deckung der Verwaltungskosten verwendet. Laut 
WWF Deutschland benötige der Park jedoch mindestens 1-2 Millionen Euro 
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jährlich, um seinen zentralen Aufgaben nachkommen zu können (WWF, 
persönliches Gespräch, 11. Dezember 2018). 
Fünftens ist die wichtigste operative Tätigkeit des Parks, die 
Wildereibekämpfung, wenig wirksam. Das Parkmanagement muss, grob 
unterschieden, zwei Arten von Wilderei ahnden: die kommerzielle Wilderei (large-
scale poaching), die hauptsächlich von professionellen, (multi-) nationalen 
Syndikaten durchgeführt wird sowie die sogenannte Kleinwilderei (small-scale 
poaching), die von der Lokalbevölkerung getätigt wird und eine Verletzung ihrer 
Nutzungsrechte darstellt. Die Nutzungsrechte erlauben die Bestandsjagd und den 
Konsum von Buschfleisch, sofern klar definierte Regeln (z. B. Tierart, 
Jagdausrüstung, ausgewiesene Zonen) eingehalten werden. 
Das Management geht mit spezifischen Ansätzen vor: zum einen konzentriert 
sich der „soft-power“ -Ansatz auf Sensibilisierungskampagnen über 
Nutzungsrechte und illegale Waldnutzung. Zum anderen beruht der „hard-power“ 
-Ansatz auf bewaffneten Patrouillen mit Eco- Guards im Park und in geringerem 
Maße in seiner Pufferzone. Beide Ansätze sind stark verbesserungsbedürftig. Der 
„soft-power“-Ansatz ist weitgehend wirkungslos, da er weder lokale Bedürfnisse 
berücksichtigt noch lokale Nutzer integriert und die Hauptursachen der 
Kleinwilderei außer Acht lässt (Armut und Arbeitslosigkeit, Mangel an 
alternativen Proteinquellen). Der „hard-power“-Ansatz zeigt zwar eine gewisse 
Wirksamkeit, könnte jedoch von einer stärkeren Einbindung der lokalen 
Bevölkerung profitieren, wie dies in den anderen TNS-Parks üblich ist. Die 
Einbindung lokaler Ressourcennutzer in Maßnahmen der Wildereibekämpfung 
könnte dazu beitragen, mehr Unterstützung für den Naturschutz zu finden und 
die Beziehung zu den Eco- Guards und dem Parkmanagement zu verbessern. 
Sechstens stellen Abholzung und Bergbau in der Pufferzone des Parks eine 
Bedrohung für die biologische Vielfalt dar und gefährden den Status des Parks als 
UNESCO-Weltnaturerbe. Die Feldrecherche ergab, dass neben privaten 
Unternehmen, die in ihren Konzessionen natürliche Ressourcen legal ausbeuten, 
sowohl illegaler Holzeinschlag als auch illegaler Bergbau in unmittelbarer Nähe 
des Parks ausgeübt werden. Das Parkmanagement verfügt jedoch über keine 
Strategie, diesen Bedrohungen zu begegnen.  
Partizipation 
Der LNP-Managementplan und das kamerunische Waldgesetz unterstreichen die 
Relevanz lokaler Partizipation am Naturschutz und am Ressourcenmanagement. Der 
Großteil der legal verankerten Partizipationsmechanismen ist jedoch nicht oder nur 
teilweise funktionsfähig: die lokale Bevölkerung ist kaum in die Verwaltung des Parks 
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integriert, die Gemeinschaftszone (community zone) des Parks ist ineffektiv, 
Mechanismen des Finanzausgleichs (revenue- sharing) sind ineffizient und 
kommunales Ressourcenmanagement wird durch schwache administrative 
Kapazitäten, mangelnde Transparenz und Kontrolle, Korruption sowie soziale 
Stratifizierung innerhalb dörflicher „Gemeinschaften“ unterminiert. Darüber hinaus 
gibt es Hinweise darauf, dass der Informations- und Konsultationsprozess über die 
Einrichtung des Parks und die damit verbundene Landnutzungsplanung seiner 
Pufferzone unzureichend waren.  
Der Managementplan des Lobéke Nationalparks und das kamerunische 
Waldgesetz betonen sowohl den instrumentellen als auch den normativen Wert 
von Partizi pation und beschreiben verschiedene Mechanismen, welche die 
lokale Beteiligung an natürlichem Ressourcenmanagement erhöhen sollen. 
Die Kluft zwischen Theorie und Praxis ist jedoch groß. Die lokale Bevölkerung 
wurde entsprechend unserer Ergebnisse weder angemessen über die Errichtung 
des Parks informiert, noch war sie in die Landnutzungsplanung eingebunden. 
Aussagen einzelner Dorfbewohner weisen darauf hin, dass die Konsultationen 
über die Einrichtung des Nationalparks und der Erklärung zum UNESCO-
Weltnaturerbe nicht den Prinzipien des Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) 
entsprachen. Lokale Bedürfnisse, insbesondere der indigenen Baka, wurden in der 
Landnutzungsplanung der Pufferzone weitgehend außer Acht gelassen. 
Traditionelle Nutzungsrechte werden in der Pufferzone des Parks daher nur 
unzureichend berücksichtigt. 
Auch weisen die verschiedenen Partizipationsmechanismen in der Praxis 
erhebliche Mängel auf. So soll über im Managementplan beschriebene „multi- 
stakeholder“-Plattformen lokales Wissen in Belange des Parkmanagements 
integriert und lokale Nutzungsinteressen reflektiert werden. Allerdings ist die 
Bevölkerung nur unzureichend repräsentiert und die Plattformen kommen, wenn 
überhaupt, unregelmäßig zu Stande. Auch die formelle Beschäftigung der lokalen 
Bevölkerung durch das Parkmanagement erfolgt nur sporadisch, sodass lokales 
Wissen kaum in aktuelle Naturschutzpraktiken integriert wird.  
Auch die vielfach gelobte Gemeinschaftszone des Parks (community zone) 
weist zahlreiche Umsetzungsfehler auf und versagt in ihrer Hauptfunktion, der 
lokalen Bevölkerung (eingeschränkt) Nießbrauchrechte an Waldressourcen zu 
gewähren. Die Opportunitäts- und Transaktionskosten sind für viele 
Dorfbewohner zu hoch: so müssen sie im Hauptsitz der Parkverwaltung in 
Mambélé eine kostspielige Genehmigung einholen, um Zugang zu dieser Zone zu 
erhalten. Die meisten Menschen können sich diese Genehmigung nicht leisten, 
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auch gibt es kaum (kostengünstige) Transportmöglichkeiten nach Mambélé. 
Darüber hinaus wird der Zugang zur Gemeinschaftszone nur innerhalb einer 
kurzen Periode des Jahres für maximal zwei Wochen gewährt, obgleich viele 
Dorfbewohner länger oder zu anderen Zeiten des Jahres Zugriff auf natürliche 
Ressourcen benötigen. Zusätzlich liegt diese Zone im Westen des Parks und ist 
damit (zu) weit entfernt von vielen Dörfern im Osten, Norden und Süden. Es 
überrascht ob dieser Mängel daher nicht, dass ein Großteil der Befragten gar 
keine Kenntnis über die Existenz dieser Gemeinschaftszone hat. 
Auch erwies sich die lokale Teilhabe am Ressourcenmanagement in der 
Pufferzone als unzureichend. Weder die Umverteilung der jährlichen 
Forstgebühren von Holzfällerunternehmen noch die Kooperationsvereinbarung 
zwischen Dorfgemeinden und privaten Unternehmen (Mambélé-
Übereinkommen) funktionieren auch praktisch.  
Die direkte kommunale Bewirtschaftung von Waldressourcen über 
Jagdgebiete (community hunting zones, ZICGC), Gemeindewälder und 
Kohlenstoffzonen (carbon zones) zeigte auch deutliche Mängel auf. 
In der Pufferzone des Parks gibt es drei kommunale Jagdgebiete (ZICGCs), die 
von sogenannten „Community Based Wildlife Resource Management 
Committees“ (Comités de Valorisation des Resources Fauniques, COVAREF) 
verwaltet werden, die sich wiederum aus Gemeindevertretern und lokalen 
Autoritäten zusammensetzen. Die ZICGCs sollen der lokalen Bevölkerung das 
Recht auf Subsistenzjagd gewähren. Die COVAREFs können auch die 
Entscheidung treffen, die Gebiete an Jagdunternehmen zu vermieten, um 
Einnahmen für Mikroprojekte zu generieren. Alle drei ZICGCs in der Park-
Pufferzone werden derzeit an Safariunternehmen verpachtet. Offenbar haben 
ihre kommerzielle Interessen Vorrang vor Nutzungsrechten der lokalen 
Bevölkerung: laut Aussagen der Befragten halten die Safariunternehmen von der 
legalen Subsistenzjagd ab, aber verteidigen ihre eigenen Interessen äußerst 
aggressiv. Darüber hinaus weisen die COVAREF Probleme der Transparenz und 
Kontrolle auf. Die von den Safariunternehmen gezahlten Steuern scheinen nicht 
in die lokalen Gemeinden zurückgeleitet bzw. für Mikroprojekte verwendet zu 
werden. Baka und Frauen stellen in den COVAREFs eine Minderheit dar und haben 
kaum Möglichkeiten, Entscheidungsprozesse innerhalb der COVAREF zu 
beeinflussen.  
Die kommunale Verwaltung ausgewiesener Gemeindewälder (community 
forests) steht vor ähnlichen Herausforderungen. Die Gemeindewälder geben den 
teilhabenden Dorfgemeinden das exklusive Recht über die Nutzung von Holz- und 
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Nichtholzressourcen und sollen über Nutzholzproduktion Einnahmen für 
Mikroprojekte generieren. Sie werden von einem von der Gemeinde berufenen 
Lenkungsausschuss verwaltet. Doch auch hier behindern begrenzte 
administrative Kapazitäten, Korruption und mangelnde Berücksichtigung der 
Interessen der Baka eine effektive und gerechte Ressourcennutzung. Darüber 
hinaus wird die Standortwahl der Gemeindewälder in Yaoundé durchgeführt, 
offenbar ohne Berücksichtigung lokaler Gegebenheiten: so befinden sich viele 
Gemeindewälder in der Nähe von Straßen, enthalten landwirtschaftliche Flächen 
und besitzen nur minderwertiges Holz.  
Jüngst wurde in vier Gemeindewäldern Kohlenstoffzonen eingerichtet, die im 
Rahmen des internationalen REDD+ - Modells Walderhalt finanziell vergüten und 
somit attraktiv machen sollen. In diesen Zonen sind Abholzung, Landwirtschaft 
und Subsistenzjagd verboten und die Sammlung von Nichtholz-Waldprodukten 
erfordert eine Genehmigung. Die Lenkungsausschüsse der Gemeindewälder 
knüpfen hohe Erwartungen an REDD+ und betrachten die finanzielle Vergütung 
von Walderhalt als eine faire Art des Naturschutzes. Allerdings sind bisher noch 
keine Zahlungen erfolgt und es bleibt fraglich, ob diese jemals realisiert werden. 
Folglich riskieren lokale Gemeinden den Verlust einer weiteren Nutzungszone an 
den Naturschutz ohne geringsten finanziellen Ausgleich. 
Livelihoods 
Die lokale Bevölkerung rund um den Nationalpark Lobéké betreibt mehrheitlich 
Subsistenzwirtschaft und benötigt zur Sicherstellung ihrer Nahrungsversorgung 
Zugang zu Waldressourcen und Land. Der Park und die Konzessionen, die der 
kamerunische Staat privaten Unternehmen in dessen Pufferzone gewährt, schränken 
jedoch sowohl ihren Landzugang als auch ihre Ressourcennutzung stark ein. Folglich 
werden Möglichkeiten zur Subsistenzlandwirtschaft und -jagd sowie zum Sammeln 
von Nichtholz-Waldprodukten (NTFP) beschnitten. Trotz dieser armutsfördernden 
Nutzungseinschränkungen werden diese kaum kompensiert: weder das 
Parkmanagement noch die privaten Unternehmen bieten ausreichend alternative 
Lebensgrundlagen oder Einkommensquellen an. Mangelnder Marktzugang und 
unzureichendes Know- How behindern hier aber eine eigenständige wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung sowieso schon.  
Lokale Baka- und Bantu betreiben zur Existenzsicherung Jagd, Landwirtschaft 
und Fischfang, außerdem sammeln sie Nichtholz-Waldprodukte. In geringerem 
Maße werden diese Aktivitäten auch zur Einkommensschaffung ausgeübt. Zwei 
Produkten wird ein hohes Vermarktungspotential attestiert: sowohl der Anbau 
von Kakao als auch von NTFP lässt sich mit Zielen des Biodiversitätsschutzes 
xxiv Zusammenfassung 
vereinen und die Nachfrage für beide Produkte ist gegeben. Allerdings mindern 
hohe Saatgut- und Düngemittelkosten, beschränkter Zugang zu Land, nicht 
entwickelte Wertschöpfungsketten, mangelndes Know-How und unzureichender 
Marktzugang die Anreize für Investitionen und Ertragssteigerung. 
Andere geringfügige Einkommensquellen der Lokalbevölkerung sind die 
Produktion von Holzkohle, der kleingewerbliche Handel, der handwerkliche 
Bergbau und Erntehelfertätigkeiten. Sporadisch werden Anwohner vom 
Parkmanagement für die Bestandzählung und Tourismus beschäftigt. Auch die 
Mongokele Mining Company und die vier Jagdsafari-Unternehmen bieten saisonal 
Beschäftigung an, doch auch diese ist kurzfristig und auf wenige Stellen begrenzt. 
Die größten formalen Arbeitgeber sind die drei Holzfällerunternehmen CTSC, 
SEFAC und die Vicwood-Thanry-Gruppe, die etwa 770 Mitarbeiter beschäftigen. 
Viele der Mitarbeiter kommen allerdings nicht aus den umliegenden Dörfern, 
sondern aus der weiteren Region: laut Aussagen der Holzunternehmen mangele 
es der Lokalbevölkerung an der notwendigen Qualifikation.  
Es gibt einige lokale Kooperationen (Associations), die z.T. von der 
Parkverwaltung ins Leben gerufen wurden und sich zum Ziel setzen, alternative 
Einkommensquellen zu fördern und über gemeinsame Vermarktung 
landwirtschaftlicher Produkte Gewinne zu steigern. Interviews mit ihren 
Mitgliedern ergaben jedoch eine unzureichende Unterstützung seitens des 
Parkmanagements und der lokalen Behörden: so fehle es an finanziellen Mitteln, 
an Material und Ausrüstung. Auch notwendige Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen 
werden offenbar nicht angeboten.  
Die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung hat keinen Zugang zu Basisinfrastruktur, wie 
z.B. zu medizinischer Versorgung, Bildungseinrichtungen und sauberem 
Trinkwasser. Trotz der Aussage des Parkmanagements, die sozioökonomische 
Entwicklung zu unterstützen und Basisinfrastruktur bereitzustellen, fand das 
Forschungsteam nur wenige Hinweise darauf. Die beiden Holzfällerunternehmen 
Vicwood-Thanry Group und SEFAC beteiligen sich an Entwicklungsprojekten, ihre 
Unterstützung ist jedoch unbeständig und beschränkt sich auf die unmittelbare 
Umgebung ihrer Sägewerke.  
In der Pufferzone des Parks ist der Zugang der Lokalbevölkerung zu Land- und 
Waldressourcen äußerst unsicher. Laut Aussagen der Bevölkerung sei sowohl die 
Subsistenzjagd als auch -Landwirtschaft in den Holz- und Safarikonzessionen 
beschränkt. Auch dies trägt zur wachsenden Armut bei.  
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Konflikte 
Während der Feldrecherche konnten vier wesentliche Konflikttypen identifiziert 
werden, die das Management des Lobéké Nationalparks vor große 
Herausforderungen stellen. Grundlegender Konflikt ist der wahrgenommene 
Antagonismus zwischen Naturschutz und sozioökonomischer Entwicklung. Die 
Vernachlässigung lokaler Bedürfnisse und anhaltende extreme Armut haben 
Ressentiments gegenüber Naturschutz geschürt. Symptome dieses Grundkonflikts 
sind Mensch-Tier Konflikte sowie teils gewalttätige Auseinandersetzungen zwischen 
„Eco-Guards“ und der Lokalbevölkerung. Ersterer wird von zahlreichen 
Interviewpartnern als existenzielle Bedrohung beschrieben: Erntezerstörung durch 
geschützte Wildtiere wie Gorillas und Elefanten erschwert der lokalen Bevölkerung 
die eigene Nahrungsversorgung. Erfahrungen und Narrative direkter Gewalt haben 
zudem zu einer Atmosphäre der Angst und des Misstrauens zwischen 
Lokalbevölkerung und Eco-Guards geführt, welche jegliche Zusammenarbeit und 
effektive Konfliktbearbeitung behindern. Darüber hinaus beeinträchtigen 
innerdörfliche Konflikte zwischen Baka- und Bantu-Gruppen ein inklusives 
Ressourcenmanagement und erschweren Integrationsbestrebungen der indigenen 
Baka.  
1. Interessenkonflikt Naturschutz und Entwicklung 
Die Mehrheit der Lokalbevölkerung scheint den Park als Bedrohung lokaler 
Lebensgrundlagen aufzufassen und nimmt ihn daher vorwiegend als restriktiv 
wahr. Zwar wird die Bedeutung von Naturschutz für den Erhalt natürlicher 
Ressourcen anerkannt, doch die Vernachlässigung ihrer legitimen 
sozioökonomischen Bedürfnisse wird scharf kritisiert. Befragte fordern das 
Parkmanagement und den kamerunischen Staat auf, ihre Grundbedürfnisse zu 
decken und in Basisinfrastruktur zu investieren. Der Mangel an 
Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten am Parkmanagement trägt zusätzlich dazu bei, dass 
der Park als ein „ausländisches Projekt“ wahrgenommen wird, von welchem die 
Parkanwohner kaum profitieren. Um die lokale Bevölkerung für den Nationalpark 
zu gewinnen, sollte das Parkmanagement dringend auf ihre sozioökonomischen 
Bedürfnisse eingehen und sie stärker in das Management involvieren.  
2. Mensch – Tier Konflikt 
Laut Aussagen der Dorfbewohner besteht ein hohes Zerstörungsrisiko für ihre 
Anbaukulturen durch geschützte Wildtiere. Befragte berichteten von 
Ernteschäden, die durch Elefanten, Schimpansen, Gorillas und kleineren Affen 
verursacht worden seien. Die Häufigkeit und die Schadensintensität habe in den 
letzten Jahren zugenommen. Die Farmer kennen nur wenige nicht-letale 
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Maßnahmen, mit denen Wildtiere wirksam von Feldern vertrieben und 
Ernteschäden verhindert werden können. Es gibt die Möglichkeit, Beschwerde 
einzureichen und Schadenersatz einzufordern, doch der 
Beschwerdemechanismus involviert drei verschiedene Ministerien, ist 
umständlich und bürokratisch. Laut Aussagen der Bauern dauere es mitunter 
Monate, bis Rückmeldung komme - oft würden die Beschwerden mit dem Hinweis 
ignoriert, sich direkt bei dem Wildtier zu beschweren. Das Fehlen geeigneter 
Präventions- und Schadensminderungsstrategien trägt zu einem Gefühl der 
Hilflosigkeit bei und verstärkt die Wut auf den Schutz der bedrohten Tierarten. 
Das Parkmanagement muss noch eine umfassende Strategie ausarbeiten, welche 
auch die Risiken durch Wildtier-Übergriffe quantifiziert. Schließlich sollten 
gemeinsam mit der Bevölkerung Präventions- und Linderungsstrategien 
erarbeitet werden.  
3. Eco- Guards und lokale Bevölkerung 
Die Erfahrungen und Narrative direkter Gewalt beider Konfliktparteien haben 
eine Atmosphäre der Angst und des Misstrauens geschaffen. Im Wesentlichen 
dreht sich dieser Konflikt um die Durchsetzung lokaler Nutzungsrechte bzw. um 
ihre Behinderung. Auf der eine Seite beklagt die lokale Bevölkerung, dass Eco-
Guards legale Subsistenzjagd verhinderten, Ausrüstung und Buschfleisch 
beschlagnahmten und Gewalt anwendeten. Im Soziodrama stellten die 
Teilnehmer die Eco- Guards als uneinsichtig und gewalttätig dar. Auf der anderen 
Seite gaben Parkmanagement und Eco-Guards an, dass sie unter voller Beachtung 
der Menschenrechte das kamerunische Gesetz gegen Wilderei in einem 
zunehmend militarisierten Umfeld lediglich anwendeten.  
Die Konfliktlösungsstrategie des Parkmanagements ist unzureichend. Der vom 
WWF Kamerun und der nationalen NRO CEFAID eingerichtete 
Beschwerdemechanismus ist ineffektiv und bedarf der Überarbeitung. Es gibt 
keinerlei Möglichkeit zu Dialog der Konfliktparteien, was der Konfliktbearbeitung 
oder Auflösung gegenseitiger „Feindbilder“ im Wege steht. Auch ist anzunehmen, 
dass die schlechten Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen der Eco- Guards ihr 
Verhalten beeinträchtigen. Schließlich sollte die Strafverfolgung der 
Safariunternehmen unter die Lupe genommen werden. Offenbar haben einige 
Safari-Unternehmen begonnen, Strafverfolgung in ihren Konzessionen in die 
eigene Hand zu nehmen. Die Eco-Guards werden dabei umgangen: Berichten 
zufolge kooperierten die Unternehmen mit dem kamerunischen Militär. Laut 
Aussagen der Lokalbevölkerung geht auch dieses gewalttätig gegen sie vor. Dies 
verstärkt Ressentiments gegen uniformierte Rechtsdurchsetzung.  
Zusammenfassung xxvii 
4. Baka-Bantu-Beziehung 
Die soziale Dynamik zwischen Baka- und Bantu- Gruppen beeinträchtigt 
Naturschutz und kommunales Ressourcenmanagement und sollte von 
Parkmanagement und politischen Entscheidungsträgern mit größerer 
Aufmerksamkeit bedacht werden. Die konfliktträchtige Beziehung beider 
Gruppen wird gemeinhin als Dichotomie zwischen "modernen Bantu-
Dorfbewohnern" und "indigenen Baka-Waldbewohnern" verstanden.  
Baka-Teilnehmer kritisierten Diskriminierung und Marginalisierung durch ihre 
Bantu-Nachbarn, während Bantu-Teilnehmer ein Bild des harmonischen 
Zusammenlebens zeichneten und die inhärente "Rückständigkeit" der Baka für 
ihre Armut verantwortlich machten. Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Baka-
Teilnehmer äußerte den Wunsch nach Integration und dörflicher Infrastruktur 
(Schulen, Krankenhäuser, sanitäre Anlagen), während gleichzeitig eine enge 
Beziehung zum Wald als kulturellem Erbe herausgestellt wurde. Die 
konventionelle Dichotomie von „modern - traditionell“ sollte überwunden 
werden, um diesen Bedürfnissen der Baka-Gruppen adäquat 
entgegenzukommen. Gleichzeitig müssen ganzheitliche Entwicklungsansätze 
auch die Bantu-Bevölkerung integrieren, um die konfliktträchtige Trennung 
beider Gruppen aufzulösen. 
Fazit 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie führen zu drei Schlussfolgerungen:  
Erstens: Naturschutz wird ohne die Berücksichtigung lokaler Bedürfnisse keinen 
Erfolg haben. Dies ist keine „neue“ Einsicht, sondern langjähriges politisches 
Narrativ, das auf die UN-Konferenz über Umwelt und Entwicklung in Rio de 
Janeiro 1992 zurückgeht und heute u.a. in der Agenda 2030 verankert ist 
(McShane and Wells, 2004: 3). Forderungen nach einer Integration von 
Naturschutz und Entwicklung beruhen auf der Erkenntnis, dass sich die beiden 
politischen Ziele gegenseitig bedingen: Entwicklung ohne Rücksicht auf die 
Umwelt ist nicht nachhaltig und zerstört längerfristig lokale Lebensgrundlagen, 
während Naturschutz ohne Entwicklung zur Entfremdung und zu 
Landnutzungskonflikten führt — und „sich letztendlich selbst bekämpft" (ibidem: 
viii, übersetzt). Laut Theorie sollten sich Entwicklung und Naturschutz gegenseitig 
unterstützen. 
Diese Studie zeigt jedoch auf, dass die Integration von sozio-ökonomischer 
Entwicklung und Naturschutz keine leichte Aufgabe ist. Zwar enthält der Lobéke- 
Managementplan ausgezeichnete Vorschläge für die Integration von 
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Entwicklungs- und Naturschutzzielen, doch die Diskrepanz zwischen 
Managementdesign und Implementierung ist ungeheuer groß. Partizipative 
Elemente wie Finanzausgleichsmechanismen, kommunal verwaltete 
Nutzungszonen im Park oder kommunale Jagdzonen und Gemeindewälder sehen 
auf dem Papier zwar gut aus, ihr Versprechen wird in der Realität aber nicht 
eingelöst. 
Dies bedeutet nicht, dass die Ideen falsch sind. Im Gegenteil – dieser Bericht 
bekräftigt Studien, die betonen, dass die Einbeziehung lokaler Ressourcennutzer 
in Naturschutz nicht nur normativ wünschenswert, sondern für die 
Gewährleistung nachhaltigen Naturschutzes von entscheidender Bedeutung ist 
(Hayer und Ostrom, 2005; Twinamatsiko et al., 2014). Wenn sich das Ausmaß 
lokaler Entfremdung vom Park reduziert, werden Konflikte höchstwahrscheinlich 
abnehmen und Regeln und Vorschriften (besser) eingehalten (siehe auch Husain 
et al., 2018). 
Die Kluft zwischen Theorie und Praxis erfordert eine Ursachenanalyse, welche 
Faktoren die Umsetzung partizipativer Instrumente behindern. Hauptursachen 
sind laut dieser Studie die schwachen Verwaltungskapazitäten, Korruption, 
Vernachlässigung lokaler Bedürfnisse sowie unrealistische Annahmen über die 
(Verteilungs-) Gerechtigkeit lokaler „Gemeinschaften“.  
Zweitens: Auch von nicht-lokalen Akteuren geht Zerstörung aus. 
Kommerzielle Wilderei und Ressourcenausbeutung durch private Unternehmen in 
der Pufferzone bedrohen die biologische Vielfalt. Ein großer Anteil des Unmuts 
über den Park ist zudem auf unsicheren Landzugang und ungleiche 
Ressourcenverteilung in der Pufferzone zurückzuführen. Die mangelhafte 
Regulierung privater Unternehmen hat recht paradoxe Konsequenzen. Während 
zum Beispiel lokale Überlebensstrategien wie die Subsistenzjagd stark 
eingeschränkt und strafbar sind, können gewinnorientierte Safari-Unternehmen 
uneingeschränkt ihre Geschäftsinteressen verfolgen und die Lokalbevölkerung 
von ihren Profiten ausschließen. 
Die kommerziellen Aktivitäten in der Pufferzone müssen besser reguliert 
werden. Private Unternehmen sollten dazu angehalten werden, die lokalen 
Bedürfnisse zu berücksichtigen und traditionelle Nutzungsrechte zu integrieren. 
Auch dies ist keine neue Forderung — der Managementplan des Parks betont die 
Bedeutung des „integrierten Managements“ seiner Pufferzone und verweist 
ausdrücklich auf den sog. Landschaftsansatz (approach paysage). Die 
Umwandlung dieses Ansatzes vom Modewort zur gelebten Praxis scheint jedoch 
gescheitert: Multi-Stakeholder-Plattformen treffen sich unregelmäßig (wenn 
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überhaupt), Verfahren der „kollaborativen Planung“ oder des „adaptiven 
Managements“ fehlen ganz. Auch hier sind schwache administrative und 
finanzielle Kapazitäten sowie mangelndes Leadership Haupthindernisse.  
Schließlich zeigt diese Studie auf, dass die schwache unterstützende Präsenz 
des Staates in der Lobéké-Region die negative Wahrnehmung der lokalen 
Bevölkerung befördert. Das Fehlen wesentlicher staatlicher Dienstleistungen und 
Behörden hat die Erwartung geweckt, dass private Akteure (sowohl der WWF als 
auch private Unternehmen) die Grundbedürfnisse decken und Infrastruktur 
bereitstellen (sollen). Eine stärkere Einbeziehung des kamerunischen Staates ist 
wünschenswert. Da Naturschutz ein globales Ziel mit vorwiegend lokalen Kosten 
ist, sollten deutsche und internationale Entwicklungsagenturen das erforderliche 
technische Fachwissen und die notwendigen finanziellen Ressourcen 
bereitstellen, um einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur lokalen Entwicklung zu leisten. 
Empfehlungen 
Insgesamt wurden 37 Empfehlungen entwickelt, um den Park in eine 
insgesamt bessere Entwicklungsrichtung zu bringen. Zu diesem Zwecke wurden 
Datenanalysen und Diskussionen mit Interessengruppen auf lokaler und 
nationaler Ebene durchgeführt und Best-Practice-Beispiele aus der Literatur 
recherchiert.  
Viele der Empfehlungen bauen auf bereits etablierten, aber 
verbesserungswürdigen Prozessen oder Mechanismen auf. Die Empfehlungen 
richten sich an unterschiedliche Stakeholder und sind in vier Zielkategorien 
unterteilt, denen entweder die Priorität "hoch", "mittel" oder "niedrig" eingeräumt 
wird:  
▪ Ziel 1: Die Parkverwaltung von LNP ist effizienter und effektiver - 
Insgesamt: 9 Empfehlungen 
▪ Ziel 2: Naturschutz involviert die lokale Bevölkerung und schadet nicht, 
sondern unterstützt die Existenzgrundlagen der lokalen Bevölkerung - 
Insgesamt: 12 Empfehlungen 
▪ Ziel 3: Konflikte um LNP sind reduziert und werden nachhaltig bewältigt - 
Insgesamt: 12 Empfehlungen 
▪ Ziel 4: Die Pufferzone von LNP wird nachhaltig verwaltet und die 
Nutzungsrechte der lokalen Bevölkerung werden respektiert und 
grschützt- Insgesamt: 4 Empfehlungen 
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1 Introduction 
Protected Areas2 (PAs) are pivotal to combat species loss and conserve nature 
worldwide. They are understood as a key tool to reconcile global conservation 
objectives such as the Aichi Biodiversity targets with local livelihoods interests 
(IUCN, 2019). However, poor governance, conflicts, and a growing demand for 
natural resources challenge PAs effectiveness and equity (Worboys, 2015:37ff). 
This study investigates the challenges of PA- governance by examining the 
case of Lobéké National Park (LNP), Southeast Cameroon. The park is habitat for 
a range of critically endangered species such as forest elephants (Loxodonta 
cyclotis), Western gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). As 
a designated UNESCO World heritage site3, LNP has committed to seek a 
governance of its resources that balances both conservation and sustainable 
development objectives (UNESCO, 2002). 
However, the park – as the entire Congo basin – suffers from continued species 
loss and faces difficulties to effectively protect its unique natural resources (Bobo 
et al., 2015; MINFOF, 2015). Equally alarming, it has been accused of depriving 
livelihoods and disregarding basic rights of the local population4, engendering 
disputes and conflicts. The purported Human Rights violations in LNP have 
attracted much international media attention, culminating in the submission of a 
formal complaint to the OECD by the international NGO Survival International (SI) 
against the World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the park’s co-managing 
organisation5. Two minor interpellations to the German government, which 
provides funding for LNP via The Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (FTNS), have 
followed up on the issue (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017; 2018). The situation on the 
                                                        
2 “A protected area is a clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through 
legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated 
ecosystem services and cultural values” (IUCN, 2019) 
3 TNS encompasses three parks: LNP in the Republic of Cameroon, Dzanga-Sangha National Park (APDS) 
in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park (PNNN) in the Republic of the 
Congo (see Map 1) 
4 In the context of this study, the term ‘local population’ refers to Baka, Bantu and any other individuals or 
groups of people that live in the areas adjacent to LNP 
5 SI claims that firstly, WWF and the Cameroonian government “denied or seriously curtailed Baka access 
to the traditional territories and natural resources”; secondly, that WWF allegedly “failed its duty […] 
to respect the human rights of the Baka” and thirdly, that eco-guards and other law enforcement 
officials are accused to violently abuse the Baka (Survival International, 2016).  
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ground, however, has so far not been thoroughly studied by independent 
researchers. 
Responding to the pressing need for field assessment, this study explores the 
challenges and opportunities of LNP to effectively conserve its resources and 
meeting social equity goals. The latter is not only a moral requirement emanating 
from global and national commitments to Human Rights6 (see Infobox 1) but also 
instrumental for achieving and sustaining effective conservation (Hayes and 
Ostrom, 2005; Watson et al., 2014; Twinamatsiko et al., 2014; Schreckenberg et 
al., 2016).  
Following the concept of Common Pool Resource (CPR) governance, the study 
examines LNP’s management challenges, the degree of participation of local 
stakeholders, the livelihood- strategies of the local population, and park- people 
conflicts undermining local support for conservation efforts. The analysis is firmly 
based in qualitative research on the ground and informs the development of 
recommendations on how Lobéké National Park can become both more effective 
and equitable. 
The following sub-chapters describe the study area. Chapter 2 and 3 outline 
the study’s objectives and its underlying conceptual framework. Chapter 4 depicts 
the study’s methodological approach. Chapter 5 discusses the results (5.1 Park 
management, 5.2 Participation, 5.3 Livelihoods and 5.4 Conflicts) and Chapter 6 
gives an overview of the study’s recommendations (a detailed list is included in 
the Annex 14). Chapter 7 concludes. 
  
                                                        
6 Funded by the German Government, LNP is also bound to the BMZ- guidelines on Human Rights 
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Infobox 1: BMZ Guideline on Human Rights 
The Menschenrechtsleitfaden of the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ (in the following: “BMZ guideline”) 
serves as basis for development, evaluation and implementation of German 
development projects. Central to the guideline are international Human Rights 
standards (including the collective rights of indigenous people) and principles 
such as participation, empowerment, and transparency. The guideline also 
refers to the principle of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), the UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Eviction and Displacement 
and the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security.  
The BMZ guideline commits German development actors to analyse potential 
(normally unintended) negative impacts of development projects on the 
realisation of Human Rights. Regarding Human- Rights- risks related to 
conservation projects, the guideline obliges to ensure the following:  
▪ Integration of all groups in political decision making and the promotion of 
FPIC 
▪ Promotion of just access to land and water and strengthening of traditional 
or customary land rights especially of indigenous peoples  
▪ Appropriate compensation and/or promotion of alternative livelihoods or 
income sources for limited usage of natural resources 
▪ Development of mechanisms that allow a fair sharing of revenues from 
natural resources 
▪ Transparent and participatory design of environmental protection, 
especially in view of usage conflicts  
▪ Promotion and strengthening of effective and easily accessible mechanisms 
for appeal (discrimination-free, gender- and conflict- sensitive) where 
people feel their rights have been infringed through environmental 
protection  
▪ Promotion of governmental supervision and regulation of the private sector 
with regards to human rights  
(BMZ 2013) 
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1.1 Study area 
Lobéké National Park is situated in the far Southeast of Cameroon. It has a 
total size of ~2,153 km2 and consists of a core zone, where human activity is not 
permitted7, and a community zone of ~332 km2. LNP is surrounded by six forest 
management units (Unites Forestières d’Aménagement, UFA) and both private 
and community hunting areas, covering an area of approximately 4,515 km2 
(MINFOF, 2014) (see Map 4). The park’s designated “buffer-zone” (see Infobox 4) 
comprises an area of ~5,959 km2 (UNESCO 2019). At present, LNP is co- managed 
by the Cameroonian Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) and the World-Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF). 
 
Infobox 2: History of Lobéké National Park 
First scientific studies on LNP were conducted in the late 80’s, demonstrating 
its unique ecological value and drawing attention to overexploitation of its 
resources (MINFOF, 2004:18). Between 1994 and 1996, the Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS) started a first conservation project in LNP, which 
was taken over by WWF and the German Development Cooperation Agency 
GTZ in 1996 (ibidem). In 2001, Lobéké National Park was created by means of a 
presidential decree (Republic of Cameroon, 2001), falling under the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Management 
Category II (National Park). In 2008, GIZ (then: GTZ) pulled out from the 
project, leaving the management of the park to WWF Cameroon and MINFOF. 
Since 2012, Lobéké National Park is part of the UNESCO World Heritage site 
“Trinational de la Sangha”, TNS. 
  
                                                        
7 Apart from tourism, research and anti-poaching efforts 
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Map 1 : Overview Trinational de la Sangha (buffer zone and national parks) 
Source: MINFOF Cameroon, WWF Cameroon, OpenStreetmaps and contributors (CC BY-
SA), own data 
 
1.1.1 Administrative Organisation 
LNP is located in the Division of Buomba-et-Ngoko (provincial capital: 
Yokadouma), in Cameroon’s East Region (regional capital: Bertouá) and 
administratively belongs to the two sub-divisions Moloundou and Salapoumbé 
(see Map 1). Both sub- divisions have directly elected councilors that elect one 
amongst them as mayor. The councils receive grants from the national 
government through MINATD. Each council is participating in the design of its 
own development plan designating future development goals (e.g. Council of 
Salapoumbé, 2012).  
In addition, the sub- divisions are governed by representatives of the national 
state (sub-prefects) and traditional authorities (chiefs). The sub-prefects are 
appointed by presidential decree and uphold the authority of the state at the local 
level. The traditional chiefs are appointed by village notables and installed by 
administrative authorities. They are considered “auxiliaries of the local 
administration” (CLGF, 2017:43f) and serve as ties between the administration and 
the villagers. They have limited authority to dispense justice according to 
6 Introduction 
customary law, in particular on issues of land tenure and civil matters. Formally 
recognized chiefs are designated a hierarchy ‘degree’ (in ranking order: first, 
second, or third) and receive corresponding allowances (Republic of Cameroon, 
1977).  
In the region of LNP, every recognized village has a chief of second degree, 
sometimes even two. The chiefs are grouped along ethnic lineages and their 
territories overlap (see Map 2). Baka and immigrants (so called ‘allogènes’, 
“strangers”) are not represented by their own chiefs. 
 
 
Map 2: Administrative structure, ethnic identity groups and communities 
worked with 
Source: MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, WWF Cameroon, Robillard (2010:50), own data 
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1.1.2 Local population 
Following the management plan, LNP’s buffer zone is home to roughly 23.245 
people living in 28 villages (MINFOF, 2014). The plan states that 26 % of the local 
population are Baka, 52 % belong to Bantu groups, and 22 % immigrated to the 
area from other regions in Cameroon (ibidem). Actual numbers, however, might 
differ: the sub-prefects of Salapoumbé and Moloundou and a WWF employee 
stated that Baka constitute the majority in their municipalities (I4; I7; I18)8. 
While the Baka are defined as an “indigenous people” by Cameroon (see 
Infobox 3), the term „Bantu” combines several different ethnic groups (Bangando, 
Kounabembé, Mbimo) that mostly use Bantu- languages and historically have 
been associated with sedentary agriculture (Lueong,2017:6). In line with Lueong, 
this report uses the term “Bantu” to refer to all non- Baka, as it is embraced by the 
local population and used by policy makers and development actors alike. The 
local population lives of less than USD 1 per day/individual, and more than half of 
the population is less than 20 years old (MINFOF 2014). 
 
                                                        
8 In general, population statistics of the area are presumably inaccurate. Many residents do not have birth 
certificates and are not officially registered. Due to crises in Cameroon and neighbouring countries, 
immigration purportedly rose in recent years. The last available data are extrapolations from old 
surveys. 
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Infobox 3: Indigenous People in Cameroon: Baka 
Different from many other African countries, Cameroon has voted in favour of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples from 2007 
(UNDRIP). Though not legally binding (different from ILO Convention 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples which was not ratified by Cameroon), this 
declaration carries considerable moral weight by establishing a universal 
framework of minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of 
indigenous peoples.  
While a universal definition of indigenous people does not exist, Cameroon and 
the “African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Right” define so- called 
“Pygmy”- groups and Mboros (pastoralists) as indigenous peoples on its 
territory. This acknowledgement implies specific obligations for their 
protection. Cameroon’s preamble of the constitution states that “the state 
shall ensure the protection of minorities and shall preserve the rights of 
indigenous populations in accordance with the law”.  
Traditionally, “pygmies” are hunter- gatherers and forest- dwellers, and Baka 
are one of three ethnic groups often referred to as ‘Pygmies’. Most Baka 
consider the term derogatory and prefer “Baka” instead (Lueong, 2017:5). Baka 
have their own language, “Baka”, and their total population in Cameroon is 
between 40.000 – 60.000. 
 
1.1.3 Concessions in LNP’s buffer zone 
The Cameroonian Forest Code regulates sustainable forest use in Cameroon. 
Its zoning plan (Republic of Cameroon, 1995c) defines two main categories of 
forest estates in Cameroon (see Map 3): forests are either (a) permanent forest 
estates or (b) non-permanent forest estates (often called ‘agroforestry’ or 
‘multiuse’ zone’). The permanent forest estates are formally assigned to timber 
production via concessions to private companies or municipalities (“forêt de 
production”) or protected as conservation areas and wildlife habitats (such as 
Lobéké National Park). Non-permanent forest estates are often designated as 
community forests (“forêt communautaire”). The basic zoning structure of 
permanent and non-permanent cannot be changed unless declassified.All 
permanent forest of LNP’s buffer zoneis assigned to forestry operations 
constituting different forest management units (Unité forestière d’aménagement, 
UFA) . 
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Infobox 4: Buffer- Zone  
The concept of a buffer zone was first mentioned in the Operational Guidelines 
for the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in 1977 (UNESCO, 
1977). A buffer zone is understood as an additional layer of protection to the 
World Heritage property, and has “complementary legal and/or customary 
restrictions placed on its use and development to give an added layer of 
protection to the property“(UNESCO, 2017, § 104). Following the protection 
requirements of the TNS landscape, the buffer- zone of the TNS must integrate 
the needs of the local communities with conservation objectives: “It is essential 
to ensure that the future activities in the buffer zones, including forest and 
wildlife management, tourism, agriculture and infrastructure are fully 
compatible with the conservation objectives for TNS so the surrounding 
landscape will satisfy the needs of local and indigenous communities while 
indeed serving as a ‘buffer’ for the property” (UNESCO, 2019). 
 
 
Map 3: Non-permanent and permanent forest zone with logging 
concessions 
Source: MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data 
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While hunting zones (Zone d’Intérêt Cynégétique, ZIC) are superposed on the 
UFAs and rented out to professional trophy hunters (so- called safari companies) 
by the state, community hunting zones (Zone d’Intérêt Cynégétique à Gestion 
Communautaire, ZICGC) are largely situated in the non-permanent agroforestry 
zone around the villages (MINFOF, 2009:34). These zones (see Map 4) are 
managed by village committees and can be rented out to professional hunters to 
generate revenues. In LNP’s buffer zone, all community hunting zones are leased 
to foreign owned safari companies. ZICGC have to develop ‘simple management 
plans’ to be approved by MINFOF and ZIC have to adhere to a ‘cahier de charge’ 
(Loi N°94/019, Art. 92 § 2)10.  
There are several mining concessions around LNP and even inside the park 
(see Map 4). Currently, no company has officially started exploitation, but one 
concession in the south of the park is under exploration.  
 
                                                        
9 Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994 
10 While the simple management plans are available, the ‘cahiers de charge’ are either outdated or not 
obtainable  
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Map 4: Land use planning overlaps and settlements 
Source: MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, WWF Cameroon, own data 
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1.2 Stakeholders 
The following stakeholders are key for the study: 
1. The management of LNP (MINFOF and WWF Cameroon) and LNP 
employees 
2. The local population (both Baka and Bantu groups) including local 
politicians 
3. Civil society organizations and community associations 
4. The private sector active in LNP’s buffer zone: Logging companies, sports 
hunting enterprises (“safari companies”) and mining companies  
 
Table 1: Multi-level overview of stakeholders 
Level Stakeholders 
International FTNS, KfW, WWF International 
National MINFOF, WWF Cameroon, Civil society organizations (CEFAID, and others)  
Local 
Baka and Bantu groups; LNP- employees; Local politicians; Logging and 
safari companies; Civil society organizations (i.e. OKANI); Community 
associations 
Source: own data 
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2 Aim of the study and research questions 
The study aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the current 
management of LNP with a particular focus on participation of the local 
population and conflicts between stakeholders.  
Correspondingly, the research supplies five outputs: (1) an assessment of the 
management of LNP, (2) an analysis of the park’s strategies against threats to 
biodiversity in and around LNP, (3) an analysis of current participation 
opportunities of the local population, (4) an assessment of livelihood strategies in 
the park’s periphery, and (5) a conflict analysis. The outputs respond to the 
following research questions:  
▪ How does the LNP management work and what can be improved? 
▪ How are threats to biodiversity approached by the park management and in 
what way could these approaches be optimised? 
▪ How does the local population currently participate in the LNP management 
and what are the existing problems and constraints? 
▪ What are the current livelihood strategies of the local population and how are 
alternatives promoted by the park management (and other stakeholders)?  
▪ What are the main conflicts between stakeholders of LNP and what are the 
specific positions, interests and needs of conflict parties? 
▪ What instruments currently exist in LNP to solve/transform these conflicts in a 
non-violent and sustainable way and how can they be improved? 
Based on the analysis, feasible recommendations are formulated and tailored 
to the study’s main readership: MINFOF, WWF, KfW, FTNS, (inter-) national NGOs 
and the local population.  
It is envisaged that stakeholders will implement the recommendations to 
improve the protection of biodiversity while enhancing prospects of poverty 
alleviation and peaceful co-existence of local stakeholders11. The 
recommendations correspond to four objectives:  
▪ Objective 1: LNP’s park management is more efficient, effective, and 
equitable 
                                                        
11 Ideally, some recommendations can already be integrated in the next management plan 2019-2023 yet 
to be drafted. 
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▪ Objective 2: Conservation efforts involve the local population and do not 
harm, but support local people’s livelihoods  
▪ Objective 3: Conflicts surrounding LNP are decreased and sustainably 
managed  
▪ Objective 4: The buffer zone of LNP is sustainably managed and respects 
and protects the usage- rights of the local population 
The recommendations, once implemented, shall meet these objectives by: 1) 
safeguarding the interests and needs of the local population, 2) promoting 
sustainable livelihood strategies in line with conservation objectives of LNP, 3) 
solving conflicts in a sustainable and non-violent way, 4) enabling effective 
conservation mechanisms. For a detailed objective system of the study refer to 
Annex 1. 
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3 Conceptual framework 
This study merges different analytical concepts to match the focus of the 
research. As an overarching concept, it uses Ostrom’s Common-Pool Resource 
Governance due to its focus on the sustainable use of resources and respective 
governance systems. Mascia et al. (2017) offer a typology of common-pool 
resource governance to assess the impact and success of conservation in marine 
protected areas. Based on initial literature review and consultations with the KfW 
and other stakeholders, this typology was adapted to the context of Lobéké 
National Park and its buffer zone. The amended framework includes four 
dimensions: park management, participation, conflicts and livelihoods.  
3.1 Common-Pool Resource Governance  
In his essay ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) Hardin theorized that 
(unmanaged) common-pool resources face problems of overexploitation due to 
their very characteristics: they are finite, access to them is unlimited and their size 
or features make the exclusion of potential resource users difficult or costly. 
Consequently, in the absence of clearly defined regulations, resource users will try 
to exploit the common-pool resource with the end of maximizing their own 
income/utility. 
Following the economist Elinor Ostrom, the problem of overexploitation can 
be solved by designing and implementing effective and equitable governance 
systems. These governance systems are bottom-up in nature as they follow the 
assumption that rules and property rights defined, implemented, monitored and 
enforced by resource users themselves are likely to perform better than top-down 
approaches (Ostrom, 1990). 
The concept of common-pool resource governance has been widely applied to 
community managed areas (such as pastures, fishing grounds or irrigation 
systems). Recently, common-pool resource governance has been extended to the 
analysis of the management of protected areas. Mascia et al. (2017) determine 
four domains of marine protected area governance that are pivotal in assessing its 
efficiency: 1) decision-making arrangements (participation), 2) resource-use 
rights, 3) monitoring and enforcement systems, and 4) conflict-resolution 
mechanisms. 
Many of the attributes of common-pool resources described above apply to 
Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone. The area is rich in natural resources 
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(wildlife, timber, ivory, minerals, medicinal plants, etc.). The lack of physical 
barriers makes resources easily accessible to the local population and external 
actors, while hard to control for the park management. As many people in the 
buffer zone of LNP rely on forest products, the levels of exploitation increase, and 
the natural resources are stretched to their limits. Attempts to regulate the access 
to resources by a more restrictive enforcement of the rules have reportedly led to 
conflicts, particularly between the local population and the park management 
(Pyhälä, Orozco, and Counsell, 2016; Survival International, 2016). Furthermore, 
poaching (both small-scale and large-scale) increases the pressure on wildlife. 
These observations indicate that the management in its current form is ineffective 
in reducing the pressures on the park and the surrounding buffer zone at large. 
Conceptualising Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone as a common-pool 
resource helps to explore local conditions and to assess its current governance. 
Simultaneously, this exercise reveals possible points for improvement, which will 
be listed as policy recommendations tailored for specific stakeholders at the end 
of this report. 
Adapting the governance domains proposed by Mascia et al. (2017), this study 
looks at four dimensions: park management (covering strategies against threats 
to biodiversity), participation, conflicts and livelihoods (see Figure 1). The 
subsequent sections explain the conceptual understanding of these dimensions as 
well as their relevance to common-pool resource governance.  
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Figure 1: Four dimensions of common-pool resource governance of Lobéké 
National Park and its buffer zone 
Source: own depiction based on Mascia et al., 2017 
 
3.1.1 Park Management 
The term “park management” in this study refers to the management 
structure present on site at the LNP Headquarter in Mambélé, the so called 
“Service de Conservation”. The park management of LNP is based on a 
collaboration between MINFOF and WWF. It is responsible for enforcing resource- 
use rules in the national park and its buffer zone and serves as a warden of the 
Cameroonian forest law (Loi N°94/0112). 
Studies have found that staff and budget capacity of park management are 
strong predictors of conservation impact (Gill et al., 2017; McConney and Pena, 
2012; Bruner, Gullison and Balmford, 2004). Hence, this study examines LNP’s 
administrative organisation and staffing, funding and budgeting, working 
conditions of staff, and potential to generate revenues through ecotourism. 
Furthermore, attention will be paid to the park management’s response to 
activities that threaten biodiversity. In LNP and its buffer zone, poaching (often 
                                                        
12 Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994 
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small-scale by local people and large-scale by professional transnational crime 
syndicates), logging and mining (both legal in the allocated concessions and illegal 
forms) put pressure on the environment, biodiversity and natural resources.  
3.1.2 Participation 
Participation can be very broadly understood as the involvement of 
stakeholders in processes and decision-making that concern them. It is an 
essential dimension of common-pool resource governance. As Ostrom (1990) 
remarked, users of resources are more likely to adhere to rules and regulations if 
these are established in a consultative manner and adequately reflect their 
interests and needs. Mascia et al. (2017:100) find that participation in decision-
making and self-governance increase the effectiveness of the governance of 
protected areas. Following Young et al. (2010), participation can strengthen the 
relationships between stakeholders and deepen mutual understanding of 
different viewpoints, hence minimizes conflicts. More normative rationales for 
participation emphasize its support of democratic values and human rights 
principles.  
Generally, one can distinguish between different levels of participation 
including information and consultation, partnership and dialogue, and delegation 
of power (Baker and Chapin, 2018). 
The study aims at analysing participation in Lobéké National Park and its 
buffer zone by examining both theory and practice of participatory mechanisms 
provided by Cameroonian forest law and LNP management plan. The following 
questions (based upon Young et al. 2010 and Norad 2013) will help to better 
analyse how participation is implemented and conducted in Lobéké National Park 
and the buffer zone: 
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Table 2: Guiding questions for the analysis of participation in Lobéké 
National Park and its buffer zone 
Which kinds of participation take place?  
− Which responsibilities are linked to which 
degree of participation? 
On which scale does participation happen? 
− Who participates and in what way? 
To which degree is participation possible? 
− Who controls access to participation? 
− Who funds participatory actions? 
− Who leads discussions in meetings? 
− How is information accessible for 
different actors? 
Who promotes/ demands participation for 
which reasons? 
− Whose interest is represented by whom? 
− How do interests flow into decisions and 
rules/laws (regulated or by prevalence)? 
What are the results of participation? 
− By whom/ how is the implementation of 
the rules controlled? 
− How are the regulations/ agreements 
met? 
Source: based on Young et al. 2010 and Norad 2013 
 
3.1.3 Livelihoods 
Protected areas are often located in structurally weak and remote regions that 
are characterized by high poverty rates and few formal job opportunities. 
Consequently, people depend on forest resources (timber, bushmeat, non-timber 
forest products, etc.) to generate income or sustain themselves (Tieguhong and 
Nkamgnia, 2012).  
There is diverging empirical evidence whether local livelihoods can be 
significantly improved by protected areas. However, there is little doubt about the 
link between peoples’ livelihoods needs and conservation outcomes. Studies have 
shown that satisfying local livelihood needs reduces conflicts and improves 
conservation performance (Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Baynes et al., 2015).  
Local livelihood needs are strongly connected to the issue of local access and 
usage rights (Brooks et al., 2013), and the framework of common-pool resource 
governance puts a strong emphasis on access to and use of natural resources by 
the local population. It is considered a crucial factor for successful governance and 
avoidance of overexploitation (Mascia et al., 2017).  
Given these reflections, the dimension of livelihoods was added to the 
common-pool resource governance framework. Within this study, the concept of 
“livelihoods” is understood as the satisfaction of subsistence needs and 
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generation of monetary income through different economic activities (agriculture, 
livestock keeping, collection of Non-Timber Forest Products, etc.). Incorporating 
this dimension yields a better understanding of the conflicts in Lobéké National 
Park and its buffer zone and the ensuing management challenges. 
3.1.4 Conflicts 
Conflicts associated with protected areas are pervasive and described as some 
of the key challenges conservation efforts are facing worldwide (Baynham-Herd et 
al., 2018; De Pourcq et al., 2015; Young et al., 2010; Lewis, 1996). Common visible 
effects of conflicts in protected areas are the loss of biodiversity, poaching 
activities, violent law enforcement, community tensions, polarization of ethnic 
groups, elite capture and loss of revenues (Sakah, 2013).  
The understanding of the drivers and causes of conflicts concomitant with 
protected areas is far from unequivocal, as approaches towards conflict analysis 
vary greatly (Baynham- Herd et al., 2018; De Pourcq et al., 2015). Within common-
pool resource governance, conflicts are understood as the result of competition 
over resource-use, and thus reveal different material and economic interests of 
stakeholders (Adams et al., 2003, Atieno et al., 2015). Accordingly, common-pool 
resource governance frameworks recommend the implementation of conflict-
resolution mechanisms that clarify resource-use rights, and adjudicate disputes 
related to resource-use (Ostrom et al., 1994: 11, Mascia et al.,2017: 102). 
However, this understanding may be too narrow and short-sighted as not all 
conflicts around protected areas are necessarily economic in nature. Competition 
over power, influence and values might also constitute important conflict causes 
and drivers (Jones et al., 2005; Young et al.,2010). The conceptualisation of 
conflicts within this study is based on Galtung’s definitions of manifest 
(observable) and latent (invisible) dimensions of conflict (Galtung, 1991).  
Following Young et al. (2010: 3979) and Jones et al. (2005:6-8), six broad 
categories of conflicts associated with conservation (often overlapping with one 
another) can be identified: 
1. Conflicts over beliefs and values (e.g. conservation vs. socio-economic 
development) 
2. Conflicts of interest (e.g. social needs vs. ecological needs) 
3. Conflicts over processes (e.g. decision-making, conflict resolution) 
4. Conflicts over information (e.g. lack of data, misunderstandings in 
communication) 
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5. Structural conflicts (referring to social, legal, economic or cultural 
arrangements) 
6. Inter-personal conflicts (personal differences between individuals or 
groups, including issues of communication and mistrust) 
Keeping these manifold dimensions of conflicts in mind, this study aims at 
elucidating potential causes and drivers of conflicts in Lobéké National Park and 
its buffer zone. To aid the examination of conflicts, the study team used analytical 
tools, i.e. the ABC-Triangle and the PIN-Tool (see Annex 5).  
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4 Methods and data collection 
This research is grounded in a qualitative case-study approach to 
accommodate in-depth, exploratory research (Stake, 1995, George and Bennett, 
2005). The case-study approach serves two purposes: first, to illuminate the 
challenges to an effective and equitable governance of LNP in depth, and second, 
to provide insights (if possible) into issues pertaining to protected area - 
governance in general. 
Foregrounding lived experience and immersion into the field, the research 
team spent six weeks on site (see Annex 3). Living in the field supported a focus on 
everyday practices and lived realities - essential to account for the overarching 
research goal (analysis of the current situation). Furthermore, it enabled persistent 
contact with the team’s various interlocutors, which was important to establish 
trust. 
4.1 Methods 
During fieldwork, the research team collected qualitative data using different 
methods for triangulation- purposes: 
▪ Semi-structured interviews (N= 40): The research team conducted 40 
interviews with members of the park management, employees of private 
companies and with civil society actors. The interviews were semi- 
structured, meaning that key topics and questions where identified 
beforehand, but used (or not) according to the exigencies of the situation. 
This allowed interviewees to come up with their own questions, remarks, 
and answers to questions that have not been posed (Kvale, 1996), thus 
allowing the emergence of information that structured interviews would 
hide (Fontana and Frey, 1994). Interviewees were selected based on four 
criteria: relevance for the study, ability to provide information, accessibility, 
and willingness to partake in an interview. The times and places of 
interviews were co-jointly scheduled with the interviewees. To avoid 
influences by third parties, interviews were held in non-open spaces, e.g. 
the interviewees’ offices. With the consent of the interviewee, interviews 
were recorded. 
▪ Community Meetings (N= 10): In total, 10 community meetings were 
convened in eight locations. Serving as entrance points into the 
communities, these meetings drew on a large pool of opinions and allowed 
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to capture the dominant ‘majority think’. Furthermore, they helped to 
assess group dynamics and to uncover potential (dis-) agreements. 
▪ Focus group discussions (FGD, N= 21): During the research, the team 
conducted eighteen FGD with community members and three FGD with 
eco- guards. FGD help to encourage participation from interlocutors that 
otherwise are reluctant to partake in a one-to-one interview (Kitzinger, 
1995: 300). FGD were conducted in homogenous and heterogenous groups. 
Criteria of participant selection included gender, age, class, and ethnicity. 
While the dynamics within heterogenous groups allowed to assess group 
dynamics and levels of disagreement, homogenous composition allowed to 
foreground the voices of marginalized groups (i.e. women and Baka). 
▪ PhotoVoice interviews (N= 20): Twenty PhotoVoice - interviews in five 
communities (Mambele, Salapoumbe, Libongo, Socambo, and Zega) were 
conducted. PhotoVoice is a participative, visual research method that 
utilizes photography as an interview tool. Participants were selected 
following five criteria: gender, age, ethnicity (see Figure 2), willingness, and 
availability. They were asked to “document the important aspects of your 
life, with five positive photos, and five negative photos”, and given a digital 
camera for the duration of approximately two days, followed by individual 
in- depth interviews. Guided by the participant, PhotoVoice is a subjective 
method that illuminates aspects that the individual wishes to portray and 
discuss. It allows participants to document their life conditions as they 
perceive them, helping “to elicit rich data about the lived experience” 
(Plunkett, Leipert and Ray, 2013:157). 
 
 
Figure 2: PhotoVoice Participants Characteristics 
Source: own illustration  
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▪ Field Walks (N= 8): The research team went on eight field- walks, during 
which one to two members of a community were accompanied to their 
agricultural fields or community forests to assess land usage and quality, 
and incidentally engaged in informal conversations. 
▪ Geographic Information System (GIS): Observations from field walks and 
data from the Cameroonian Forest Atlas by MINFOF and the World 
Resources Institute (WRI), the map service of the Central Africa Regional 
Program for the Environment (CARPE) by USAID, satellite data (e.g. 
Landsat), and information from OpenStreetmap have been fed into a GIS. 
The system was used to facilitate an understanding and overview of the 
project area, to check information from third sources, to choose the 
research sites and to generate the maps used in this report. 
▪ Theatre of the Oppressed (N= 10): The research team conducted eight 
“Theatres of the Oppressed” and two day- long theatre workshops with 
members of four communities (Mambele, Nkoulou, Zega, and Dioula). The 
‘Theater of the Oppressed’ is an interactive, creative method allowing 
people to act out conflict situations on stage, guided by a facilitator (Boal, 
2001). These improvised theatres help to reveal the positions, attitudes, 
feelings, and motivations of conflict parties. They are an expression of 
typified experiences or feelings, often exaggerated or caricatured to make 
them comprehensible and evident to the audience. 
The research team facilitated the theatres by introducing an opening 
situation, i.e. “You are in the forest. Two eco-guards approach. What 
happens?”. Actors were chosen from the audience and invited to freely and 
spontaneously act out the scene by taking on the roles of the conflict 
parties. The scenes were visually documented to be jointly discussed with 
the actors and the audience after the play. The research team employed 
the method to illuminate the conflict between the local population and the 
eco- guards (see Table 8 and Table 9), but also studied intra- community 
conflicts, i.e. between Baka and Bantu (see Table 10). 
▪ Stakeholder Workshops (N= 2): One workshop with local stakeholders in 
Mambélé (50 participants) and one workshop with national stakeholders in 
Yaoundé (20 participants) were conducted. The purpose of the workshops 
was twofold: first, to present research findings and to listen to the different 
stakeholders’ related concerns. Second, to jointly develop 
recommendations to tackle identified problems (Annex 13). Participants in 
Mambélé were chosen following three criteria: ethnic group, community, 
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and availability. Participants in Yaoundé were chosen following four 
criteria: relevance for LNP governance, influence, expertise, and 
availability. 
The discussions among participants and developed recommendations 
serve as important data- sources for this study. In Mambélé, participants 
had to prioritize their five most preferred workshop- topics, which were 
discussed in randomly selected small- groups using the “Carusell”- 
method13. At the end of the workshop, the discussions of the different small 
groups were presented to the entire plenum by chosen representatives. 
Every participant received a copy of the workshop- results. In Yaoundé, 
participants were randomly allocated to different groups to develop 
recommendations for the topics chosen by the participants in Mambélé14. 
Time constraints inhibited the use of the Carusell- method; instead, one 
small group focused on one topic each, and presented their results to the 
plenum at the end of the workshop. Each participant received a copy of the 
workshop- results from Mambélé.  
▪ Participant Observation: Participant observation helps to access “non- 
verbal knowledge” that cannot be conveyed by oral accounts (Kawulich, 
2005). By observing people’s actions and listening to informal 
conversations, the study- team was able to orient research in the field. In 
addition, information obtained in interviews and FGDs were triangulated 
with accounts of participant observation. For example, the discrimination 
of Baka by Bantu was frequently observed by the study- team, but rarely 
directly mentioned in interviews. 
To clarify meaning and to cross- verify interpretation, the empirical data 
obtained via these methods was additionally triangulated with 15 expert 
interviews conducted in Yaoundé as well as a review of policy reports and 
academic journal articles. All data gathered was listed and converted into code for 
citation within the text (see Annex 4).  
                                                        
13 The topics were discussed for thirty minutes each and moderated by two team- members. After thirty 
minutes, the small groups moved on to the next topic. As a result, every group had the opportunity to 
discuss all five topics. 
14 One of the topics could not be covered due to the small number of participants. 
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4.2 Data Analysis 
To account for the explorative character of the study, the team employed an 
iterative strategy of content analysis to discover information gaps and to explore 
new themes while in the field. Practically, this meant that the collected data 
underwent a preliminary analysis while in LNP to guide further data collection 
processes. Data analysis involved the categorisation of the empirical data into 
certain topics or key questions, which were further explored to assess their 
congruence with the reality on the ground. In addition, the research team 
triangulated the data and exchanged information in regular team- meetings to 
explore possible contradictions or information overlaps. 
4.3 Research Assistance 
The research team employed two Cameroonian counterparts (one male and 
one female) for general research assistance and translation. They were chosen 
based on the following criteria: language skills (French and English), knowledge of 
conservation and protected areas, gender, soft skills (flexibility, adaptability, 
cultural sensitivity, communication skills), willingness to stay in a remote area, 
and availability. The two assistants supported the team in all employed methods 
(interviews, community meetings, FGDs, PhotoVoice- interviews, theatres and 
workshops).  
As not all team- members were fluent in French, they additionally helped with 
direct translation. Direct translations are neither neutral nor complete, but always 
(selectively) interpreted by the translator (Temple, 2002). Therefore, the team 
worked closely with the assistants and discussed meanings, expressions, and 
concepts to ensure that there was no conflating of meanings or connotations. 
Nevertheless, parts of this report are as much product of the interpretations of the 
assistants as of the team. 
In addition, the research team sought advice and support from a consultant 
with a background in social anthropology to implement the PhotoVoice- method. 
She helped the team with logistical organisation, participant selection, and 
general guidance in implementing the method with vulnerable groups.  
4.4 Ethical Considerations 
As Stake put it, "qualitative researchers are guests in the private spaces of the 
world” (Stake, 2003: 154). Therefore, it was an ethical duty to the team to respect 
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the private spaces of the interlocutors and to behave in manners that were 
considered adequate and sensitive in the given socio-cultural context. 
Furthermore, the team applied a strict code of ethics. Informed consent was 
always obtained before collecting data (see Annex 2). 
To manage expectations, the team carefully explained that it is not attached to 
an NGO or any other development agency and has no mandate to change the 
reality on the ground. It was of great importance to the team to transparently 
convey its key findings to research participants and to carefully listen to their 
concerns regarding these findings. Therefore, two stakeholder workshops were 
organised, trying to involve as many representatives as possible. The team strictly 
maintains participant anonymity considering that “[t]hose whose lives and 
expressions are portrayed risk exposure and embarrassment, as well as a loss of 
standing, employment, and self- esteem” (Stake,2003: 154), and only provides 
personal information if relevant for the study’s intended purpose. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Park management 
 
Research Questions:  
How does the LNP management work and what can be improved? 
How are threats to biodiversity approached by the park management and in what 
way could these approaches be optimised? 
This chapter sheds light on the park’s management’s capacity and 
conservation performance by looking at its administrative organisation and 
staffing, funding and budgeting, working conditions of staff, and potential to 
generate revenues through ecotourism. Furthermore, it closely examines 
currently employed anti- poaching and resource extraction strategies and briefly 
reviews the collaboration between the three Trinational de la Sangha (TNS) parks. 
Finally, it provides an analysis of latent conflicts and infighting in its current co- 
management set- up that hamper effective collaboration. 
Identifying noticeable gaps in park management capacity (human and 
financial), the chapter supports recent findings that capacity gaps and weak 
ecological performance are likely related (Gill et al., 2017), but also highlights the 
importance of integrating local groups in conservation management, especially 
with regards to anti- poaching efforts. In addition, it underscores the necessity of 
clarifying managerial mandates and responsibilities to improve the current co- 
management set-up.  
5.1.1 Administrative Organisation and Staffing 
According to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
the term “co-management” describes a management where governmental and 
non-governmental actors share governance in a collaborative way. However, 
decision-making, authority and responsibility may rest with one agency only. The 
decision-making agency is obliged to inform or consult the other(s) (Dudley, 
2008). 
The three national parks forming the Trinational de la Sangha (TNS) have 
different forms of co-management. At present, LNP is managed by the 
Cameroonian Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) and by the World Wide 
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Fund for Nature (WWF). In this case, co-management becomes manifest in WWF 
giving financial and technical support to MINFOF, with the latter being the 
decision-making authority acting on behalf of the Cameroonian government. In 
the Dzanga-Sangha Protected Area (APDS), the ministry and WWF share 
governance and management. As opposed to LNP, every position from the 
Central African ministry has a counterpart position filled by a WWF employee. In 
contrast, in Nouabalé Ndoki National Park (NNNP), the Congolese State has 
delegated the management to a newly created foundation “Fondation Nouabalé 
Ndoki”, in which both the government and the NGO, the Wildlife Conservation 
Society (WCS) are represented. 
The term “park management” in this study refers to the management 
structure present on site at the LNP Headquarter in Mambélé, the so called 
“Service de Conservation”. It includes five units: (1) the Administration and 
Finance Unit dealing with operational matters, (2) the Surveillance Unit 
coordinating patrols and tasks of eco-guards, (3) the Unit for Ecological 
Monitoring and Research monitoring wildlife and maintaining databases, (4) the 
Unit for Co-Management and Eco-development ensures the involvement of other 
stakeholders and (5) the Ecotourism Unit responsible for sustainable development 
through tourism. The last two share the Sub-Unit Participation, which works with 
local communities and does awareness raising (see Figure 3). The Units are all led 
by the Conservator (MINFOF 2014; I16). Conservator, Unit Heads, and eco-guards 
are all employed by MINFOF. WWF is represented by the Programme Manager, 
has an employee filling the position Head of the Sub-Unit Participation and is 
active in the research unit. 
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Figure 3: Organisation chart of LNP Management (units/positions with 
WWF staff in green) 
Source: own illustration 
 
Currently, only three other WWF staffs than the ones mentioned above are 
present on site, namely a person responsible for logistics (cars and housing) and 
two volunteers. Due to financial reasons this is a mere fraction of the positions 
stated in the Management Plan (MINFOF, 2014: 60): 6 seniors, 7 juniors and 10 
maintenance and security staffs. It would be helpful if WWF had more experienced 
staff on site (aside from volunteers) to ensure sufficient consultation and technical 
support to MINFOF. Additionally, the decision-making system is based on a co-
signature, but the management staff consists mainly of MINFOF employees. On 
the other hand, there is no MINFOF employee officially working on participative 
management in LNP (only one person from WWF). As participation is an 
important element, the support of this unit with ministry personnel would be 
expected. 
While the Unit Head of Surveillance is filled by a professionally trained eco-
guard suitable for the role, the other Unit Heads appear to lack expertise and work 
experience. According to the management plan (MINFOF, 2014: 97), the Unit 
Head for Ecological Monitoring and Research needs to be an engineer / technical 
engineer of water and forests (“IEF” Ingenieur des Eaux et Forêts / “ITEF” 
Ingenieur des Techniques des Eaux et Forêts) or a technician specialised in fauna. 
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While this was the case, the experience in ecological monitoring and in scientific 
research appeared to be missing. The Unit Head stated that research is not very 
developed in LNP and that he wanted more researchers to come. He also requires 
a position for a veterinarian who monitors infectious diseases by sampling animal 
carcasses (I38). To make coordination of research and monitoring easier and to 
improve networking with research centres/universities and scientists interested in 
working in the park, a person with a background in biology in the position of Unit 
Head for Ecological Monitoring and Research is needed. Such a person would 
bring a more extensive research network and a better estimation of important 
research topics. The advantage of a more developed research team is, on the one 
hand, the possibility to monitor animal populations and infectious diseases - the 
latter can serve as an early warning system for example for Ebola outbreaks as it is 
done in APDS. On the other hand, it would bring guest researchers into the park 
who bring the same benefits as tourists (i.e. jobs for the local population, income). 
Furthermore, it would ameliorate the cooperation with researchers in the other 
TNS parks. 
The management plan (MINFOF, 2014:97) also states that the Unit Head for 
Ecotourism is required to have a higher technician diploma in tourism (“Brevet de 
Technicien Supérieur en tourisme”). However, the person in this position at the 
time of the study and the person preceding him both had a background in water 
and forest engineering and appeared to have only little knowledge of tourism 
development (I38). Employing an expert in the work field could help promoting 
ecotourism in LNP since he or she would be able to assess realistic potentials of 
Lobéké, improve its weaknesses, promote its visibility online, coordinate touristic 
activities and serve as a contact person for tourism industry and the other TNS 
parks. 
The Unit Head for Ecological Monitoring and Research and the Unit Head for 
Ecotourism exchanged positions in August 2018 just before the arrival of the 
research team. The reason remains unknown. This exchanging of positions 
indicates that the park management does not specifically ask for expertise in the 
different work fields. The new Unit Head for Ecotourism only stayed in his new 
position for several weeks and the position was vacant when the research team 
departed. In general, there is a constant fluctuation of staff within and outside 
LNP because employees get transferred to other national parks and are willing to 
leave as soon as another opportunity arises. Following eco- guards and experts, 
the premature transfer of people and constant exchange of staff leads to a loss of 
knowledge and hampers team- building efforts (I26; F16; E15).  
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The Conservator, being head of the park management, needs to give his 
agreement when decisions are made. He appoints an interim for each time he is 
absent i.e. when he leaves for meetings in distant cities. Even though someone 
represents him during that time, his absence hinders activities of the park 
management. Especially his WWF counterpart, the Programme Manager, is 
limited since decisions cannot be taken by WWF without the Conservator’s 
consent (I21). His absence also creates an inability to act upon MINFOF Unit 
Heads, which delays even simple decision making. For example, the research 
team was not able to obtain monitoring reports from the surveillance unit or the 
last fauna inventory results during his absence. On the other hand, employees 
working in surveillance state that the absence of the Conservator does not pose a 
problem as long as he is contactable. 
Finally, all Heads of Units are first and foremost eco-guards. They fulfil typical 
eco-guard’s tasks like going on patrols. Since Heads of Units are often in the field, 
they perceive themselves more as eco-guards than as head of their specific unit 
(I15; P26). The park management clearly concentrates on patrols for anti-
poaching. Consequently, work areas such as research and ecotourism play a minor 
role. 
 
Infobox 5: Local Distinction between WWF and MINFOF 
Communities do not distinguish between WWF, which is a civil society 
organisation and MINFOF, which is a governmental actor. For instance, if eco-
guards as state representatives act inappropriately, WWF is blamed. Only few 
people, like village chiefs, know the difference: the majority of the population 
appears to be unaware that WWF is only an advisor to MINFOF. A WWF 
representative in LNP did not think that this mix up poses a problem and 
believes it did not make a difference to the communities (I21). Indeed, 
participants of a community meeting claimed that the distinction was 
irrelevant: “We do not know the difference because they work together” (C9). 
However, a clear and visible distinction between WWF and MINFOF may 
change addressees of recent complaints on human rights violations and enable 
more differentiated and targeted appeals. 
 
5.1.2 Finance 
Lobéké National Park is financed by the Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund 
(FTNS), several international donors (NGOs) and by MINFOF. The Trust Fund was 
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established in 2007 with the aim to contribute to long-term financing of 
conservation and eco-development in the TNS area. The current endowment of 
the trust fund was mainly provided by the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) via KfW, and the French Development 
Agency (AFD), and amounted to € 49.4 million at the end of 2018 (FTNS, 2017; 
2018). The revenues of the endowment fund should contribute sustainably to the 
park management but are only used for LNP as of 2019. From 2009 to 2018, LNP 
received a total amount of 1.86 million EUR through project financing, 75% of it as 
of 2016 (KfW, personal communication, March 21,2019).  
This amount underscores LNP’s extreme funding deficit – unfortunately, a 
usual problem of protected areas in developing countries (Bruner, Gullison and 
Balmford, 2004)15 and the Congo- Basin (Wilkie, Carpenter and Zhang, 2001). 
Both WWF and KfW experts in Germany consider the current funding of LNP too 
low; following a WWF expert, LNP requires at least one to two million euros/year 
(WWF, personal communication, December 11th, 2018).  
 
Infobox 6: Activities to be financed by international donors in 2018 (e.g. 
WWF Germany, US Fish and Wildlife Service) 
Daily patrols, provision of access to drinking water and electricity in the buffer 
zone, awareness raising, wildlife monitoring, census of medium sized and large 
mammals (“inventaire faunique”), monitoring of bushmeat consumption, 
gorilla semi-habituation programme (Parc National de Lobéké, 2017). 
 
In addition to German financing, other projects have been financed via FTNS 
by institutions like the European Union via the Center for UNESCO World 
Heritage or the Congo Basin Forest Fund. As national financing is scarce, LNP 
relies – like almost all central African protected areas – on international donors 
such as KfW to cover its running costs (I23). 
 
                                                        
15 Following Bruner et al., the lower and upper bounds of recurrent management costs for all existing 
protected areas in developing countries are $1.1 billion and $2.5 billion, respectively. Even the higher 
estimate does not include the costs for development projects and compensation payments 
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Infobox 7: Elements planned to be financed via FTNS 
Housing for eco-guards, field equipment, tourist viewing platforms, 
delimitation of the park borders, patrols and control posts, bonuses for staff, 
management of ZICGC, committee meetings (Parc National de Lobéké, 2017). 
In 2017, only about 50% of planned activities were implemented (FTNS,2017). 
 
In the last years, FTNS provided the largest share of LNP’s funding (KfW, 
personal communication, March 21, 2019). Still, the financing mechanism is 
perceived as being expensive and complicated with regards to its rather lengthy 
procedures to request funding (I32; I30; P67). 
In Cameroon, LNP and therefore MINFOF as manager of the protected area, is 
the main beneficiary of subventions. These subventions are used together by 
MINFOF and WWF (double signature) in the way that WWF provides technical 
support and co-manages FTNS expenses to ensure good governance of financial 
flows (MoU MINFOF-FTNS-WWF).  
Further donors of LNP are WWF Germany, US Fish and Wildlife Services 
(recently withdrew from further funding), Japan Monkey Centre and Africa 
Biodiversity Collaborative Group. Their funding is managed by WWF. Financing by 
international donors is used to finance a proportion of the protection programme, 
the participation and eco-development programme and the research and 
ecological monitoring programme. MINFOF solely covers the salaries of its own 
staff (eco-guards) and does not fund any programme activities (Parc National de 
Lobéké, 2017). 
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Figure 4: Shares of budget16 contribution to LNP by partners 
Source: Parc National de Lobéké, 2017; own illustration 
Figure 5: Proportions of planned FTNS budget for the five LNP 
programmes17 in 2018 
Source: Parc National de Lobéké, 2017; own illustration 
5.1.3 Working Conditions 
Motivated and well-trained staff is a vital component of efficient park 
management (Gill et al., 2017). However, interviews and focus group discussions 
showed that LNP employees are evidently demotivated, likely influencing their 
16 The LNP Budget Plan 2018 depicts not actual, but planned income and expenditures. Like LNP 
management plans, annual budget plans often vary substantially (up to 50%) from the amounts that 
are realised at the end of the year. Therefore, the actual FTNS financing is likely much smaller than the 
share displayed in Figure 5 (KfW, personal communication, March 21, 2019) 
17 Five programmes: (1) programme for administration and infrastructure, (2) programme for protection, 
(2) programme for participation and eco-development, (4) programme for research and ecological
monitoring, (5) programme for transboundary management
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work performance and attitude towards the park, e.g. thoroughness of patrols 
and interaction with local resource users. The research revealed that current living 
and working conditions, e.g. poor housing, long separation from family members, 
and allegedly missing payments of bonuses, negatively affect their work attitude. 
 
 
Image 1: Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) seized from wildlife traffickers 
during an eco-guard patrol 
Photo: May Hokan 
 
Eco-guards are recruited in the capital city Yaoundé and sent to work in 
Lobéké., Travel from the capital to Lobéké takes two to three days, and some 
employees even come from further away. No employee of the park management 
comes from Mambélé. The situation could be different as compared to APDS and 
Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park (NNNP). These two neighbouring parks have the 
possibility to hire eco-guards locally. Local eco-guards and other employees can 
thus live at home with their families (M4; I30). Opposed to that, employees in 
Lobéké have all moved to the area without having the option to bring along close 
family members. This is mainly due to the housing situation. Housing provided by 
the park to its employees is poor: the houses are small, there is no electricity, 
sanitary facilities are dilapidated. Employees complain that they cannot receive 
visiting family members under these conditions. One eco-guard expressed his 
discontent as such: “We live here like monkeys” (M3). Combined with limited 
communication possibilities (weak internet connection, almost no network 
coverage) and lack of public transport (F16), living conditions appear inadequate 
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for civil servants, and are an omnipresent subject. Evidently, they affect work 
motivation negatively, as one employee clearly expressed: “When people are sent 
to work there [LNP] it is perceived as a punishment” (I15). Improving the living 
situation of park employees is likely to encourage them and have a positive 
influence on efficiency. Currently, a reconstruction of the eco-guards’ houses is 
under way. 
 
 
Image 2: Latrines of Eco- Guards 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, Male) (PV2) 
He took the picture to show the latrines of eco-guards, a simple wooden construction. He is 
angry: “State employees like us have to use them". He says that the latrines are dirty, not well 
constructed, and that at least eight people have to share them. “You understand now why I 
cannot bring my girlfriend here" 
 
The current handling of length of leaves is another aspect showing that 
working-conditions are not well adapted to the living situation in LNP. As civil 
servants, eco-guards can take leaves for up to three days for pressing occasions or 
emergencies in addition to vacation. However, these leaves are far too short for 
travelling to the capital (one way takes a minimum of two days) or to their 
hometowns. As a result, eco-guards are often absent longer than permitted, 
accepting potential sanctions (F20). This does not only affect motivation but can 
also have a negative impact on conservation work such as patrol planning.  
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Image 3: WWF Car 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, Male) (PV1) 
The picture shows a car of WWF. He took the picture to illustrate his difficulties to move 
around. He would like to visit friends and family or go to the village in the evening, but he 
does not own a car and cannot move around freely. It takes him at least two days, normally 3-
4 days, to visit his family. 
 
Furthermore, eco-guards claim that bonuses (“prime de saisi”) for seized illegal 
objects, such as cable snares, weapons and endangered wildlife are not paid or not 
paid in time (F16). Bonuses have the purpose of rewarding eco-guards for their 
work, e.g. collecting a high number of cable snares in the forest and are a viable 
tool for increasing work motivation and, in turn, efficiency. Bonuses that are not 
paid regularly fail to do both and have the opposite effect.  
It has to be kept in mind that bonuses could have negative side effects, such as 
the seizing of objects in a legal context: for example, if the prospect of a bonus 
leads to claims that hunting weapons or porcupines seized within the community 
were seized inside the national park. This can be avoided by limiting bonuses to 
objects that are illegal in every context (cable snares, war weapons, protected 
species). Additionally, it must be ensured that the bonus does not exceed the 
value of the confiscated object (difficult e.g. with cable snares) to avoid the 
incentive of fraud.  
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Image 4: Poste de Garde 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, Male) (PV2) 
The picture shows la "poste de garde" where eco-guards guard the entrance to the office: 
“The eco-guards have to work there the whole night". He says that the house is empty, there 
are not even any chairs inside: "The people who work there have nothing.” When asked if he 
ever complained, he says: “You know the management plan, how it should be. It is not like 
this. But we are functionaries, a bit like the military. We do not complain". 
 
5.1.4 Ecotourism 
Ecotourism can provide economic resources that benefit both park 
management and local communities. The number of charismatic and partly 
endemic species (forest elephants, lowland gorillas, grey parrots) and the unique 
landscape (primary rainforest) in the Congo Basin harbour a high potential for 
ecotourism. At the same time, the region is the least developed tourism 
destination in Africa (Yunis, 2003). Political instability, low economic growth and 
the remoteness of the area have hindered the development of touristic activities.  
The number of visitors in LNP started rising in 2008 but then remained 
relatively low with only 96 visitors in 2016 (Table 3). Most likely, the reasons for 
this low number are the political instability of the area as well as poor 
infrastructure and accessibility of the park. It is a long journey from Yaoundé to 
LNP, taking two to three days on a poor road with few hotels on the way. For 
tourists coming from one of the other two TNS parks, the journey is relatively 
easier (one day from Bangui to APDS by car and there is the possibility to take an 
aeroplane). 
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Djembe, a campsite on the riverside in the southern part of LNP, is accessible 
by motorboat from Bayanga (CAR) within about five hours and from Bomassa 
(Congo) within only 30 minutes. Unfortunately, tourists have to pass the 
Cameroonian border inspection post in Libongo (north of the Park) or Socambo 
(south of the Park) for Visa control (see Map 5) before being allowed to enter. 
Additionally, park visitors currently have to go to LNP’s main office in Mambélé, 
which is a several hours car ride from both Socambo and Libongo. These 
administrative obstacles are unfortunate: Djembe has the best touristic potential 
of all sites in LNP due to its rich wildlife and its location in proximity to the Sangha 
River and NNNP. The swarms of grey parrots and green pigeons observable in one 
of the baïs are a great tourist attraction. Indeed, Djembe used to have a touristy 
infrastructure with five wooden huts and a restaurant, but the site was abandoned 
due to the presence of poachers and had to be “re-conquered” (I23). In the 
process, a bridge connecting it to LNPs Headquarter was burned down. As a 
consequence, Djembe is currently only accessible by boat (I23; I21; P7). The poor 
accessibility of LNP may lead to a loss of potential visitors.  
Trans-boundary visas for visitors of the TNS landscape are planned (I23; E13). 
Tourists would only need one visa for all three countries if they enter and exit the 
tri-national area at the same point, facilitating their movement within the TNS 
landscape. Congo and CAR have already signed the agreement. If the third 
country, Cameroon, would sign it as well, it would potentially increase tourist 
numbers once Djembe is rebuilt and invested in. 
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Map 5: Touristic potential along Sangha river 
Source: MINFOF Cameroon, WWF Cameroon, OpenStreetmaps and contributors (CC BY-SA), 
own data 
 
Table 3: Numbers of visitors in LNP and APDS in the years 2008-2016 
Protected area 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2016 
LNP 25 55 120 128 92 92 51 96 
APDS 655 547 577 450 383 - 92 187 
Source: MINFOF, 2014; P11 
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5.1.5 Anti-Poaching Strategy 
The demand for food (bush meat, agricultural products), timber and Non-
Timber-Forest-Products is challenging the management of common-pool 
resources (I21, I22). Poaching is one of the greatest threats to wildlife 
conservation world-wide (Moore et al., 2018). More precisely, threats derive from 
illegal subsistence hunting, opportunistic poaching as well as commercial and 
organised cross-border trophy harvesting often facilitated by corruption, 
patronage networks and weak judicial systems (Haenlein and Smith, 2016). 
Around LNP, bushmeat is considered a staple food for both Bantu and Baka alike 
due to an absence of other protein sources (Fa et al., 2016). Under certain 
conditions (see Infobox 8, Image 5 and Table 4) that shall support the 
management of common-pool-resources, subsistence hunting and the 
consumption of bushmeat is legal and commonly referred to under the term 
“usage rights”. 
 
Infobox 8: Animal classes 
In Cameroon, animals are categorised in classes A, B and C. Class A animals are 
forbidden to hunt. Class B animals can only be hunted with a permission (e.g. 
by safari companies). All other animals automatically belong to Class C and 
can be hunted for own consumption, but not for commercial purposes 
(Republic of Cameroon, 1994, Art. 78; 2006, Art. 2, 3).  
The classifications and respectively the hunting quotas are changed regularly 
in line with the latest MINFOF inventories (I10). Flawed quotas however pose a 
threat to biodiversity as was the case for the NNNP area (I33). 
 
The preferably hunted ungulates are however overharvested and hunting may 
soon not be able to meet the subsistence and economic needs of the local 
population. In combination with limited subsistence hunting zones, this likely 
causes hunting success to be less frequent, forcing people to shift to other species, 
to hunt with non-sustainable techniques (e.g. night hunting, where type of species 
and sex are not discernible) and illegal gear (cable snares, firearms) or to 
penetrate further into the forest (Fa et al. 2016; Bobo et al. 2015). Considering the 
above, a sustainable wildlife management including anti-poaching activities is 
justified and necessary both for conservation and to maintain bushmeat as a food 
source for the local population. 
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Image 5: Picture of animal classes 
Photo: Julia Maria Bayer 
 
Generally, the park management deals with two types of poaching: 
professional large-scale poaching and small-scale poaching. Large-scale poaching 
(locally referred to as “la grande chasse”) usually targets bigger animals such as 
bongos, buffalos or elephants mostly to economise trophies (e.g. ivory). It is often 
carried out with heavy weapons, e.g. AK47. With regards to large-scale poaching, 
the border area constitutes a special challenge for conservation due to an influx of 
weapons from the formerly war-torn neighbouring countries CG and CAR. The 
latter is currently still considered to be in a state of civil war (I24, M3). 
Three eco-guard missions involved shootings18 with heavily armed offenders 
since March 2015. Nevertheless, elephant carcasses are found more frequently 
(I23; Brigade de Tri-national de la Sangha 2016 I, II & 2017, I, II, III). Large-scale 
poaching is often carried out on behalf of professional sellers and middlemen 
pulling the strings in the background. Interviewees indicated that Baka (and 
Bayaka in CAR) also engage in big game hunting, although only as “stooges” and 
not as the driving force (I30). This may reason from their local knowledge of the 
forests and from their greater hunting success with firearms in comparison to 
                                                        
18 During those incidents one eco-guard was killed and one paralysed (I23) 
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their Bantu neighbours (Fa et al. 2016). In any case, identifying the real 
responsible remains a challenge (I2, I16).  
 
Table 4: Hunting rules 
Hunting type Zone Tool 
Authorisation 
required 
Animal 
Class 
Season 
Subsistence  
Hunting  
(own 
consumption) 
Non-permanent 
forests (around 
the village a 
hunter lives in) 
Traditional 
weapons made 
from natural 
materials 19 
No C All year 
Commercial 
Hunting (“permis 
de collecte”) 
Non-permanent 
forests 
Firearms Yes20 B, C January 
to June 
Sports/ Trophy 
Hunting 
(managed by  
touristic Safari 
companies) 
ZIC, ZICGC Firearms Yes B, C January 
to June 
Source: Republic of Cameroon, 1994, Art. 78; 1995b, Art.2 Nr. 21; 1995b, Section II, IV; I5, I15, 
I23; 2000a 
                                                        
19 According to Fa et al. (2016), only indigenous hunters occasionally use traditional hunting techniques and 
weapons; Bantu only use cable snares and firearms  
20 Several official documents are needed to obtain the authorisation at a cost of XAF~150.000 per season 
(I15). The bureaucratic burden and cost hinder most people from getting authorised.  
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Map 6: Trophy hunting - zones and research sites 
Source: MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data 
 
The vast majority of poaching incidents in LNP and its buffer zone falls into the 
category of small-scale poaching (mostly with cable snares), i.e. hunting of class C 
animals – for subsistence or commercial purposes – without respecting the 
regulations described in Table 4. Small-scale poachers are reported to be mainly 
villagers from the Lobéké buffer zone and include Baka and Bantu (I16, I23).  
To combat both small- and large-scale poaching, the park management 
follows a common approach of firstly promoting restraints for harvest and 
consumption (“soft power”) and secondly safeguarding wild species (“hard 
power”) (Fa et al., 2016). 
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Image 6: Eco- Guards killed on duty 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, Male) (PV2)  
The participant took a picture of photographs of comrades that died while in service. He says 
that it is “not normal" that eco-guards are killed on duty: “We are not the army”. Following 
the participant, these incidents show that being an eco-guard is a dangerous job: poachers 
shoot as soon as eco-guards approach. He says that they need better material, for example 
bullet-proof vests: “When we are in the forest, we are practically naked". 
 
Promoting restraints (“soft power”) 
The park management is implementing an awareness raising program on the 
dangers of heavy war weapons, carried out by WWF staff in Mambélé. The project 
tries to encourage villagers to voluntarily hand in weapons and ammunition. In 
return, people are granted amnesty (I14, I19). The sub-prefects of Moloundou and 
Salapoumbé supported the propagation of this concept. To date, 22 weapons 
have been handed in (I39). For 2019 it is foreseen to elaborate the project further, 
e.g. to an exchange of weapons for nutrition (I19).  
On a more abstract level, the park management campaigns against poaching 
and raises awareness about other illegal forest exploitation. For instance, MINFOF 
and WWF employees inform the residents of the buffer zone about the rules 
outlined in Table 4 (I17). In many villages, posters have been put up to educate 
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people about the animal classes and there are road signs demarcating the limits of 
the national park. Boundaries between the agroforestry zone and the logging 
concessions area said to be clearly visible (I15, P23). This could however not be 
verified. 
 
Infobox 9: COVAREF and COVILAB 
The Comité de Valorisation des Ressources Fauniques (COVAREF) is a 
community committee who manages the community hunting zones (ZICGC, 
see Chapter 5.2.6). COVAREFs are usually accompanied by a Comité Villageois 
Lutte Anti-Braconnage (COVILAB) that shall support the COVAREF and the 
park management with awareness raising activities and the provision of 
intelligence around poaching in their concession (I10). 
 
Raising awareness and explaining why poaching is forbidden and what usage 
rights the local population has ideally helps to prevent poaching (I22). The park 
management’s continuous awareness raising is crucial to create an understanding 
for conservation. However, the abundance21 of small-scale poaching around LNP 
proves that its effectiveness is limited. A logging company employee responsible 
for community work stated that despite educational efforts, people would not 
understand why they are allowed to hunt an animal in one area, but not in the 
other; or why they can hunt one species, but not a very similar one that is hard to 
distinguish from the other22 (I6). On top of that, the current awareness raising 
strategy follows a top-down approach with park management officials promoting 
law enforcement without incorporating the people’s needs into the strategy and 
without engaging them in a dialogue on a par. So far, community involvement 
only takes place indirectly through the “Comités Villageois Lutte Anti-
Braconnage” (COVILAB) (I10). 
Another likely reason for the lack of success is that awareness raising measures 
are by nature not able to address the root causes of poaching, namely poverty and 
lack of formal employment. It can merely serve to educate on existing laws. 
Poaching however is sometimes the only means for the local population to earn a 
                                                        
21 A safari company operating in ZIC 9 and ZIC 30 found 2900 cable snares in August 2018 alone (I24) 
22 For instance, the Peter’s duiker is categorised Class B and illegal to be hunted for subsistence, whereas 
the similar looking blue duiker may be hunted for subsistence (Republic of Cameroon, 1998; 2006). 
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living or to provide for their family – despite the risk of getting arrested (F11, F17, 
I22). People will likely continue to engage in poaching or illegal logging and 
mining without formal jobs (I3, I6, I12, I22, I37). This leads to circumstances where 
the local population is often fully aware of the illegality of poaching but is 
simultaneously forced to continue with it due to a lack of alternatives. A man from 
Libongo spoke of the risky nature of illegal hunting that finally made him stop: "I 
saw the consequences of poaching". Now he is a fisherman but earns so little that 
he considers poaching as an option again (F12). LNP eco-guards are aware of the 
dilemma and some regret that they cannot provide the local population with any 
alternative to hunting (F16, F20).  
Moreover, convincing people to stop poaching is considered especially 
challenging in an area where the consumption of bushmeat is deeply rooted in the 
culture and habits of locals. However, interviewees still believed that in the long 
term, eating habits could be changed if there is access to other food sources (I12, 
I27). The local population often expressed the desire to receive support for 
livestock keeping (PV18, PV19; see Image 7), but previous efforts promoting 
livestock breeding were not successful (F17). Still, it is advisable to support 
livelihood strategies in the park’s buffer zone that are not based on bushmeat 
hunting. Without real alternatives, raising awareness is an inadequate and 
insufficient tool to combat poaching. In addition, current awareness raising efforts 
should be designed in a more participatory way. The success of such campaigns is 
demonstrably enhanced when local people from the community act as facilitators 
themselves (Gounden, n.d.). 
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Image 7: Goats 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, male, 45 years) (PV18) 
According to the participant, animal husbandry is useful for consumption and income 
generation. “Nowadays, the Muslims keep livestock, but we [the Baka] would like to do it as 
well. Conservation has to help us with that; otherwise we will look for meat in the forest.” 
 
Protecting wildlife (“hard power”) 
The park management contains a Surveillance Unit carrying out missions to 
protect and safeguard wildlife. At the moment, 52 eco-guards employed by 
MINFOF are working in the Lobéké buffer zone and carry out three types of 
patrols: pedestrian, fluvial (on the Sangha, Boumba and Ngoko rivers) and 
motorised patrols on road axes (F16, F20, I16; Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Implemented missions according to type 
Source: Parc National de Lobéké, 2018 
 
Patrols (usually a team of 5 eco-guards) take place in both the LNP core zone 
and the buffer zone, where eco-guards support private enterprises23 and 
COVILABs in their anti-poaching missions (I13, I16, I22, I25). Generally, the park’s 
core zone and especially the clearings (called “baïs”) are prioritised in the park’s 
anti-poaching strategy. The baïs have a particular high wildlife potential (large 
mammals) and are therefore a likely target for poachers. To protect biodiversity 
more efficiently, the Surveillance Unit uses the Spatial Monitoring and Reporting 
Tool (SMART) to collect data on wildlife, to monitor illegal activities and to 
manage and plan future patrol routes (I16, I38, SMART, 2017). In addition to 
patrols, eco-guards carry out road checkpoints and control strategic road 
crossings (in collaboration with the gendarmerie) in search of illegal wildlife 
traffickers (I16, P50). 
Dynamic patrols based on spatiotemporal data – as employed by LNP – are 
crucial for wildlife protection. The tactic to increase patrols in high poaching areas 
while still maintaining a presence in low-disturbance areas corresponds with 
practices of other PAs (Critchlow et al., 2015). Eco-guards themselves assessed 
the impact of patrols as positive with regards to a successful wildlife protection. It 
was argued that only few heavily armed poachers are encountered, and the influx 
                                                        
23 Armed poachers can be a threat to employees. Thus, the private sector engages in anti-poaching efforts 
(I3, I12, I25) 
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of illegal hunting materials and weapons has been limited due to their work; 
poaching camps have been destroyed and poachers arrested. There are seizures 
of weapons and bush meat, and snares24 are constantly dismantled (F16, F20, Parc 
National de Lobéké, 2018). 
These achievements contribute to stable populations of great apes and bongos 
in LNP and its buffer zone. Nevertheless, 80 species and sub-species of mammals 
are already threatened by overharvesting in the Congo Basin and require strict 
conservation, above all the forest elephant (MINFOF,2015; Bobo et al., 2015).  
 
 
Figure 7: Elephant population 2002 - 2015 
Source: MINFOF, 2015: 21 
 
The latest inventory carried out in summer 2018 is yet to prove if the 
surveillance efforts could stop the number of elephants from plummeting in and 
around LNP25 (see Figure 7; MINFOF, 2015). In view of the above, the park 
management’s surveillance efforts should be improved where possible and some 
shortcomings, which are explained in the following, certainly hinder more 
effective anti-poaching missions. 
During the research, it was often claimed that the number of 52 eco-guards 
was insufficient to protect wildlife in LNP and its buffer zone (M3, I16). According 
                                                        
24 Snares are an unsustainable hunting tool and disastrous for wildlife as they trap many different species 
and kill animals of all ages and sex (Lion Aid, 2014). 
25 The elephants may have been poached or they may have migrated to other areas (I31) 
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to the IUCN standard of 1 ranger per 5000ha, the current number is sufficient to 
protect the LNP core zone including the community zone (MINFOF, 2014).  
However, taking into account that eco-guards also work in a buffer zone that is 
more than twice the size of the park’s core zone, the current number falls short by 
82 eco-guards. Therefore, interventions in the buffer zone are currently only 
implemented if eco-guards can be spared on the baïs (I16). This may be a reason 
why a safari company in the north of LNP turns to the military for support in anti-
poaching activities instead of MINFOF eco-guards (I24). The local population, too, 
experiences more frequent and stricter controls in the vicinity to LNP 
headquarters and less around remote villages, which is mirrored in the compliance 
of the people with the law: the stronger the presence of eco-guards in an area, the 
lower the incidents of poaching (P44). An expert from DSNP however argues that 
“it is not a matter of quantity, but quality”, which is why he supports a reduction of 
patrolling days in DSNP to increase motivation and to enable a more thorough 
investigation of individual poaching cases (I30).  
To formulate a recommendation, the question on the appropriate numbers of 
eco-guards must first be discussed with regards to another shortcoming: the 
participation of the local population in surveillance tasks. The park management’s 
wildlife protection measures do not include the local population. Neither Bantu 
nor Baka participate in patrols or controls and there is no attempt to integrate 
them into the park’s wildlife protection strategy in the future. This is especially 
noteworthy as patrols are at the core of the park management’s work and as 
employment opportunities are scarce and sought by the local population (F13).  
Elsewhere it is common to include the local population in anti-poaching 
activities to generate income from wildlife and to create buy-in for conservation 
efforts (Big Life Foundation, n.d.). In DSNP for instance, village rangers will be 
trained in the near future to secure the forests around their communities and in 
NNNP rangers are entirely recruited locally (I30, M4). A pilot anti-poaching project 
in Zimbabwe’s Lower Zambezi involving marginalised women (“Akashinga”) has 
shown great success in integrating the multiple goals of conservation, economic 
development and female empowerment (Goergen, 2018; Barbee, 2017; IAPF, 
2019). Involving locals in enforcement and monitoring has also shown to be a 
significant factor in protecting vegetation density and forest cover (Ostrom and 
Hayer, 2005: 616).  
The only minor community involvement around LNP however takes place 
through the COVILABs (I10, I16). For specific interventions and on demand, the 
COVILAB can be supported by LNP eco-guards. However, this collaboration is 
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volatile and does not sustainably support the surveillance and conservation 
capacities of the COVILAB members (I5, I10, I23). Therefore, it is strongly 
recommended to assess possibilities how to include the local population into 
environmental protection as is already the case for other protected areas.  
For instance, the local population could participate in current wildlife 
protection efforts in form of unarmed local village rangers26 to (1) overcome the 
deficient numbers of eco-guards in the buffer zone (2) to increase the detection of 
illegal activities, (3) to provide an alternative income source for locals, and (4) to 
reduce incentives for poaching as has been the case in other protected areas (I24; 
Moore et al., 2018). International financial support will be needed to enable an 
NGO like WWF to hire and train such local village rangers. In any case, an 
employment of village rangers must be closely coordinated with MINFOF to not 
undermine its sovereignty and to guarantee a fruitful collaboration between 
MINFOF eco-guards and village rangers that eventually reduces conflict and 
serves the environment. 
Infrastructure and anti-poaching measures 
Shortcomings on infrastructure have adverse effects on anti-poaching 
measures in and around LNP, too. One example for an especially weak 
infrastructure is Djembe, a hotspot for wildlife and consequently, poaching (I23). 
 
 
Image 8: Abandoned office building Djembe 
Photo: Julia Maria Bayer 
                                                        
26 For more information see the detailed recommendation 2.2 and 2.3 in Annex 14.  
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Generally, poor telephone, internet and radio networks are a challenge and 
delay communication between patrols and headquarters for hours. Therefore, it 
would be an advantage if eco-guards on duty could directly receive information 
from the NNNP airplane that is regularly patrolling the Sangha River (P75). The 
park management plans to revive Djembe for both tourism and surveillance 
measures (I23, P113). This plan is advisable as it may lead to improved living and 
working conditions for eco-guards and, through a higher presence of people may 
reduce poaching. 
Litigation 
The current LNP management plan of 2014 describes litigation as “irregular” 
and states that arrests and sanctions only have little deterrent effects (MINFOF, 
2014). In Cameroon, the prosecution procedure of poaching depends on the class 
of animal killed and procedures range from being transferred to the district court 
to a simple commitment to respect the Forest Law through signing a form called 
"Engagement sur l'honneur27". Between January and August 2018, 13 people were 
arrested and brought to court, among them one Baka. Confiscated weapons and 
trophies of class A animals are generally sent to the district level and said to be 
destroyed there (I15, I16). 
Litigation was not looked at specifically in the scope of this study. However, 
the research team found that one procedure of the park management is 
problematic: LNP staff auctions confiscated animals of class B and C in the 
villages, which is a cause for misunderstanding between the local population and 
the eco-guards. Although the money raised is said to be given to the state, the 
local population perceives the auction as a paradox or even affront, i.e. eco-guards 
selling bushmeat to the villagers after they took it from them in the first place (I16, 
C8, C9, C10). Therefore, it is recommended to reconsider the usefulness of 
bushmeat auctions. Annex 5 
In conclusion, the anti-poaching strategy shows room for improvement. It 
could especially be optimised with regards to the inclusion of the local population 
in wildlife protection and awareness raising activities. At the moment, the 
strategy is not designed in a transparent and participatory way as it is required by 
international guidelines, e.g. by the BMZ (BMZ 2013). As long as socioeconomic 
causes of poaching are not addressed and the local population does not actively 
participate in conservation, efforts on anti-poaching will likely not be able to 
                                                        
27 See Annex 5. 
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withstand anthropogenic pressures on wildlife in the long run (Haenlein and 
Smith, 2016). 
Resource Extraction Strategy 
Logging 
LNP is surrounded by logging concessions. The current management plan 
makes explicit mention of illegal logging, which led the research team to expect it 
to be an issue for conservation. However, neither formal nor illegal logging was 
mentioned as a threat to biodiversity in any of the interviews with park 
management staff. Presumably, it plays only a minor role in their conservation 
efforts.  
Nevertheless, incidents of illegal logging have been reported from the buffer 
zone, e.g. from a community forest (I6, P110). Further, commercial logging 
companies are said to harvest more timber within their concessions than allowed 
(P1). In addition, a logging company from Kika stated that only road entrances 
and bridges are closed after logging operations whereas the roads as such remain 
open (I6). This is problematic as it provides poachers and farmers with an easy 
access to the forests (I32). Moreover, forestry operations can disturb certain 
species. For instance, chimpanzees are negatively affected when logging does not 
follow certain practices that ensure a low impact on their territories (I33). For this 
reason, they may tend to avoid the concession areas and are more often found 
inside the LNP core zone as is shown in Map 7. 
Lastly, staff of logging companies is often accused of poaching (I10). Logging 
companies themselves seem to share this suspicion and thus raise awareness for 
the issue amongst their staff (I12). 
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Image 9: Trees 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, Male) (Pv1) 
The participant took the picture to underline the importance of conservation. He says that 
we should cherish these trees: “Without trees, there is no furniture, not even houses.” It was 
important to fight against illegal logging. Logging is controlled by MINFOF, and he pays his 
respect to the Ministry for its work. 
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Map 7: Chimpanzees distribution 
Source: MINFOF, 2015: 35 
 
However, there are many unknowns around both illegal and legal logging. By 
the park management’s own account, forestry operations are not closely 
monitored (MINFOF,2014). Therefore, it is recommended to analyse its ecological 
and social impact in LNP’s buffer zone. This should be done in cooperation with 
the local population whose natural resources may be affected from logging as 
well. Since 2006, UCL ExCiteS28 carries out projects with communities in CG and 
CAR on this matter (Vitos, 2013; I40). These projects could serve as an impulse for 
future activities around LNP. 
                                                        
28 University College London Extreme Citizen Science 
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Image 10: Working in the forest  
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, male) (PV2)  
The participant says that he took this picture to show the good and bad sides of working in 
the forest. “[The forest] is happiness. It is nice to breathe [fresh air], and you see animals. 
Some tourists even cry”. The forest helped to “understand life differently.” However, there 
are downsides: “The insects that bite you, and the snakes. Even the elephants are against 
you. And the trees- they lose branches that can hit you”. 
 
Mining 
Exploration and prospecting for minerals causes damage to flora and fauna 
and disrupts ecosystem processes (Turner, 2012). Both legal and illegal29 mining 
exists in LNP’s buffer zone, the latter in form of artisanal mining. According to the 
WWF programme manager for LNP, the Cameroonian government is actively 
encouraging legal mining in the area. So far, three exploration permits30 have 
been issued to Mongokele Mining, the only formal mining company operating in 
the park’s periphery (I21). Initially, Mongokele Mining attracted around 200 
people to the mining sites around LNP, but only around 30 are currently still 
employed (I37). 
Mongokele Mining used to operate in very close proximity to the park, 
stretching its operation closely to its boundary, and constructing roads almost 
                                                        
29 “Illegal” means without having an official licence to extract resources in a specific concession area in line 
with the Cameroonian mining code and the forestry law 
30 Totalling a size of 1.200 km2 
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reaching its limits. But following complaints by a timber company working in the 
same concession, it was ordered by the ministry to retreat to a distance of 15km 
from LNP (I21, I25, I37). This is an example for issues related to overlapping 
concessions, demonstrating incoherent concession policies and a lack of 
coordination amongst the respective authorities at national level (Chupezi et al., 
2009). It is estimated that there are now about 300 illegal artisanal miners working 
in the abandoned mining sites close to the park’s boundary (I37). The exact 
location of the abandoned mining site remains unknown to the research team. 
While offering an income source, artisanal mining has adverse effects on 
habitats. Illegal artisanal miners use the open-pit technique, which requires 
deforestation and an exposition of potential mineral-yielding gravel deposits (see 
Image 11). The open pits often constitute traps for animals (I20, Chupezi et al. 
,2009). The park management however does not have a specific strategy in place 
that tackles threats to biodiversity induced by mining. Measures are rather 
isolated, e.g. disturbing the work of illegal miners through patrols (P80, I16).  
 
 
Image 11: Illegal artisanal mining site 
Photo: Julia Maria Bayer 
 
Generally, mining is often connected to hunting as miners often work deep in 
the forests and rely on bushmeat as food source (Turner, 2012). This was 
confirmed by several interviewees; illegal artisanal miners interviewed in 
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Mbongoli31 stated that the entire village is engaged in bushmeat hunting (P80, I6, 
I12, I37).  
With regards to the above, it is assumed that mining operations directly and 
indirectly pose a threat to biodiversity. The scale of this threat has yet to be 
determined. Chupezi et al. determined no significant environmental impacts ten 
years ago but highlighted that in future a combination of commercial and 
artisanal mining (which does exist today) could lead to adverse effects on 
biodiversity (Chupezi et al., 2009). Further, the linkage between poaching and 
mining has not been analysed by Chupezi et al. and should be addressed in future 
analysis.  
Mining activities in the vicinity of the park thwart the ideas of UNESCO and 
may endanger the UNESCO World Heritage status of the TNS landscape, which 
might lead to a loss of donor support (E13, I21). Clearly, Cameroonian policies are 
not streamlined: on the one hand, Cameroon invests in the protection of LNP and 
its buffer zone as unique biodiversity hotspot. On the other hand, mining permits 
are granted for the same area (I21). The research team could not verify if the 
UNESCO is aware of the mining activities in LNP’s buffer zone. In view of the 
above, it is recommended to engage in dialogues with UNESCO and Cameroonian 
policy makers on the national level to ensure that mining policies do not thwart 
conservation efforts and UNESCO standards around LNP. 
5.1.6 Collaboration within the “Trinational de la Sangha” 
A trans-boundary cooperation between the three TNS Parks is laid down in the 
“Accord de cooperation TNS” of 2000. Regarding the objectives set in this 
agreement, the collaboration between the parks on research, ecotourism and 
anti-poaching activities seem insufficient. Attempts to establish a closer 
cooperation were reportedly unsuccessful (I27). Despite the existence of three 
committees, CTPE32, CTS33 and CTSA34, which meet regularly to plan and evaluate 
                                                        
31 This new settlement is situated right next to the Mongokele Minining office. About 130 people, mainly 
miners (both illegal and formal), currently live there (P68) 
 32 CTPE: Comité Tri-national de Planification et d’Exécution. Reunites Park Management (Conservators, 
NGO employees (WWF and WCS). Meetings are twice per year. Plans patrols, BLAB, eco-touristic 
circuits and research (I21, I23, MINFOF, 2014) 
33 CTS: Comité Tri-national de Suivi. Reunites regional prefects. Meetings are once per year (I21, I23, 
MINFOF, 2014) 
34 CTSA: Comité Tri-national de Supervision et d’Arbitrage. Reunites ministries of the three countries. 
Meetings are every 2 years (I21, I23, MINFOF, 2014) 
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activities in the TNS landscape, there is only little information flow (I32; I33; P67). 
The head of research unit in LNP, for instance, does not know who her current 
Congolese counterpart is and vice versa. NNNP has a monthly newsletter to 
inform its donors and interested parties about newly filled positions, tourist 
numbers etc , but there is no further regular information exchange. Every TNS 
park follows its own work plan and strategies are not shared (I38, I30). 
5.1.7 Managerial Conflicts: The Management Triangle 
Looking at the management actors of LNP, there are clear signs of a conflict 
within the park management. This conflict has local dimensions, evident as 
disrupted collaboration between MINFOF and WWF Cameroon in the park 
management, and national dimensions when taking into consideration the role of 
FTNS as a financing partner. Subsequently, these dimensions will be explored 
before discussing the idea of a new national level agency for protected area 
management (referred to as the “super-structure” or “national agency” by 
stakeholders) as a possible way forward. 
 
 
Figure 8: The management triangle 
Source: own illustration 
 
MINFOF and WWF Cameroon: Power imbalances in the park management 
When asked about the working relationship between MINFOF and WWF in the 
park management, staff from both sides assured the research team that the 
collaboration was working well. Contentious issues were described as 
“misunderstandings” (I19; I39). Nonetheless, more thorough interviews and 
investigations during the research team’s stay in Mambélé revealed that there is in 
fact a strong latent conflict between MINFOF and WWF. 
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On the one hand, the Conservator of LNP emphasized the sovereignty and 
authority of the Cameroonian state (I39). On the other hand, WWF 
representatives in Yaoundé lamented an absence of the state in the area around 
LNP. WWF is expected to take over responsibilities that are beyond its mandate 
and its area of expertise as a conservation NGO. The national director of WWF 
asserted they were “expected to act as the government” around Lobéké, i.e. 
providing health-care and education, building basic infrastructure and furthering 
socio-economic development (EI12). WWF employees of the park management 
underlined that WWF’s role was that of a technical advisor with limited decision-
making power (I17; I19; I21). 
These dynamics have created power imbalances in the relationship between 
MINFOF and WWF. MINFOF as the proxy of the Cameroonian state has the 
authority in decision-making, yet WWF controls funding and equipment: in terms 
of implementing projects or carrying out field activities neither side can act 
without the other. In other words, MINFOF theoretically has more power, but de 
facto power lays mostly with WWF. Both sides are frustrated with each other but 
are forced to co-exist in a relationship of mutual dependency. They exploit the 
resources at their disposal (MINFOF authority, WWF finances) to create leverage 
over the other side. MINFOF representatives interpret this as WWF overstepping 
its boundaries and in turn, assert their power by limiting WWF’s scope of action. 
WWF, conversely, blames MINFOF for making the park management inefficient 
and feels unjustly blamed for the shortcomings of the Cameroonian state as 
described above. These power imbalances have hardened into a latent conflict 
that does not allow for an effective and results-oriented management of LNP. 
FTNS: From financier to implementing partner 
The unclear role of FTNS in the management triangle with MINFOF and WWF 
has been found to cause confusion and potentially even exacerbates the conflict 
between the two actors. Initially intended as a mechanism for sustainable 
financing and oversight, FTNS is increasingly venturing into management 
activities. FTNS representatives mentioned that to them, poor management is the 
core issue of LNP and the main driver for most problems and conflicts around the 
national park. They complained that neither MINFOF nor WWF complied with 
FTNS procedures, that reporting was untimely and that contracts for suppliers 
were handled improperly (EI9). FTNS is frustrated with the poor results of the park 
management of LNP (particularly when comparing these to the other TNS parks).  
FTNS has used the ineffectiveness of the partnership MINFOF-WWF as a 
legitimization for a stronger and more active involvement in the management of 
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LNP. Besides implementing its own projects (such as the Carbon Project), FTNS 
frequently hires consultants that are tasked to work on specific topics (for 
example construction of infrastructure) or to reinforce the insufficient capacities 
of the park management. The Executive Director of FTNS commented on this 
development: “If we don’t do it, nobody will” (EI13).  
Both MINFOF and WWF are aware of this change in roles of FTNS, and the 
WWF Program Manager and the Conservator made mention of FTNS taking on a 
more active role in LNP and its management. Whereas the former did not seem to 
mind the involvement, the latter expressed his disapproval: “FTNS should refrain 
from executing projects in the area” (I39). The Conservator appeared to feel 
increasingly left out of operational activities and sidelined in decision-making. 
During an interview he recounted several examples of FTNS (sometimes in 
collaboration with WWF) taking decisions without consulting him, e.g. cancelling 
the contract to expand the tourist accommodation Camp Kombo or administering 
an NGO-project without involving the park management. The Conservator is 
clearly frustrated and feels his expertise is not appreciated: “People in Yaoundé 
have made mistakes” (I39). The decision of FTNS to take things into its own hand 
and cooperate more closely only with WWF because of MINFOF’s alleged 
ineffectiveness thus reinforces his feeling of losing power to partner 
organizations. Essentially, the most powerful actor by design (MINFOF as the 
state representative) becomes the least powerful one in practice. This creates 
tensions between the management parties. 
Towards a new super-structure? 
Evidently, the difficulties of current management set-up go beyond the 
operational level. The MOUs between FTNS, MINFOF and WWF constitute a 
complicated system of financial flows with unclear responsibilities and mandates 
for each of the parties. The research team was informed that there are currently 
plans to optimize these arrangements through the creation of a new “super-
structure” (I39). These plans are not being developed as a direct response to 
management issues in LNP but they were mentioned as a possible solution to the 
current conflict. 
The idea of such a super-structure refers to a national level agency for the 
management of protected areas. This agency would be independent of MINFOF 
and staffed with experts from different w0rking fields related to conservation 
(conservation, socio-economic development, tourism, etc.). It would directly 
collaborate with international, national and local stakeholders. In terms of 
organizational structure each national park would be headed by a chef de service, 
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who answers directly to the agency in Yaoundé. Financial flows from donor 
countries and other actors would be channelled directly to the agency (I39). 
The establishment of a super-structure is likely to have several advantages. 
First, it could allow for a better cooperation and coordination between different 
interest groups. Including experts from different fields would ensure that the 
perspective on protected area management would be broadened. Aspects such as 
social issues, tourism or economic development would be featured more 
dominantly alongside conservation. Second, the mandate of FTNS would be 
clearer. As national staff told the research team, working with a new super-
structure would allow FTNS to take a step back from management and limit itself 
to financing the agency, since it expects the new agency to bundle more 
competences and capacities than the current park management relies on. Third, 
the organisational structure of the new agency could enable better and more 
transparent communication between stakeholders. Currently, FTNS and other 
actors complain that the park management is often unavailable. The Conservator, 
who is often hard to reach, is the first point of contact for FTNS. MINFOF Yaoundé 
has no person in charge of LNP, who is informed enough and mandated to make 
decisions. With a new agency more decision-making and planning could 
increasingly happen on a national level. 
Notwithstanding these potential improvements, the creation of a super-
structure is also linked to disadvantages. The delegation of more responsibilities 
to the state in the management of LNP and protected areas in Cameroon at large 
might be laudable from a perspective of good governance. Practically however, 
experiences with MINFOF in the current set-up raise doubts about the efficiency 
of government institutions, supporting arguments for assigning more power to 
non-state actors such as NGOs or private companies. Besides, the coordination 
between the super-structure and other relevant ministries could complicate 
bureaucratic procedures instead of simplifying them. On top of that, the process 
of establishing a new agency would require large amounts of resources and years 
of political debate (all ministries concerned would lose power to the new agency). 
Lastly, one of the possible advantages, increased decision-making on a national 
level, could easily turn into a disadvantage of the super-structure: as more power 
is delegated away from the park management, there is a stronger likelihood of 
technocrats in Yaoundé losing touch with the local conditions and realities in LNP. 
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5.2 Participation 
 
Research Question:  
How does the local population currently participate in the LNP 
management and what are the existing problems and constraints? 
 
This chapter examines the on-the-ground implementation of participatory 
mechanisms promoted by LNP’s management plan and Cameroonian forest law.  
First, it looks at the main rationales for local participation in conservation and 
examines the underlying legal frameworks and discourse in LNP. Second, it briefly 
reviews the consultation process on LNP’s establishment and examines the 
integration of customary rights in zoning processes and land use allocation. While 
both are a formal requirement, there is evidence that the local population was 
neither sufficiently consulted about the establishment of the park nor adequately 
involved in related land- use planning. As a result, legal uncertainty of traditional 
use rights prevails. Third, the chapter examines participatory mechanisms that 
seek to strengthen the financial, economic and political integration of local 
stakeholders in natural resource management. 
While these mechanisms are officially promoted for instrumental and 
normative reasons, the research indicates that the bulk of them is not or only 
partially functional: the local population is not adequately integrated in the park’s 
management and does not benefit from its community zone. The delegation of 
power to local communities via community- based resource management is found 
to be largely inefficient, ineffective and inequitable. This is mainly due to weak 
capacities, lack of transparency and control, elite capture, social stratification 
within “communities”, and neglect of local needs. As a result, the local population 
has little opportunity and ability to control and influence the governance of LNP 
and its buffer zone. 
Finally, the chapter provides an overview of stakeholders that can potentially 
help to foster participation. 
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5.2.1 Why Participation?  
The discourse on participatory management of protected areas is largely 
informed by two different rationales either emphasizing instrumental or 
normative goals.  
Following Common Pool Resource Governance- theory (CPRG), participation 
of local stakeholders is instrumental for rules implementation, reduces conflicts, 
and decreases monitoring and enforcement costs (Ostrom, 1990). Indeed, there is 
evidence that the integration of local resource users in rule making and 
monitoring is significantly and positively related with biodiversity and forest cover 
(Hayes and Ostrom, 2005). “Participation” in CPRG is understood as a multi- level 
concept involving consultation and information, integration in rules- making and 
decision-making processes, revenue- sharing, and consideration of local 
institutions (including the integration of customary use rights).  
Demands for active participation are also based on a normative rationale 
stressing that participation supported the evolution and deepening of democratic 
values. This perspective involves citizenship obligations and responsibilities (Baker 
and Chapin, 2018:1), and is related to human- rights based approaches to 
participation. Rights to participation are supported by several international legal 
instruments, notably Human Rights conventions, that include the rights to 
peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, information, and direct or indirect 
participation in public affairs. Furthermore, conventions on collective and minority 
rights promote the full and effective participation of e.g. indigenous people (e.g. 
UNDRIP 2007, see Infobox 10). 
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Infobox 10: Selected articles of UNDRIP  
Article 18: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters 
which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves 
in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop 
their own indigenous decision-making institutions. 
Article 20: 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, 
economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of 
their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all 
their traditional and other economic activities. 
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development 
are entitled to just and fair redress. 
Article 26: 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the 
lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional 
ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they 
have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories 
and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the 
customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples 
concerned. 
Article 28: 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include 
restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, 
for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, 
used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent. 
Source: UN 2007 
 
Discourse on participation in LNP  
Participation of local stakeholders in LNP is required by commitments of 
Cameroon, UNESCO, WWF and donors to international human rights, including 
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commitments to collective rights of indigenous people (see Infobox 1 and Infobox 
3). Both UNESCO35, and WWF36 recognise local and indigenous peoples’ rights and 
highlight the imperative to include the local population in the management of 
LNP and its buffer zone. Furthermore, Cameroon, as a member of the Central 
African Forest Commission (COMIFAC) and signatory of the 2005 Convergence 
Plan, pledged to involve its rural population in the planning and sustainable 
management of its forests (MINFOF, 2014:7).  
The current LNP management plan emphasizes both instrumental and 
normative motives for local participation, and has the stated goal of „reinforcing 
the participatory protection system of the park and its surrounding zone, in a 
context of integrated area management, in order to maintain its biodiversity, its 
natural habitats and to contribute to the local development [...]” (MINFOF, 
2014:i). 'Eco-development and participatory management' represent one of the 
five pillars the plan is concentrating on, and 24% of the scheduled expenditure 
(third after infrastructure/administration and protection) is reserved for it 
(ibidem). Further underscoring the weight attributed to participation, the 
management (WWF) is employing one member of staff and two volunteers 
concentrating on participation of local communities.  
Participation is also desired by the local population in LNP’s buffer zone. 
During interviews and focus group discussions, participants regularly demanded 
more active involvement in the management of “their” forest by referring to 
normative and instrumental rationales and argued that: (1) they are the forest’s 
primary inhabitants, (2) their traditional way of life guaranteed the continued 
existence of the ecosystem, (3) their customary usage rights (as autochthonous or 
indigenous people) ought to be respected, and (4) they have the right to 
participate in local decision- making processes as they are citizens of Cameroon in 
contrast to animals that “never go to vote” (C8). 
                                                        
35 UNESCO, in its decision to declare TNS a world heritage site, requires member states to “[i]ncrease 
further the involvement and representation of local and indigenous communities in the future 
conservation and management of the TNS landscape in recognition of the rich cultural heritage of the 
region, the legitimacy of their rights to maintain traditional resource use and their rich local 
knowledge, including through providing effective and enhanced mechanisms for consultation and 
collaboration” (UNESCO 2012). 
36 In a statement on 'Indigenous People and Conservation' , WWF recognises „that indigenous peoples have 
the right to determine priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands, territories, 
and other resources“ and „supports the rights of indigenous peoples to improve the quality of their 
lives, and to benefit directly and equitably from the conservation and sustainable use of natural 
resources within their territories“ (WWF, 2008:3). Even if WWF does not directly use the term 
“participation”, both aspects are not realisable without it.  
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5.2.2 Information and Consultation Process 
While the park and the zoning of its buffer- zone constitute a manifest reality, 
there is evidence that the local population was not appropriately informed about 
their establishment nor involved in related land- use planning.  
While the majority of the population appears to have been informed about the 
setting up of LNP in 2001 (I15, I29; Njounan Tegomo et al., 2001:48), interviews 
led by the research team suggest that women and remote settlements were not 
consulted (F6, F10, F15, C6, C7, C8, F10, F15, EI7). Furthermore, it is likely that the 
process of consulting local people in LNP’s buffer zone was not carried out in an 
appropriate manner. Following a study by Neubauer, the management- plan of 
LNP was created without integration of local Baka communities (2014:204). Local 
NGOs like CEFAID cast doubt on proper FPIC beyond awareness campaigns, 
stressing the fact that there was no full consent and no possibility to reject the 
installation of the park (CEFAID, 2012; EI2).  
This is a common experience of local communities elsewhere in Cameroon 
(and of indigenous people around the world.37 A case study on Boumba Bek, the 
national park next to LNP created just four years later, cites a local Baka: “We 
didn’t know anything about it; but we learned that the government had set 
boundaries. We didn’t agree with this because from the start they had not told us 
anything and when setting these boundaries, they did not inform us, as they should 
have done”.  
The head of CEFAID equally criticizes the consultation methodologies 
employed by WWF to inform about the inclusion of the Sangha Trinational on the 
UNESCO World Heritage List in 2012 (EI2). Following a report by the NGO, “the 
consultation process did not make it possible for the communities to gain 
sufficient information to provide their opinion on the nomination of their forest 
landscape as a World Heritage Site. Not only did the process fail to facilitate their 
understanding of the impacts of a concept which was completely new to them, 
but it also gave them no time to digest the information about the purpose of the 
consultation” (CEFAID, 2012:2). Furthermore, only a small number of 
communities were consulted (ibidem).  
                                                        
37 A comprehensive study on FPIC consultations of indigenous people around the world by Forest Peoples 
Programme noted that “[t]he gap between what is increasingly accepted to be a requirement of 
international law and actual practice is still very wide“ (Colchester and Ferrari, 2007:2), and conclude 
that the “denial of land rights, coerced decisions, manipulations of indigenous leadership, bribery, 
corruption, the creation of false organisations and fake leaders, and the falsification of documents “ 
(ibid.:20) are widespread problems hampering proper FPIC consultations. 
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5.2.3 Integration of Customary Rights in Forest Zoning  
The Cameroonian forest law (Loi N°94/01)38 was adopted in 1994 and divided 
Cameroonian forest estate into “permanent” and “non- permanent” domains (see 
1.1.3). The law guarantees customary usage rights of local communities to exploit 
forest, wildlife and fish products in the permanent domain as long as protected 
species are not affected and exploitation is non- commercial. The law was 
considered innovative, as it “restor[ed] some of the rights that colonial and 
postcolonial rule had taken from forest people” (Topa et al., 2009:99). In practice, 
however, the forest law and its related zoning and gazetting process have become 
controversial.  
First, the involvement of Baka in the zoning process is considered 
unsatisfactory. Despite efforts to include Baka, “[i]t was difficult for the zoning 
operation to take into account the specificities of the Baka who hardly understand 
French, rarely frequent public places, and are less inclined to frankly express their 
points of view in the presence of their Bantu brethren“ ( Njounan Tegemo et al., 
2012: 50).  
Second, the zoning largely ignored „the Baka’s view of the forest as a 
continuous entity and their flexible use of land and resources“, as it only relied 
upon clear indicators of human occupation such as settlements, farming fields and 
fallows (ibidem: 48f)39. As a result, the forest zoning allocated “a significant area” 
of indigenous community land to permanent forest domain (see Map 9) that is 
primarily assigned to private concessions (Topa et al., 2009: 99). However, “the 
current regulatory framework for these areas does not sufficiently specify local 
inhabitants’ rights to hunt, gather, or fish” (ibidem). In absence of clear terms for 
exercise of these rights, “interpretation […] differs from one forest stakeholder to 
another” (Forest Legality Initiative, 2013).  
For example, the concessionaries of UFA around LNP appear to neglect 
customary usage and access rights. Participatory mapping done with support by 
CEFAID and GTZ in the early 2000’s shows that many zones inside the UFAs (see 
Map 8 and Map 9) were used by the local population and contained fields and 
even settlements. Yet, no single management plan that is attached to the zones in 
the Cameroonian Forest Atlas (MINFOF and WRI 2019) contains any agricultural 
                                                        
38 Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994. 
39 This shortcoming raises questions on the feasibility of zoning in “an area like southeaster Cameroon, 
where people live in the forest that is a continuum consisting of farmlands, and hunting, fishing and 
gathering fields connected by a network of trails” (Njounan Tegemo et al., 2012:49). 
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zone (see Infobox 11). The management plan for UFA 10-063 states that 
"notwithstanding the presence of crops along the road Kika-Nguilili and some 
cacao plantations at Ngombi, this does not allow for the delimitation of a specific 
zone” (SIBA, 2003:31). Local accounts confirm the difficulties to exercise 
customary use rights in LNP’s buffer zone (see Chapter 5.3.5).  
 
Infobox 11: UFA Management Plans 
Each UFA has to develop an inventory, a schedule and a five- year 
management plan within the first three years of exploitation. To a great part, 
the management plans concern conservation issues, such as defining differing 
quota for each tree species, etc. They also entail a description of the social and 
economic conditions of adjacent villages and include a division of the UFA into 
three zones: one, where conventional logging can take place (timber 
production zone), one where logging is not or only restrictively allowed 
(conservation areas, e.g. a 5km zone along the national park’s border, or 
around a cave hosting certain bat species in a UFA in the south of the park); 
and a third “agroforestry zone”, where logging is not allowed, as it has been 
used for agriculture by the local population prior to the establishment of the 
UFA (agroforestry zones).  
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Map 8: Subsistence activities of villagers from Libongo - participatory 
mapping 
Source: Centre pour l’Education, la Formation et l’Appui aux Initiatives de Développement au 
Cameroun (CEFAID), MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data – satellite data: Sentinel2 scene 
from 2018-02-05 (ESA) – CRS: WGS84 UTM zone 33N 
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Map 9: Synthetic usage map of the UFA 10-063 - dating back to 2003 
Source: Société Industrielle des Bois Africains, 2003, Plan d’Amenagement UFA 10-063, p.10, 
MINFOF Cameroon and WRI – Satellite data: Sentitenl2 scene from 2018-02-05 (ESA) – CRS : 
WGS84 UTM zone 33N 
 
5.2.4 Overview Participatory Elements  
LNP’s management plan and Cameroonian law provide several participatory 
elements to negotiate and integrate the different stakeholders’ positions, 
interests and needs. These elements not only address local communities, but also 
private economic actors. Table 5 provides an overview of all these participatory 
elements (those further explored in bold):  
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Table 5: Participation in Lobéké National Park and buffer zone 
Participatory element Target Group Description 
People 
Traditional usage rights Local population National legislation on traditional use rights 
Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) 
Baka population/ 
ASBABUK 
Consultation for Baka using core zone 
(gathering NTFP) 
Community zone (inside 
LNP) 
Local population, esp. 
Baka 
NTFP and fishing inside a certain part of the 
park 
Community hunting zone 
(ZICGC) 
Local 
population/COVAREF 
Subsistence hunting and income  
Managementplans for 
ZICGC 
Local 
population/COVAREF 
Sustainable quotas, divided usage zones, 
anti-poaching, self-organisation 
Territoires de Chasse 
Communautaire  
Communities No explanation available 
System for exploitation of 
raphia-palm 
Local population Sustainability control 
Community forests Communities Independent land usage, income from 
logging 
Community projects  Communities Alternative incomes, basic infrastructure 
Common interest groups 
(GIC) 
Local population Associations promoting economic activities 
Ecotourism and research Local population Not further specified 
Private economic actors 
« Convention de Lutte 
Anti-Braconnage » 
Private sector Anti-poaching obligations 
“Cahiers de charge” Safari companies Anti-poaching obligations 
Management plans/ five-
year plans 
Logging companies Sustainable logging, anti- poaching, 
designation of agroforestry zones, 
customary usage rights 
Annual Forestry Fee Logging companies, 
communities 
Distribution of annual forestry fees to state 
and communities 
Mambélé Convention Safari companies, local 
population 
Dispute settlement between safari 
companies/ local population 
“Comité Paysan-Foret” Loggig companies, local 
population 
Represent popular interest to logging 
companies 
Multi-stakeholder platforms 
Various Platforms State actors, Private 
sector 
Alignment of strategies 
Source: own illustration based on MINFOF, 2014 
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5.2.5 Participatory Mechanisms controlled by Park Management 
Several participatory mechanisms are mainly controlled by the park 
management and, in theory, provide spaces for dialogue and joint management 
of natural resources: multi-stakeholder platforms, employment opportunities for 
locals, a community zone inside the park and a recently passed Memorandum of 
Understanding between TNS park authorities and local Baka groups. While 
information on these mechanisms and their implementation is scarce and little 
information could be obtained in the field, this sub- chapter seeks to provide a 
short description and assessment of these mechanisms.  
Multi-stakeholder platforms 
The management plan foresees three administrational multi-stakeholder 
platforms (MINFOF, 2014:149): the ‘Comité de gestion”, which brings together 
different ministries to align actions, the ‘Comité consultatif local’, which rallies 
local ministry representatives (COVAREF and certain local office holders 
participate), and the ‘Comité scientifique et technique’, which aims at providing 
external expertise.40  
Despite these laudable efforts to increase dialogue and collaboration of 
different stakeholders, the platforms only meet irregularly or have never met. 
Furthermore, some stakeholders are excluded from these platforms. For example, 
while the first two platforms involve several ministries, they do not include the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS), which represents indigenous peoples and other 
vulnerable groups. Its inclusion could strengthen the voice of indigenous people 
and provide required expertise on projects addressing them. In addition, no 
platform gives local village leaders the opportunity to gather and meet with the 
park management – even though they appear to be very interested in dialogue. 
During this research, for example, representatives of villages, community forests, 
COVAREF, and others were invited to Mambélé to discuss the study’s results in a 
joint stakeholder workshop. No monetary or other economic incentive for 
participation was provided (apart from the provision of transport and 
accommodation costs), yet every invited person took great efforts to participate, 
and most of them did so actively. The successful implementation of this workshop 
hints at the different stakeholders’ interest in dialogue and proves the feasibility 
of organising such meetings. This potential should be further developed (see 
recommendation Nr. 4.4 in Table 18 in Annex 14 for more details). 
                                                        
40 The research was also informed about a ‘platforme de concertation’ (coordination platform) allegedly 
bringing together local mayors and the private sector, but no further information could be obtained 
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Employment by park management  
Few local employees are engaged in the maintenance of park facilities, and 
sporadically, locals are employed as guides and porters for inventories, eco-
tourism or anti-poaching patrols. Apart from these rather scarce employment 
opportunities, however, the local population is not involved in the park’s 
monitoring, surveillance or awareness raising activities. Plans of the park 
management to increase employments opportunities through ecotourism have 
not been actualised. As a result, epistemic participation remains low: a committed 
and sustained integration of local and indigenous workforce and knowledge has 
not been realised (Mwenge and Mukumo, 2015) (also see Chapter 5.1.5 and 
Chapter 5.3.4). 
Community zone inside LNP 
An early attempt to increase participation was the establishment of a user- 
organized community zone inside the national park (see Map 4), where adjacent 
communities are allowed to fish, harvest and collect plants as long as they do not 
threaten conservation goals (MINFOF, 2014:57).  
While laudable in theory, the community zone has failed to provide notable 
benefits to local communities. The major reason for its inefficacy is its lack of 
access. 
First, local villagers must request authorisation to access the zone, and they 
can only do so at the park’s headquarter near Mambélé. Many villagers, however, 
live far away from Mambélé and lack means of transport. It is difficult if not 
impossible for them to request authorisation. Second, the authorisation is only 
valid for two weeks, while some families need to spend several weeks in the 
forest. Third, the authorisation can only be obtained against a fee of XAF 5.000-
10.000, different for Baka and Bantu (C4; F18; F18). This fee is not foreseen in the 
management plan, and villagers deem it unfair and unjustifiably high (C3; F6). 
Fourth, the community zone is situated in the far west of the park. However, 
participatory mapping (see Map 13) has shown that settlements in the north, 
south and east of the park also depend on resources available inside the 
community zone. The current siting of the zone is too far away from them, and 
they do not benefit from its existence. Fifth, access to the zone is denied for a long 
period of time for conservation reasons (March – September), while some non- 
timber forest products are only available in specific periods of the year (see Table 
13). Furthermore, the zone is supposed to be self-organised by its users (MINFOF, 
2014:103), but this is not the case. In total, these points make the community zone 
non-functional. It is thus rarely (officially) used by villagers (I14, C12, C2), and 
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many interviewed villagers do not even know that there is a community zone in 
LNP (C8; C7; F14; F15).  
Memorandum of Understanding 
The research team had the opportunity to participate in a meeting on a 
Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) between TNS- park authorities and local 
Baka groups specifying local access rights to the protected areas of the TNS (M1). 
After 13 years of discussion, the aim was once more to seek a MoU that both sides 
were willing to sign. The discussions were particularly enlightening, as they 
demonstrated the multitude of interests and complexity of debate. On the Baka 
side, for example, different speakers underlined that unlimited access to “their 
forest”, including the right to hunt, was of high cultural, spiritual and economic 
value. The park authorities emphasized the fundamental legal difficulties to allow 
hunting inside protected areas and expressed concerns about a potential increase 
of poaching activities (a concern shared by some Baka representatives, I14).  
Other mayor points during the discussions illustrate the complexity of debate. 
For example, both MINAS and WWF representatives pointed out that every local 
community needed a detailed MoU, including maps of usage zones, to adequately 
protect different customary use. WWF further emphasized that additional MoUs 
between the private sector and local communities were required. The LNP 
conservator stated that autochthonous Bantu also needed access to forest 
resources and that a MoU exclusively for Baka risked exacerbating ethnic conflict.  
Despite these contentions, the MoU has eventually been signed in February 
2019, “granting [Baka] greater access rights and joint management of the national 
parks” (WWF, 2019). Unfortunately, at time of writing, the written MoU for LNP is 
not available to the public and it remains unclear which rights have been granted 
and how they will be implemented. Notwithstanding, the lengthy continuous 
discussions around the MoU demonstrate the commitment of both sides to reach 
compromise, and the founder of the Baka NGO OKANI underlined that verbal 
dialogue was extremely important for local Baka groups, not least because most 
of them were illiterate (I1).  
 
5.2.6 Participatory Mechanisms in Management of Buffer Zone  
There are several participatory mechanisms provided by the management plan 
and the Cameroonian forest law that seek to strengthen the financial, economic 
and political integration of local stakeholders in natural resource management in 
the park’s buffer zone. These include the redistribution of annual forestry fees 
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from logging companies, a collaborative convention between local communities 
and private companies (“Mambélé Convention”), and the direct management of 
forest resources and revenues by local communities through community hunting 
zones, community forests, and carbon zones. 
Redistribution of Annual Forestry Fees 
According to the Cameroonian forest law, revenues from the forestry sector 
(annual forest fees) should be distributed amongst the state and local 
communities (see Infobox 12).  
Following the limited information obtainable on site, the taxes from the timber 
companies are paid from their headquarters in Douala to the state in Yaoundé. 
The part dedicated to local communities is then channelled to local councils in 
Lobéké (I6; I12; I22; I25). Following a senior forest officer of WWF Cameroon, the 
revenue sharing mechanism is overly complicated and does not work well in 
practice (P5). This might explain why none of the park officials nor company 
representatives were able to explain how it works in practice (I6; I12; I 22; I25). 
Clear answers to questions on revenue shares were avoided and the research team 
was referred to the ministries in Yaoundé or the forest companies’ headquarters in 
Douala (I6; I12; I25). The mechanism appears to not only lack transparency but 
also local legitimacy, as illustrated by discussions during a community meeting: 
participants called the distribution-committee of forestry revenues ('comité des 
redevances forestières') a „bureau phantom“ (C6).  
 
Infobox 12: Revenue sharing in the Cameroonian Forest Sector 
Circulaire n°001/C/MINFI determines that the annual forestry revenues are 
equally distributed between the State (50%) and the beneficiary communities 
(50%). The community´s share is then re-distributed between fiscal 
administration (for administration costs), FEICOM (Special Council Support 
Fund for Mutual Assistance) and the local communities. One quarter of the 
share attributed to local communities (6.75 %) is exclusively allocated to 
development projects carried out by residents. 
 
One reason for this negative assessment by locals is given by a 2015 study on 
forest revenue redistribution mechanisms in Yokadouma council: local 
communities are sidelined by a “complex and long administrative transfer 
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process” that is “entirely opaque” (Assembe Mvondo et al., 2015: 16ff).41 As a 
result, villagers have “no access to information about the true amounts due to 
them, the disbursement dates or the future use of the revenue” (ibidem). 
Mambélé Convention 
Another mechanism to increase local economic involvement via benefit- 
sharing is “The convention de collaboration pour la gestion durable de la faune 
sauvage” (“Mambélé convention”) signed by local communities, safari hunting 
companies and the forest administration in 2007. It defines a basic understanding 
on a participatory management of fauna resources in the south-east of Cameroon. 
More specifically, it tries to negotiate conflicts of interest between safari and 
logging companies and the local population on the exploitation of wildlife 
(MINFOF 2015: 200; Yanggen, 2010: 57). The convention includes the agreement 
on joint financing of anti- poaching operations, the sharing of game meat by safari 
companies, and the provision of waste wood to local communities by logging 
companies.  
Research participants recall the agreement in a positive manner but claim that 
it did not work well anymore (F12, I5, I12). Representatives of MINFOF and WWF 
in Yaoundé also raised concerns about its proper functioning (EI12; EI3). This was 
mainly due to two reasons: first, actors present today (e.g. Mayo Oldiri and Pepe 
Safari companies) were not signatories of the agreement, as concessionaires 
changed with time. Second, the spirit of cooperation seems to have diminished. 
Participants claimed that private companies only partly honour the convention’s 
commitments. Following local accounts, not all safari companies shared the meat 
of game with communities and the provision of timber for charcoal production has 
reportedly ceased (C5; C7; C8; F12, P56).  
Community hunting zones and COVAREF 
Following conflicts between local communities and safari companies during 
the late nineties (Neubauer, 2014:221), the park management, assisted by WWF, 
GTZ and MINFOF, established five community hunting zones (Zones d’intérêt 
                                                        
41 The study explains the workings of the transfer of annual forestry fees to local communities as such: 
“[T]he administrative services responsible for its management […] are at the central level in the 
Nation’s capital city, Yaoundé. Checks bearing the various amounts earmarked for councils and local 
communities are sent to the paymasters of each regional capital. The Yokadouma Council have to 
collect their checks at the regional capital of Bertoua 300 km away,[…]. The specified amount is then 
transferred to the council accounts, which are managed by the mayor and the council treasurer, with 
assistance from a council Forest Revenue Management Committee” (Assembe Mvondo et al., 2015: 
16ff). 
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cynégétique à gestion communitaire, ZICGC) that are under direct management 
of local communities (see Map 6). The experimental and new approach of 
community managed hunting zones seeks to include locals in the sustainable 
management of faunal resources. Local communities are allowed to use the 
ZICGC for subsistence hunting and to generate revenues e.g. through income 
from lease (I9, I5, I10, P96). Since 2008, three community wildlife resource 
valorisation committees, known as COVAREF (“Comitées de Valorisation des 
Ressources Fauniques”), serve as local management structures of these 
community hunting zones. They decide on their utilization and control revenues 
(MINFOF, 2014:5; EI3). Furthermore, the COVAREF are supposed to support 
community development projects and engage in conflict resolution and anti- 
poaching activities through COVILAB (see Infobox 9). In LNP’s buffer zone, all 
ZICGC are leased to professional safari companies.  
Administrative Organisation  
Within the COVAREF, decisions are taken by a general assembly of volunteers 
whose members are proposed by traditional chiefs and subsequently elected by 
the communities (I10). The chiefs and some other authorities are entitled to 
participate (I5). All villages are represented proportional to their size (1000 
inhabitants - 2 delegates, 5000 inhabitants - 4 delegates). There is a 15 % quota 
for women and Baka (I10). However, a primary education level is required to 
partake in the COVAREF. A representative of each COVAREF is a member of 
multi-stakeholder platforms foreseen in the management plan (MINFOF, 
2014:159).  
The research team spoke to representatives of all three COVAREF that 
manage four ZICGC (Nr. 1,2,8 and 9) around LNP. They are centred around the 
villages of their respective presidents in Koumela (N°1), Mbateka Ndyong (N°2) 
and Kika (N°3) and not around their officially registered office, which might be due 
to the influence of their presidents (I5, I10, C5). 
In total, all three COVAREFs around the park generated annual revenues from 
lease tax (“taxe d’affermage”) of XAF 29.088.220 (€~44.000) in 2015 (MINFOF, 
2015: 159), excluding their 10% share of felling tax (“taxe d’abbatage”). 
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Table 6: Basic information on COVAREFs 
Name Official base General assembly Population 
ZICGC with 
safari 
N°1 
(Salokomo) 
Salapoumbé 24 
(9 Baka, 5 women) 
(?) 1 Mayo Oldiri 
N°2 
(Boumba- 
Ndjombi) 
Moloundou 52  
(10 women, 2 Baka) 
13 villages 
12.000 people 
2 Mayo Oldiri 
N°3 
(Ndjombo-Bolo) 
Kika 24 
(9 Baka, 5 women) 
(?) 3 Pepe Safari 
Source: MINFOF, 2014:49; own data 
 
Problems 
The local population’s access to the community hunting zones (ZICGC) is 
restricted. Reportedly, safari companies renting these zones hinder the local 
villagers from subsistence hunting, even though this was the primary goal of the 
zones, as a former Chef de Mission of WWF at LNP criticized (P96). Following 
another WWF- employee, the sport- hunters, mostly operating around the forest 
“bais” where hunting success is greater, defend their interest against local hunters 
as they feel they paid for it (I19). 
According to the Management Plan, it is foreseen to delimit micro-zones (one 
for safaris and one for subsistence hunting) inside the ZICGCs (see Map 10) and to 
set up a participative management system for subsistence hunting that includes a 
code of conduct, and hunters’ interest groups (MINFOF, 2014:128). Additionally, 
the COVAREF should authorize the hunting of a big mammal for Baka cultural 
rites every 2-3 years and take this into account in their quota management. At this 
point in time, none of these steps have been taken (COVAREF N°1 and N°3). The 
president of COVAREF N°3 said that it was up to MINFOF to start the process (I5).  
Restricted access is not the only problem reported by villagers. A frequent 
complaint was that there were no huntable animals in the vicinity of the villages 
anymore (C7, F10). Stakeholders are aware of the problem, but the exact reason 
for this development is unknown: it might be that the pressure from hunting 
drives the animals into the hinterland or that the animals are reducing in numbers 
despite conservation efforts (C2, I19). The consequence of this development is 
that villagers must go far to find game, and often penetrate further into the 
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concessions behind their agroforestry zone (UFA and ZIC). They overhunt species 
(hunting pregnant and small animals), which affects quotas for the safari 
companies, and increases potential for conflict. 
 
 
Map 10: Proposed micro-zoning of ZICGC 1 and 8 
Source: MINFOF, 2009 :46 
 
Another problem haunting COVAREFs is non- transparency and lack of 
control. Reportedly, the feeling tax (‘taxe d’abbatage’) is not always paid and 
revenues do not reach local communities.  
As far as this research is informed, the COVAREF do not publicly account for 
their activities. A WWF volunteer of the park management’s participation unit 
reports that local communities frequently complain about quality and quantity of 
revenues they receive from the ZICGC (P27). During some focus group discussions 
and interviews, the COVAREF delegates were accused of misbehaviour (C2, F8). 
Representatives of the COVAREF N°2 stated that their revenues were used for 
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hydraulic energy projects, classrooms and teachers’ wages, two birth centers, a 
pharmacy, a hospital for Baka, the reconstruction of a church, the acquisition of 
tools such as chainsaws, machetes, and generators, and support for handicapped 
people, orphans and Baka children (I5). The research team, however, was only 
able to detect one school building financed by the COVAREF N°2. This 
observation seems to confirm complaints that financial means of the COVAREFs 
are not invested in community development (see Image 12) and have gone astray. 
 
 
Image 12: School classroom in Zenga 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Bantu, farmer, female) (PV 16) 
The picture was taken in Zenga. The photo voice participant describes that the village school 
building is in a bad state, as water leaks into the classroom through the roof. The leaks have 
existed for three years already. “The COVAREF is aware of the problem but does not provide 
any money for repairs”. 
 
Some communities are situated very far from the ZICGCs. Libongo, for 
example, has no own ZICGC and is part of the COVAREF N°1 in Salapoumbé 
whose president lives in Koumela. The distance (~75km road) combined with the 
lack of network coverage make it difficult to influence and control decisions taken 
by their COVAREF. Another complaint is that all COVAREF- meetings are held at 
the park’s headquarter in Mambélé, which makes it difficult for most members of 
the general assemblies to participate and to exert control (I5). 
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Furthermore, there are only few Baka representatives in the COVAREF, and 
some Baka complained that only Bantu profited from the revenues controlled by 
the COVAREF (F17, Image 13 and Image 14). The lack of support by the COVAREF 
for Baka communities was also criticized by a study of Neubeuer: "[The] projects 
of Baka are barely considered. Here again, the main problem is the refusal of the 
Government of Cameroon to recognize the settlements of the Baka as villages. 
[Baka settlements] are considered part of the Bantu villages and are thus 
subordinate to the respective Bantu chiefs, who "represent" them. Consequently, 
the Baka communities get nothing from the revenues derived” (2014:223f; own 
translation). 
 
 
Image 13: COVAREF project budget 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Baka, farmer, male) (PV17) 
The participant took the picture at a COVAREF meeting in Mambélé. It shows a project 
budget that does not include the "Baka project" in Dioula: a water pump, livestock and 
farming equipment. In September 2017, the three presidents of the COVAREF met with 
representatives of the Baka-NGO OKANI and promised to implement the project, yet 
nothing happened. The participant says that there is only one Baka in the administration of 
the COVAREF and their interests are too often disregarded. 
 
The park management is aware of the dysfunctionality of the COVAREF (I19). 
However, it seems that all responsibility is shifted upon the communities. 
Following the WWF Community Coordination Officer, the park management 
wanted the communities to find their own solution to their problems (I19). The 
conservator said that it was the COVAREF’s decision to renew the contracts with 
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the safari companies, and it was their decision whether to open a zone for 
subsistence hunting or not (I39). Similar statements were made by the Unit Head 
of Finance and Administration (P25). Simultaneously, he stressed the fact that it 
was the park management that started the whole process, that it constituted an 
exemplary participatory process, and that the management collaborated with the 
COVAREF almost daily (P25). However, some voices inside the park management 
doubt that the communities can respond to the problems (I17, I39).  
Community forests  
Certain areas of the non-permanent forest zone (ca. 5.000 ha) have recently 
been declared 'community forests' (see Map 3), covered by a management 
agreement between local communities and forest administration. Locally 
promoted by WWF and FTNS (I3, I11, I34, P14, C4), the establishment of 
community forest is in line with promising policy reforms of Cameroon’s forest 
sector aimed at increasing local participation and sustainable forest management 
(for an assessment of forest management in Cameroon see Buttoud and 
Nguinguiri, 2016). The main goal of community forests is to enable local 
communities to generate income by exploiting timber (I19). Evaluating 
ASDEBYM, a community forest for the Baka communities of Mambélé and Yenga, 
a WWF Participation staff said: “They have their problems, but at least they have 
their responsibility. We assist them, as they are beginners” (I19).  
Organisation 
Following first consultations and subsequent approval by the sub-prefect, the 
community has to develop a ‘simple management plan’ which includes 
regulations on agriculture, cutting of timber for domestic use and subsistence-
hunting (P96). A steering board is in charge of the management of the community 
forests. All members are volunteers and appointed by a local assembly (I11). Once 
revenues from logging are generated, the steering board decides on projects that 
will be funded (I34, P47; for a more detailed description of the economic 
operations inside the community forests and their limitations, see Chapter 5.3.2) 
As far as the research team was able to observe, women and Baka are 
represented in the community forest’s steering boards but are mostly staying on 
the sideline. To counter exclusion and marginalisation, some community forests 
have been designated for Baka only (e.g. ASDEBYM, and one community forest is 
said to be currently being created in Mboli (I3) ). Women from the NGO WHCS 
told the research team that WWF proposed to create their own community forest 
and trains them on timber extraction (F19).  
Results 87 
Problems 
The three community forests visited left an overall positive impression. The 
people involved appear to feel empowered and motivated. Other community 
forests, however, face severe management problems (C4). Besides limited control 
of decisions and spending (F4) and a dominant role of the presidents, Baka in 
Mambélé reported to be denied free access to their own community forest by 
neighbouring villages (C3).  
Baka communities appear to have more (economic) problems with their 
community forests (I1). One reason might be that many “aspects of community 
forests are inconsistent with livelihoods and resources of indigenous people, such 
as the emphasis on small-scale timber production or administrative structures 
that conflict with traditional forms of land use” (Topa et al., 2009:99). A study by 
Neubeuer emphasizes that the current size of community forests of maximum 50 
km2 are too small for Baka, who, as acknowledged by official guidelines by 
Cameroon, require at least 1 km² per inhabitant to contribute to the sustainable 
management of the forest (Neubauer, 2014: 206 ff). 
Many communities do not have their own community forest yet, but this is a 
consequence of the novelty of the ongoing reform process. Some will face 
difficulties, as they have no (Zega) or only a restricted agroforestry zone (Bela and 
Libongo, see Map 15 in Annex 10)42.  
The limited availability of high- quality agroforestry land has already led to 
problems in Socambo where the community forest is swampy, has no valuable 
wood and is difficult to exploit (I34, P82, P83). In general, the siting of the forests 
is reportedly done in Yaoundé (P47) and does not appear to be well 
communicated with the respective communities (F4). For example, most 
community forests are close to main roads, have agricultural fields inside and 
were exploited in colonial or early postcolonial times, decreasing their value (P47).  
The whole community forest programme is mainly directed from Yokadouma 
(I3). While LNP’s management plan mentions community forests as outstanding 
example of the participatory national forest governance (MINFOF, 2014: 21), the 
information given is outdated, and no strategy towards assistance or 
collaboration is pronounced. This is remarkable, especially as the national forest 
                                                        
42 Between Nguilili and Ngatongo, there is a community forest (Tola SWE) established inside the 
permanent forest zone (UFA 10-066). It is unclear if the UFA has been reduced or another solution was 
found. The proceeding could serve as an example for other villages on the fringes of the agroforestry 
zone. 
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code determines that MINFOF must provide community forests with technical 
advice free of charge. 
Carbon zones  
There are four ‘carbon zones’ within four community forests around LNP. This 
is a recent development: the carbon zone of To’okpwassi was measured while the 
research group visited the forest. The carbon zones are funded and initiated by 
FTNS and carried out with a local NGO (I19, P1, P47). In these areas, logging, 
agriculture and hunting are prohibited, and NTFP collection requires 
authorization. Reportedly, even footpaths must be rearranged to circumvent the 
zone (P46). The objective of these carbon zones is to encourage communities to 
reduce deforestation of their community forests by rewarding associated 
emissions-reductions via the REDD+ programme.  
The steering board of the community forest in Socambo expressed high 
expectations of REDD+: “(…) people are discouraged to join the community 
forest, because they don´t benefit. Maybe now with the carbon zone, they can 
profit, and more people will join” (I34). Furthermore, he stated that the 
remuneration for not cutting the forest constituted a fair conservation strategy. 
However, he also appeared to be dubious about the “foreign” payment promises 
and said that some villagers were not willing to accept the prohibition to expand 
their agricultural fields (I34). 
From a perspective of participation and land rights, the carbon zone - project 
appear to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, local communities need 
stable income sources and the conservation of forest resources is in their interest. 
On the other hand, it was not clear if the delimitations of the zones were specified 
through thorough and informed consultation. The carbon zones lie within the 
non- permanent forest zone that is designated for community forests, agriculture 
and other uses. However, neither agriculture nor timber extraction are allowed 
within the carbon zones. Hunting is reportedly banned as well, even though it is 
highly doubtful that subsistence-hunting has a significant impact on the carbon 
content of biomass. Most importantly, it is far from certain if the REDD+ 
payments will ever arrive in the respective communities (TAB, 2015). As a result, 
villagers loose yet another usage zone to conservation without receiving any 
benefits (P82, P83). 
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Image 14: Logging truck 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Baka, Farmer, Male) (PV17) 
Following the participant, the depicted truck carries wood from the COVAREF. The 
participant states that it is only the Bantu community that profits from the COVAREF, as the 
president of the COVAREF was Bantu. According to him, the Baka should be more involved in 
management and benefit-sharing. 
 
It appears that neither the redistribution of the annual forestry fee, the 
Mambélé convention nor the management of forest resources by communities 
work well in practice.  
First, they are not effective: while aiming at contributing to local development 
and poverty alleviation, there was only little evidence of funded development 
projects on site. Assessing the impact of revenue- sharing mechanisms on local 
development in Yokadouma Council, Assembe- Mvondo et al. come to a similar 
conclusion and remark: “[O]ur results indicate that forest and wildlife revenue 
redistribution mechanisms are not effective because the objectives of promoting 
local development, reducing rural poverty and promoting sustainable 
management of forest resources have not been achieved. Admittedly, some social 
facilities […] are positive realizations. But a closer look shows that this is a 
marginal performance compared to the total revenue generated by the various 
revenue-sharing mechanisms” (Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2015: 15f).  
Second, they are not efficient nor equitable: redistributions are directed to 
councils or COVAREF and not to the villagers directly, who receive little 
information about the amounts transferred (Topa et al., 2009: 100f). Many 
villagers do not even know their delegates at COVAREF or community forest 
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boards (F4, F8). Most of these office holders are part of the local elite, politically 
well-connected to the ruling political party of Cameroon (RDPC) and local 
economic actors (P21, I36, P73; see Robillard, 2010: 404ff for a thorough analysis 
of ‘elite capture’ around LNP).  
Furthermore, it appears that the revenues are not equally shared among Baka 
and Bantu groups. First, most Baka villages in the area are not officially 
acknowledged as such and thus do not receive any redistribution (Glory Lueong, 
personal communication; November 20, 2018; also see Neubauer 2014:223ff). 
Second, Baka groups claimed to receive less revenues than their Bantu neighbours 
(PV14, C12, F4; see Image 13 and Image 14). Third, no important function in village 
councils, COVAREF and steering boards of community forests is held by a Baka 
and very few by women. Baka and women rarely finish primary school, and 
therefore do not satisfy the requirements to partake in the COVAREFs. As a result, 
the deficient mechanisms “contribute to and reinforce the political and 
socioeconomic marginalisation of forest minorities such as Pygmies […] and 
women” (Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2015: vii). 
These two latter points not only underscore the social stratification within 
villages. They also question popular assumptions about “village communities”. 
Most villages in Cameroons rainforest zone are made up by different families that 
were coalesced to villages during colonial times. Hence, Cameroon’s 
“communities” are neither homogenous social entities nor “the kind of resilient 
social institution that is so often visualized by outsiders as the backbone of 
community forestry” (Topa et al., 2009: 104). In general, the romantic concept of 
“community” in the development discourse tends to blind out disparities in views, 
capacities, influence, cultures, and aspirations (McShane and Wells, 2004: 405), 
and risks at supporting unequal power relations and social privilege (e.g. 
patriarchy). 
5.2.7 Stakeholders 
As the challenges of the participatory mechanisms provided by management 
plan and Cameroonian plan illustrate, participation of local people requires 
capacity development, awareness- raising, and integration of a much wider and 
complex set of stakeholders. The table below gives an overview of different 
stakeholders that could serve as intermediaries and starting-points for the 
implementation of the participatory measures by the park management.  
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Table 7: Stakeholder analysis 
Stakeholder Description Motivation Potential 
Ministries MINAS, MINMIDT, 
MINADER, MINEP, 
MINEPIA, MINADT 
Besides MINFOF, other 
ministries are not present in 
LNP’s buffer zone. However, 
MINAS appears to be 
interested in promoting own 
activities in the area, if 
international support, 
capacity building and 
financial means were 
available 
MINAS is officially 
responsible for the assistance 
to IP in Cameroon, but not 
well funded. MINADT’s 
assistance is responsible for 
any change of zoning and the 
creation of new (Baka) 
chieftaincies. MINADER 
would be the prime partner 
for promotion of alternative 
livelihoods. 
Prefects Upholding state 
authority in Salapoumbé 
and Moloundou 
Fight against armed 
poachers; secure border 
zones 
Can request local military to 
abide by human rights; can 
support anti-poaching 
measures in the area and 
inside their own ranks 
Mayors Salapoumbé and 
Moloundou; elected by 
population; receive the 
forestry and hunting 
redistributions of 
national concessions; 
decide on investments 
Want to be re-elected; would 
like to receive the full share of 
forestry and hunting 
revenues for their 
communities 
They are well connected to 
local power elites and fully 
understand relations on the 
ground; starting point of any 
initiative on better 
redistribution policy 
Village chiefs Represent the 
traditional ethnic 
identity groups 
(autochthonous Bantu); 
however, their power on 
their population is 
limited; officially, they 
are present in many 
decision bodies 
Improving living conditions of 
‘their’ villages would meet 
villager’s expectations and 
strengthen their authority 
and local legitimacy 
The village-chiefs are the 
representatives with most 
knowledge on specific 
village- and household-
needs; they are important 
partners for community 
projects; they only partly 
represent Baka and 
immigrants though and tend 
to disregard them  
Private 
actors 
Logging, trophy hunting 
and mining enterprises. 
Economically the 
strongest actors in LNP’s 
buffer zone 
Are by law obliged to pay a 
certain share of their taxes 
and to provide assistance to 
community projects; also 
have to contribute to 
conservation efforts 
If put under international 
attention, adherence to 
social and ecological laws 
and standards could be 
improved; the participatory 
renewal of management 
plans and internal zoning is 
very important to secure 
local usage rights  
International 
development 
cooperation 
For quite some time 
mostly German, French 
and US-American 
The willingness to support 
conservation efforts in the 
region is manifest as they 
As WWF, Cameroonian 
ministries and private 
enterprises seem unable, 
92 Results 
development 
cooperation has been 
present in the area (see 
Robillard, 2010: 229ff). 
At present, there is no 
international 
involvement in local 
development apart from 
WWF and FTNS 
helped set up national parks 
in southeast Cameroon. The 
willingness to accompany 
these efforts with 
development activities seems 
to have decreased  
unwilling and/or overstrained 
with the task to provide basic 
infrastructure and socio-
economic support to local 
communities, international 
development cooperation 
could help with integrating 
development and 
conservation efforts 
International 
IP NGOs 
Rainforest Foundation, 
Forest Peoples 
Programme, Survival 
International 
Want to provide assistance 
and secure rights of the Baka 
as part of international 
lobbying for IPs 
Provide an external actor for 
Baka to assert their positions; 
may provide funding for 
national and local IP 
organisations; could serve as 
counterweight but ideally 
also as partner for WWF  
National 
indigenous 
people 
NGO’s  
CEFAID, CED Fight for land tenure and 
usage rights of different IPs in 
Cameroon 
Know the Cameroonian 
context and are actively 
engaged in national 
campaigns for law reforms, 
memorandums of 
understanding, etc..; served 
as incubators for the local 
Baka associations and 
provide assistance. Lack 
capacity and do not always 
meet the expectations 
Local Baka 
organisations 
ASBABUK (Association 
Sanguia baka Buma'a 
Kpode), OKANI 
 
Foster the formation of local 
Baka associations; Try to 
provide platforms for the 
discussion and formulation of 
Baka positions and needs; 
serve as partners in 
agreements with the park 
management representing 
the local Baka; act as partners 
for international or national 
development (e.g. usage 
zone mapping) and 
cooperate with national or 
international organisations to 
spread awareness about the 
local (indigenous) 
population’s conditions and 
challenges 
 
In absence of any official 
political representation of the 
Baka, these organisations are 
important as advocates of 
Baka rights; most members 
and founders are Baka 
themselves; also engage in 
attempts to maintain Baka 
culture 
Common 
Initiative 
Associations exist for 
fishermen, cacao 
They are a part of a 
Cameroonian strategy to 
They lack any external 
funding and are in need of 
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groups 
(French: GIC) 
farmers, charcoal 
producers, etc.43 
enable, empower and 
organize small-scale 
producers. 
technical training and other 
support; they could serve as 
starting points for the 
support of alternative 
livelihoods 
Religious 
groups 
Catholic church, 
protestant churches, 
Muslim communities 
The catholic church is quite 
present in the area and 
maintains a hospital in 
Salapoumbé- Every village 
has small churches of 
different denominations and 
many bigger settlements 
have small mosques. 
The catholic church was one 
of the first and most 
important actor in attempts 
to settle the Baka; many 
Baka are going to church 
regularly; pastors of all 
denominations are respected 
by villagers; most immigrants 
are Muslims from northern 
areas of the country or 
Central Africa, and local 
mosques might be a good 
partner for integration efforts  
Source: own illustration based on insights drawn from literature and own data  
 
                                                        
43 see Robillard,2010:287ff for an extensive examination of the diverse associations active around LNP 
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5.3 Livelihoods 
  
Research Questions  
What are the current livelihood strategies of the local population and how are 
alternatives promoted by the park management (and other stakeholders)? 
The integration of local livelihood needs is central to Common Pool Resource 
Governance. On the one hand, livelihood needs drive unauthorised resource use – 
on the other, conservation often harms local livelihoods and induces suffering. 
Understanding the socio- economic context and impact of conservation is not 
only a moral prerequisite, but also instrumental for designing policy responses 
that increase the potential of local cooperation.  
The aim of the chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the current 
livelihood strategies of residents of Lobéké National Park, to display existing 
challenges and to point out possible areas of further involvement. The chapter 
starts with a description of the different livelihood activities of local communities 
and examines their main and minor income sources. Hereafter, it explores 
potential alternative livelihood strategies, formal employment opportunities and 
related impediments. It examines restrictions on resource access and use in the 
park’s buffer zone and looks at the provision of basic infrastructure by both the 
park management and private companies.  
This study’s findings are in line with previous studies that highlight the 
dependency of the local population from forest resources to satisfy basic 
livelihood needs (Tieguhong and Nkamgnia, 2012; Sayer et al. 2016). Alarmingly, 
local communities adjacent to the park face severe restrictions in access and use 
of forest resources, especially in its buffer zone. As alternative livelihood 
strategies are barely provided, local poverty is exacerbated. Basic infrastructure 
(roads, water, hospitals) is not developed, worsening the living conditions of the 
local population.  
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5.3.1 Livelihood Activities of the Local Population 
Following official accounts, 23.24544 inhabitants, belonging to two main ethnic 
groups (Baka and Bantu), were living in Lobéké’s buffer zone in 2012 (MINFOF, 
2014). The local population ekes out a living through subsistence farming, fishing, 
hunting, and, to varying degrees, small- scale commerce.  
Following a study by Tieguhong and Nkamgnia in 2012, the average per capita 
annual income of in total 111 households in five villages45 located in LNP’s buffer 
zone is USD 147/year. This figure is far below the national per capita income of 
USD 803/year (FAO, 2005) , illustrating the population´s severe poverty.  
Main livelihood activities of Baka and Bantu groups 
Traditionally, Baka people are hunter and gatherers and rely on the 
consumption of bushmeat and the collection of Non-Timber-Forest-Products 
(NTFPs) . However, agricultural activities appear to play an increasingly prominent 
role. Following local accounts and observations, Baka are mainly cultivating 
annual crops, such as cassava, taro/yam, corn, plantain, but also perennial crops 
such as cacao, the main cash crop in the area (F3; F9; C7). Local Bantu populations 
appear to be predominantly engaged in agriculture and husbandry (goats, sheep, 
and poultry; to a lesser extent, pigs and cattle) (F11; F21). Fishing appears to 
constitute an important food and income source for both Baka and Bantu, too, 
especially for communities close to the Sangha and Ngoko rivers (Libongo, 
Socambo, Kika, Moloundou) (C7; C9; C10) but also for communities fishing in 
smaller rivers within the forest (F7; C11; F3).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
44 This figure might be incorrect, as the last official census was done 2005: 
http://www.ceped.org/ireda/inventaire/ressources/cmr-2005-
rec_v4.7_repertoire_actualise_villages_cameroun.pdf  
Since then, all data is based on projections of population growth, that do not account for the influx of war 
refugees from neighbouring countries. 
45 The five communites were Zenga (PK 14), Socambo, Mambélé, Koumela, Libongo. The study team 
collected data in all these villages, too. 
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Image 15: Forest 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, female, 20 years old) (PV20) 
The participant took a picture of the forest. She says that she likes the forest because here 
they can find everything they need: NTFPs like koko, honey, plantains, njangsa, yams, and 
also bushmeat. “ We eat some and we sell some as well” 
 
 
Image 16: Farming Plot 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, Female, 38 years old) (PV16) 
The participant likes this picture, because farming is a way to generate income. She plants 
several crops on her field: manioc, papaya and banana. Some of the harvest she keeps for 
consumption, the other part she sells to people in the village or people passing by. If she could 
invest money, she would plant macabo, cacao, sugar cane and pineapple and extend the size 
of the plot. 
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Image 17: Cassava plantation in Libongo 
Source: Tobias Beyer 
 
These findings are in line with a study conducted by FTNS in 2018 that 
investigated the socio-economic situation of the population in seven villages 
around LNP (FTNS, 2018)46. The study’s results relating to the main sources of 
income for Baka and Bantu are shown in Table 9 and Figure 10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
46 A study by Tieguhong and Nkamgnia in 2012 on livelihood portfolios of over 100 households in LNP’s 
buffer zone provides similar numbers. Following their analysis, forest products (timber, bushmeat, and 
NTFPs) contribute largely to the annual household income (44,4%), followed by agriculture (18,3%) 
and livestock (10,2%). Fishing contributes only little to the household´s income (3,3%), and artisanal 
mining is almost negligible (0,5%). Of more relevance are small-scale businesses (8,4%), wages from 
employment (7,1%), and other income sources such as remittances, gifts and support by the 
government or NGOs (7,8%) (Tieguhong and Nkamgnia, 2012).  
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Figure 9: Main income sources for Baka in the Lobéké National Park 
periphery 
Source: FTNS, 2018 
 
 
Figure 10: Main income sources for Bantu in the Lobéké National Park 
periphery 
Source: FTNS, 2018 
 
As shown in the figures, the income from hunting, or in other words from 
bushmeat trade, plays an important role, especially for Baka groups (30%). The 
data gathered in the present study supports this evaluation (F9; PV7; PV20). 
Looking at the presented figure, however, the presented share of 9% of revenues 
from hunting for local Bantu groups strikes to be too low47. Following discussion 
with Baka groups in Mambélé and Ndongo, Bantu groups make use of the Baka´s 
                                                        
47 This impression was also supported by Dr. Glory Lueong (Glory Lueong, personal communication, 
November 20, 2018)  
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knowledge of forest animals by hiring them for (illegal) hunting activities (F2, F9). 
The same has been stated by several experts (EI14; EI1; EI3; EI4; EI8).  
Despite its significance for local people’s livelihoods, the sale of bushmeat is 
illegal without a licence (see Infobox 8 and Table 4). According to a Cameroonian 
GIZ employee with years of experience in the study area, it was illusionary to keep 
people from hunting and to prevent them from selling bushmeat (EI1). While 
partial legalization by offering sales permits was the right response, the 
administrative process to obtain a license should be designed more practically and 
equitably (EI1). However, possible impacts on wildlife need to be considered 
carefully, i.e. legalization should be restricted to common, fast-breeding species 
to adhere to conservation goals. 
 
 
Image 18: Selling Bushmeat 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Student, Baka, Female) (PV7) 
This picture shows a woman selling game that she hunted. The participant likes the picture 
because it shows how meat can be sold to earn money for soaps, books, pens, etc. People 
along the street buy it from them. When people do not buy it, they will eat it themselves. 
 
Other livelihood activities 
Other, minor income sources of the local population are charcoal production, 
working as harvest hand, small-scale commerce, and artisanal mining.  
Charcoal is produced in Libongo, where villagers are organized in a cooperative 
called COLIDESA. They used to have free access to leftovers of the forest 
company, SEFAC-group. Since the new SEFAC management started charging for 
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leftovers, it has become more difficult for COLIDESA members to produce 
charcoal (F12). To ensure the continuation of this reasonable utilization of 
residuals, the forest companies should be obliged to share their left-overs with the 
local population for free. This was initially agreed upon in the Mambélé 
convention, which needs to be renegotiated. 
 
 
Image 19: Hired Baka during Cocoa harvest 
Photo: Tobias Beyer 
 
Many Baka are working on the fields of Bantu, helping with cleaning and 
harvesting or watching over the farm to keep wild animals away. They earn 
between XAF 500 and 1.000 per day, which is the equivalent of € 0,76 and € 1,53 or 
USD 0,86 and USD 1,7348. It was also reported that farmers do not collaborate 
with Baka long-term, but exchange employees on a daily basis (P45; F14). 
                                                        
48 This is below the Word Bank´s definition of extreme poverty of USD 1,90 per day 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/understanding-poverty 
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Additionally, people own small shops and act as middlemen in the region by 
buying agricultural products from farmers. Most of these traders are Muslim 
immigrants from Cameroon´s northern regions, and few are local Bantu, while 
Baka are not involved in these activities (PV5; PV17; P99; P100; F19).  
 
 
Image 20: Local Shop 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, Male, 34 years) (PV17) 
The participant took a picture of a local shop. He likes it, because shops have a lot of products 
that he and other Baka can buy, for example pens and notebooks. All shops in Dioula are 
owned by Muslims from the North. He says that he can do good business with them. 
 
Furthermore, artisanal mining is practiced by around 300 people around 
Mongokélé (I37). It is illegal and does not constitute a reliable and established 
income source. Notwithstanding, it is likely that more people will engage in 
artisanal and small-scale mining in the future, as alternative livelihood activities 
are rare. The continuous criminalisation and marginalisation of small-scale mining 
entails uncontrolled mining practices that are harmful to the environment, e.g. 
the utilization of chemicals, as well as a lack of legal protection of miners. 
Therefore, an additional study should investigate the consequences of a potential 
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legalisation of artisanal mining, putting a special focus on the impact on 
ecosystem services and biodiversity. Following WWF guidelines within the ASM-
PACE programme49, the introduction of responsible mining techniques might 
minimize harmful environmental impacts (WWF, 2012; also see Africa Mining 
Vision 2009 on how best to integrate artisanal mining in local development plans 
(African Union, 2009).  
5.3.2 Potential Alternative Income opportunities  
Timber Extraction in Community Forests  
Community forests are managed by local communities and constitute an 
attempt to increase local participation in forest governance (see Chapter 5.2.6) 
and to provide additional income. Income can either be generated by (1) the sale 
of timber or (2) the establishment of a carbon zone. The latter is a relatively new 
project linked to REDD+, and participating communities have not received 
payments for their carbon zones yet (P83; I34) (see Chapter 5.2.6). This alternative 
approach of valorisation of forest resources can be a powerful instrument to 
support conservation efforts while simultaneously providing an additional income 
source for local people, and should be pursued further. However, the sharing of 
those revenues must be organized equitably, so that all villagers can benefit.  
The sale of timber is a more established and direct way of income generation. 
To ensure sustainable timber extraction, a management plan of the forest area 
must regulate the harvest of trees. In Socambo, it was reported that FTNS 
supported the development of a “simple management plan” (I34), while in other 
community forests such plans where not known (e.g. Dioula) (P107). This is 
problematic, as a lack of knowledge and control might result in overexploitation of 
forest resources.  
In terms of income generation, the main problem of community forests in 
LNP’s buffer zone is the timber extraction itself. Heavy machinery, such as chain 
saws, skidders, trucks or sawmills, is often lacking. As a result, income cannot be 
generated on a bigger scale. In addition, timber does not have the required quality 
for commercialization and is normally only used for house constructions in the 
village.  
In light of these difficulties, the community forest of Dioula has started to 
collaborate with a company based in Yaoundé, which provides a portable sawmill 
                                                        
49 Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) in and around Protected Areas and Critical Ecosystems (PACE) 
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that cuts trees on the spot. It remained unclear how much influence the company 
exerts upon the management of the community forest, and how much revenue 
eventually stays within the village (P107).  
Other community forests hope to collaborate with logging companies to 
improve timber extraction and to gain revenues through profit-sharing (P83). 
While profit- sharing might not be fairly negotiated, a small communal logging 
enterprise could create a much-needed employment opportunity for the local 
population. However, forest companies are not necessarily interested in such a 
joint venture, as many community forests are on terrain that was either already 
exploited or is difficult to access (P83).  
To unlock the income potential of timber extraction and to decrease the 
communities’ dependency on external partners, community forests should be 
supported with the development of sustainable management plans and access to 
harvest machinery.  
Commercialization of Cacao  
Cacao is the main cash crop in the area and has the potential to provide a 
significant (alternative) income source for the population50. In addition, a cacao 
plantation is an agroforestry system that integrates big shade trees and is more 
biodiverse than any other agricultural cultivation (Schroth & Harvey, 2007). 
Hence, an increase in cacao plantations can potentially support conservation 
efforts.  
However, many locals cannot afford to establish a cacao farm (F21; P44; P88). 
Cacao plantations require high initial investment (e.g. land) and costly 
maintenance51. Required inputs like fungicides, seedlings, and fertiliser are 
relatively expensive., and rates of return are quite low, as it takes three to five 
years to yield the first harvest. Lack of knowledge and skills are other factors that 
discourage local farmers from engaging in cacao cultivation. In general, it is easier 
for Bantu to engage in cacao production than for Baka, since the former usually 
have better access to capital and land.  
In order to increase the potential of cacao farms, is advisable to provide micro-
funding mechanisms to help poorer farmers with the initial investment, and to 
                                                        
50 XAF 500-1.000 per kg (€ 0,76-1,52 per kg) with a harvest of 1.000-2.000 kg/ha depending on the variety 
(F21; P44; P88) 
51 To buy pesticides and to clear ground vegetation, costing around XAF 35.000 ha/year, depending on the 
level of grass (F21)  
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provide more trainings on sustainable agroforestry practices such as the ones by 
the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF, financed by FTNS)52. An ICRAF- expert 
emphasized that these trainings require long-term commitment in order to be 
successful (EI10). 
 
 
Image 21: Cacao Harvest 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Bantu, Female, 38 years) (PV 16) 
The participant took a picture of her cacao harvest. She likes this picture because by selling 
the harvest she can earn enough money to send her children to school. She harvests the 
cacao fruits four times per year. Buyers come to the village from Kika and/or Moloundou and 
pay around 550 XAF per kg. The cacao plot she cultivates belongs to her parents. 
 
                                                        
52 “Promoting sustainable agriculture in the perspective of a REDD+ project around Lobéké and Dzanga 
Ndoki national parks” (Jan 2017- Sept 2018) 
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Image 22: Cacao Field 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, Male, 45 years) (PV18) 
The participant took a picture of a cacao field. He says that the cacao is ready to be harvested. 
“It helps us to send our children to school, to build houses”. The people who buy the cacao come 
directly to the producers; there is no fix timing. One kilo of cacao costs 600 XFA. He explains: 
“The price is low because roads are bad. That reduces the price”. 
 
Commercialization of Non-Timber-Forest-Products 
As numerous experts remarked, the commercialization of Non-Timber-Forest-
Products (NTFPs) has potential to constitute another relevant, alternative income 
source for local communities (EI9; EI1; EI10). The majority of local people collects 
them (I34; F19; F9; C10; C11). The most commonly gathered NTFPs are koko 
(Gnetum spp.), bush mango (Irvingia gabonensis), djansang (Ricinodendron 
heudelotii), wild pepper (Piper guineensis), pepe (Monodora myristica, common 
name: calabash nutmeg), mbalaka (Pentaclethra macrophylla, common name: 
African Oil bean tree), tondo (Aframomum spp.), rondelle, kanda, and ebaye. Most 
important for personal use are koko and bush mango, and the latter and djansang 
are the most commercialized NTFPs. During a workshop on the collection and 
utilization of NTFPs with the women´s association Or-Vert in Mambélé the 
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research team developed a seasonal calendar displaying collection periods for the 
respective NTFPs (see Table 12 and Table 13 in Annex 12). 
 
 
Image 23: Women collecting Non-Timber-Forest-Products near Dioula 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Baka, female, 20 years old) (PV20) 
This picture was taken by a Baka woman. The women are harvesting Djansang, which they use 
to make soup and to earn money by selling some. They go to the farm together to harvest the 
NTFP and sell it to Bantu. Following the participant, it was very difficult to harvest Djansang, 
and the Bantu did not buy at a reasonable price: a bucket is sold for 500frs and when the Bantu 
take it to town, they make a profit of XAF 4.000. 
 
The NTFPs are in high demand in countries of West Africa, and Cameroon is 
already involved in their export (Awono et al., 2016). However, profitable value 
chains, including processing and reliable commercialisation systems, need to be 
investigated and established further, so that people in LNP’s buffer zone can be 
integrated (EI9; EI10). The local NGO AFEBEN, based in Yokadouma, is involved in 
the promotion of NTFPs and should be supported in its activities. 
NTFPs might not only provide income, but also decrease the vulnerability of 
local people to Human-Wildlife-Conflicts (see Chapter 5.4.2), as most of them are 
not attractive to elephants or gorillas. 
A problem, however, is that people need to enter the forest and LNP´s 
community zone for the collection of NTFPs, while the access to the latter is 
complicated and expensive (see Chapter 5.2.5). In addition, an overexploitation of 
NTFPs can threaten natural stocks. Considering these problems, the incorporation 
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of NTFPs via agroforestry systems on people´s farms represents a favourable 
solution to ensure both sustainable harvest rates and better availability. This 
integration requires know-how and training that could be facilitated by the World 
Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) (EI10).  
Impediments to commercialization 
The access to markets is crucial for the creation of revenues from agricultural 
and forest products. However, market access is limited in the entire buffer-zone of 
LNP, hampering both product sale and the purchase of agricultural inputs, such as 
seedlings, pesticides, and fertilizers (P88; P44; M6; C10; C11; F9).  
This is due to three main reasons. First, there are only few local markets in 
bigger towns such as Libongo, Moloundou and Salapoumbé. The former vibrant 
border commerce of Libongo with neighbouring CAR and CG has stopped in 2014 
due to civil war in CAR (F11).  
Second, transport is time- consuming and costly, and most farmers lack means 
of transport. Occasionally, farmers transport their products, e.g. plantain, on the 
top of logging trucks of forest companies (P35). Most local farmers, however, sell 
their products directly at the street and wait for buyers. The sale of cacao, for 
example, entirely depends on the arrival of external buyers either coming from 
Douala, Yaoundé, Bertoua or Yokadouma, and prices are mainly controlled by 
them (F21; P44, Image 22).  
 
 
Image 24: Border to the Republic of Congo at the Ngoko River close to 
Socambo 
Photo: Tobias Beyer 
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Third, check points along the road require payments for the transport of 
commercialised goods. Depending on the amount being transported, the fee 
reportedly lies between XAF 2.000 and 5.000 53 (F9). Participants also mentioned 
that they have to buy an authorisation for transportation from the “chef du post” 
(M6). These opaque fees present a big obstacle and burden for small-scale 
producers and should be suspended.  
The limited access to markets greatly reduces the incentives to engage in 
agricultural commerce. It is vital to support the establishment of a transportation 
system that enables local farmers to sell their products to markets in Douala and 
Yaoundé independently from external buyers and middlemen. A possible solution 
is to facilitate and further encourage collective sales of products from small 
producers, as already done by some associations in the area. 
 
 
Image 25: Motorbike 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Bantu, Female, 38 years) (PV 16) 
The participant took a picture of a motorbike. She says that motorbikes are the only means 
for transport in the area. There are no safety measures and they carry too many people. 
Going to Kika costs around 2,5000 XAF, to Moloundou 15,000 XAF. 
 
                                                        
53 It remained unclear who controls the check points and receives the fees. 
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The study team met with three local associations either established by the 
park management or the government. These associations can help mitigate 
limited market access, lack of knowledge and assets, and promote alternative 
livelihood strategies. However, they lack support and consequently cannot unlock 
their full potential.  
GIC and CLG 
GIC/MOLISSO is a farmers’ association from Mambélé established in 2012 and 
has ten members. The association organizes product sales to negotiate a better 
price for increased quantity. The members jointly purchase agricultural inputs, 
exchange working tools and invest in group savings (XAF 60.000 year) (F21). There 
are GICs in other villages as well, and the GICs support each other financially, e.g. 
by granting credit. On initiative of the “chef de poste” for agriculture in Mambélé, 
a network of the different GICs between Dioula and Mambélé, called CLG, was 
founded in 2017. CLG is used as platform to discuss current challenges the farmers 
face and to develop joint solutions. 
“Women-Health-and-Conservation-Society” (WHCS) 
WHCS was initiated by the wife of a WWF employee in 2008. Its main objective 
is to increase the involvement of women in conservation efforts, and to reduce 
women’s dependency on forest resources. Currently, WHCS has around 19 female 
members who all come from Mambélé (both Baka and Bantu). In the past, the 
women received trainings by WWF, FTNS and committed individuals on soap and 
rattan mat production, bee keeping, husbandry (keeping porcupines), fishing, 
creation of vegetable gardens, and the cultivation of mushrooms, pineapples and 
plantains. Furthermore, they were trained on mosquito prevention and control 
methods. The women organised mosquito awareness campaigns in other villages, 
and their efforts were compensated with XAF 5.000 (€ 7,63) per day by the park 
management. Since 2012, however, the women have not received support and 
consequently ceased most of their activities. They occasionally produce rattan 
mats for sale, and the park management at times hires them to weed the 
premises of the headquarters and the park’s tourist camp, Camp Kombo, (F19). 
Or-Vert women association for the collection of NTFPs 
This organization was founded by FTNS and the director of the NGO AFEBEN 
in Mambélé in 2014. The association has 34 members, who collect NTFPs and sell 
them collectively. They mainly collect their products in community forests or 
UFAs, which is tolerated by the logging companies. The community zone of LNP 
is only used occassionally to collect wild mango as access is expensive and difficult 
(M6). 
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Support required 
GIC/MOLISSO: The members of GIC/MOLISSO stated that a microfinance 
system would be of great help to them. They also require a nursery for cacao 
seedlings in Mambélé, . So far,there are only two seedling nurseries in Lokomo 
and Moloundou (F21). 
WHCS: The members of WHCS received a lot of trainings on health-related 
issues and alternative livelihood activities. With some refreshment courses and 
financial compensation, the women could act as multipliers and train other 
villagers or pupils in schools. Similar associations should be established in other 
communities. Women from other villages expressed their keen interest in joining 
WHCS, however could not be involved hitherto due to lack of transportation (F19).  
Or-Vert: The association´s main problem is the marketing of their products. 
They require reliable buyers and a partner trading NTFPs. Additionally, their 
access to the community zone should be facilitated (M6). 
It should be noted that there are no associations representing hunters and 
artisanal miners, excluding these livelihood aspects from being politically 
pronounced and included in negotiations with private actors, park management 
and state representatives. Consequently, the absence of these associations 
hampers the sustained and effective inclusion of the respective groups into 
governance efforts. Improving mining livelihoods “by helping miners organise” 
(Tieguhong et al. ,2009:61) is recommended. Once formally established (e.g. as a 
GIC), this association could be a partner in conservation efforts (keeping them out 
of the core zone, avoiding introduction of chemical procedures), serving as an 
anchor for community projects (e.g. providing alternatives to bushmeat to miners 
to avoid poaching) and contribute to a general feeling of the population to get a 
share of the resources of their environment (Villegas et al., 2012). 
5.3.3 Formal Job Opportunities 
– offered by park management 
As usual for civil servants in Cameroon, most of the park management staff 
was appointed by the government and comes from outside the region. Hence, 
locals do not work in higher and/or permanent management positions. 
Occasionally, they are employed for inventories (every five years) on a short- term 
basis (I15; I23). They also work as tourist guides and carriers. However, these 
opportunities are rare due to the low number of visitors (I23). 
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The lack of job opportunities within the park management was criticised by 
many villagers. They claimed that the park management hired the same people 
for monitoring and touristic purposes despite an official rotation system (C3) and 
complained that only people from Mambélé were employed while other villages 
were disregarded (F13; F19; C7; C9). Villagers expressed the desire to be more 
involved in conservation, for example by being employed as eco-guards (F2).  
To improve the perception of LNP and to offer more stable income 
opportunities for the local population, it would be beneficial to increase efforts to 
integrate locals in the management of LNP on a long- term basis, especially those 
from outside of Mambélé.  
– offered by private sector 
The three logging companies are the most powerful economic actors in the 
park’s buffer zone, and its biggest formal employers. CTSC in Kika employs 
around 120 people (25% Baka) (I6), SEFAC in Libongo employs around 550 
workers (just 1% Baka) (F12). The Vicwood-Thanry Group in Lokomo used to 
employ 400 people54 but due to the company’s economic problems and the 
presence of poachers within their UFA 10-007 boardering CAR, only 100 workers 
are still on the payroll (I12). As a result, Lokomo was almost abandoned, 
demonstrating the town’s dependence on the company. 
 
 
Image 26: CTSC sawmill in Kika 
Photo: Tobias Beyer 
                                                        
54 No information on the share of Baka available 
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While there ere is no binding quota or regulation for the recruitment of local 
people, SEFAC claims to hire 50% “locals” but defines "local" broadly as the vast 
East region of Cameroon. Vicwood-Thanry Group even has an extra position for 
the recruitment of locals. However, both SEFAC and Vicwood- Thanry Group 
mainly recruit workers from bigger cities such as Yaoundé or Bertoua. Only CTSC 
asserts to hire 90% of local people from LNP’s buffer zone, a number confirmed 
by villagers (I5; I6; I12; I25). While working conditions in CTSC in Kika were 
criticised (P84), working conditions in the SEFAC company were reportedly good 
(F12). Both SEFAC and Vicwood-Thanry Group are OLB55 certified (I12).  
It should be a priority for the three logging companies to provide vocational 
training for local people, thereby increasing their chances of being hired. In 
addition, it is advisable to establish a quota for hiring workers from adjacent 
communities. MINFOF could support such a quota by conditioning the awarding 
of concessions on the integration of local employees. 
Other formal employers in the LNP landscape are four hunting safaris and a 
mining company. However, the number of people employed is comparably low (31 
locals in mining, 30-40 in hunting safaris), and jobs are seasonal and often short- 
term (I37; I24). 
 
                                                        
55 Origine et Légalité des Bois: https://www.bureauveritas.com/home/about-us/our-
business/certification/sector-specific-solutions/forest-wood-products/olb 
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Image 27: Baka housing in Ndongo 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant: (Farmer, Baka, female, 25 years old,) (PV6) 
The picture was taken in Ndongo by a Baka farmer. It shows the house of her uncle. She 
describes it as: "Déjà gatée" (“already destroyed”) and says: “Many people live in that house. It 
is difficult to live there.” 
 
5.3.4 Restrictions on Livelihood Activities  
The main livelihood activities of the local population require land for the 
cultivation of crops and access to the forest for hunting and gathering, 
underscoring the spatial dimension of local livelihoods. Due to the creation of the 
park and the strict protection of its core zone, a substantial area (2.179 km2) 
cannot be used as before. The efforts by the park management to grant access to 
the protected area in form of a community zone are not effective (see Chapter 
5.2.5).  
Most livelihood restrictions, however, appear to occur in the concessions of 
private companies (logging, safari, and mining) in LNP’s buffer zone. These 
concessions are six times bigger than the park’s core zone (12.638,5 km2) and 
often overlap with villages and farms (see Map 3 and Map 4). The economic actors 
are legally obliged to restrict certain usages in their zones (e.g. hunting protected 
species or clearing forest for agriculture in UFAs) and have a self-interest to 
impede local resource use (safari companies, for example, require high game 
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density). While legally required to guarantee customary use (see Chapter 5.2.3), 
there is evidence that private actors severely restrict local communities’ 
traditional hunting and gathering rights. 
Local access to bushmeat is restricted in both safari and logging concessions. 
Safari companies are patrolling within their concessions, and timber company 
SEFAC in Libongo is collaborating with a safari company to prosecute any form of 
hunting, including subsistence hunting (I25). Following accounts in Bela, safari 
companies “beat and kill people, and have colonized the UFA”, and even patrolled 
in villagers’ non-permanent agroforestry zone (C8). Baka in Libongo made similar 
claims, stating that safari employees are active near their houses, and beat them 
up: “Safari [companies] have taken the forest” (C7). In general, villagers had great 
difficulties to comprehend hunting restrictions enforced by safari companies and 
deemed it unfair that safari companies were allowed to hunt, while “the villagers 
who need to hunt to survive are sent to prison” (F6). Reportedly, patrols of 
hunting safaris also destroy makeshift camps used for the collection of NTFPs 
(F11; F12; F14; C7). 
Similar restrictions are reported with regards to UFAs. In interviews, 
participants reported that they were chased away from UFAs, and that their huts 
were burnt (I4, I14, P35, C12, C2, C5). Villagers of Zega claimed that the logging 
company active in proximity to their village had already cut down all trees in the 
forest and was trying to chase them away to “destroy” their village (C11). As most 
villagers lack official land titles to their farms within UFAs, they have difficulties to 
prove that their farm existed before the UFA was established, and consequently 
fear that their farm will be destroyed once the company decides to start timber 
extraction on their farm´s territory (P88, P100). Other communities complained 
that commercial timber exploitation often leaves the forest in a degraded stage, 
and that they cannot find certain NTFPs any longer (C3). These complaints not 
only raise doubts about the protection of customary use rights of local 
communities but also about the environmental sustainability of current timber 
exploitation practices.  
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Image 28: Signpost of the UFA 10-012 
Photo: Tobias Beyer 
 
While mining concessions appear to be extensive according to the TNS 
landscape map, only one company, Mongokele Mining, is currently actively 
extracting resources. As the company is rather small (I37), it currently does not 
restrict local livelihood activities. However, if the sector is expanded in the future 
and more companies are present, limitations on livelihood activities will likely 
increase.  
5.3.5 Mitigation of Livelihood Challenges 
Several measures can help mitigate the livelihood restrictions described above.  
First, access to forest resources should be facilitated to ensure the 
continuation of current livelihood strategies (hunting and NTFP collection). 
Second, MINFOF should adapt and enforce a more dynamic and equitable land- 
use planning of LNP’s buffer zone to better integrate local livelihood needs. These 
measures are crucial for people that are highly depend on forest resources 
(especially Baka) and therefore of high priority.  
In the long-term, alternative livelihood activities must be provided. On the one 
hand, alternative livelihood strategies decrease local dependency on forest 
resources and thus improve conservation effectiveness. On the other, they 
potentially alleviate poverty through the generation of decent income. Alternative 
livelihood activities should be established through projects and vocational 
trainings by park management, private actors and an institution experienced in 
116 Results 
the implementation of development projects (ICRAF, international agencies like 
GIZ or local NGOs). Instead of using a top- down approach, the introduction of 
alternative livelihood strategies should consider suggestions by the local 
population and be organised bottom- up.  
Potential alternative livelihood strategies proposed by the villagers are e.g. 
bee- keeping ((F21; P25; also see Degrande et al., 2018), support with the 
cultivation of fruit trees (P88), and the promotion of husbandry (F19). As some 
Baka appear not to be used to eat other meat than bushmeat (P14, P25), the latter 
might require awareness campaigns, and behavioural change. It is also advisable 
to build upon existing knowledge of local associations to determine potential 
alternatives.  
In addition, it is advisable to promote sustainable agricultural practices for 
cacao farms and to provide seedlings. This would increase productivity, 
potentially decreasing demand for new farm land and better compensate harvest 
losses. The processing of cocoa beans to more valuable products, such as cacao 
butter, was also considered a potential new income source (P88, P45). 
Any promotion of agriculture must be combined with measures to reduce local 
vulnerability to Human-Wildlife-Conflict (see Chapter 5.4.2). Intensification 
through use of synthetic fertilizer and pesticides should be avoided. Instead, 
ecological intensification measures should be introduced through agricultural 
extension services, paying special attention to Baka´s living conditions and skills.  
In order to make (perennial and annual) agriculture more attractive and to 
encourage investments, the question of land tenure needs to be further 
investigated.  
Finally, the park management should increase its presence in buffer zone and 
interact with the local population to monitor their needs and desires. 
5.3.6 Provision of Basic Infrastructure and Community 
Development 
The park management has the legal responsibility to support local 
communities by offering alternative livelihood activities and/or by compensating 
people’s losses resulting from limited access to natural resources. This is required 
by national law (Art. 26 and Art. 27, Loi N°94/01)56 and by international and donor 
guidelines (BMZ 2013). Furthermore, the different private companies operating in 
                                                        
56 Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994 
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LNPs buffer zone are legally required to provide basic infrastructure and engage in 
development activities (Art. 61 and Art. 66, Loi N°94/01)57. This responsibility has 
already been recognized by both park authorities and private actors and was 
expressed in the Mambélé convention.  
During fieldwork, the park management emphasized its responsibility to 
provide alternative livelihood strategies and basic infrastructure. The park’s 
budget plan allocates financial means to several initiatives, e.g. 224,232,841 XAF 
to micro-projects on alternative livelihoods (Parc National de Lobéké, 2017).  
 
 
Image 29: Hospital in Socambo 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Restaurant owner, Bantu, female) (PV12) 
The participant appreciates that there is a local hospital. However, she took this picture to 
show a negative aspect of her life: the hospital has no drugs and materials. There is no 
electricity. One nurse and one lab technician are responsible for more 2000 people, and there 
is no doctor. “This makes life difficult and the hospital building is useless”. When there are 
complicated health cases, people are sent to Moloundou or Salapoumbe but the roads are 
bad. 
                                                        
57 Ibid. 
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WWF Cameroon repeatedly highlighted the crucial importance of community 
development to ensure effective conservation for and with the people and 
emphasized being actively involved in community development around LNP, e.g. 
by paying schoolteachers and school fees. When asked about approaches and 
concrete projects to support the local population, WWF Cameroon pointed out 
that schools, teachers and wells were badly needed in many villages, and reported 
that they planned to build poultry farms in the future (I21; P18). However, while 
development of basic infrastructure was described as a vital necessity, few 
development project could be observed on site. According to most villagers, the 
park management is neither present nor active in villages other than Mambélé 
(F13; C7; C9). Despite several requests, the study team was not able to obtain a list 
with implemented or planned community development projects by the WWF 
Community Coordination Officer to verify this claim. 
MINFOF also acknowledged its responsibility to engage in community 
development (I18; I39). Following the conservator, the Cameroonian state had the 
obligation to create favourable living conditions for its citizens. As the state was 
represented by the park in this region, the park supported local communities 
through various measures: the park helped establish community forests and 
ZIGCs and had successfully implemented local development projects: "It is here 
out of all places in Cameroon that we have a lot of community projects” (I39).  
However, while the state was responsible for supporting the improvement of 
people’s living conditions, the communities were partly responsible for their own 
development: “People have to be able to fish on their own and should not be 
given fish” (I39). A lack of education combined with widespread alcoholism and 
corruption by villages elites kept local communities from development. In 
addition, most villages lacked capacities to design and submit community 
development projects. The WWF- Programme Manager equally shared the 
concern that the communities were not well equipped to manage the community 
forests and COVAREF in a way that benefitted the local population at large (I21).  
Other MINFOF representatives of the park management stated that 
development projects should be financed by other actors such as KfW, FTNS or 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as the primary objective of the park was 
biodiversity conservation (I18). On state level, the Governor acknowledged the 
state’s responsibility to invest in community development. He reported ambitions 
to invest in large infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams and roads but 
the planning is still on-going (I2), and a prospective development strategy 
compatible with conservation efforts appears to be largely absent. 
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The degree of involvement of the private companies in community 
development differed.  
Forest companies are required by law to engage in community development 
activities. Two of the three timber companies (VICWOOD-THANRY GROUP and 
SEFAC) acknowledge their special role for community development and their 
commitment exceeds legal obligations (I12; I25). Both companies mainly focus on 
medical support and the prevention of contagious diseases, education, provision 
of electricity and construction of community buildings (F11; I25). While 
VICWOOD-THANRY GROUP has an own development plan, SEFAC supports one 
development project each year proposed by a community (I25). However, their 
involvement is selective and limited to the proximate surroundings of the sawmills 
in Libongo (SEFAC) and Lokomo (VICWOOD-THANRY GROUP). For the third 
logging company, CTSC, community development appears to be of less interest 
as an employee pointed out: "A forest Company is not a social project" (I6). Though 
operating in the area for four years, no community projects have been initiated 
yet, except for football matches and an internship programme with a nearby 
school (I6). 
The safari companies and the mining company are not engaged in community 
development but intend to get involved soon. However, no concrete ideas or 
areas of involvement were further described (I13; I37). It was often stated that the 
state bore the primary responsibility for the development of basic infrastructure 
and not the companies (I25). 
As a result of the insufficient provision of basic infrastructure, the majority of 
local people feels abandoned and neglected. These feelings of neglect are 
projected upon the park and inhibit local buy-in for conservation efforts. During 
field research, villagers often described conservation as quasi-synonym to 
restrictions, and it appeared that the lack of basic infrastructure is a cause of 
resentment over conservation , causing friction and conflicts (see Chapter 5.4.1). 
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Image 30: Boy drinking water out of the Sangha river 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Bantu, Farmer, male) (PV 11) 
The picture was taken by a Bantu farmer in Socambo. He says that the boy is fetching water 
from a river, while some meters upstream people are washing themselves and defecate into 
the water. He wishes for clean drinking water and a pump. Following the farmer, water is the 
basis of health and drinking water from a river was “a serious issue”, not only as it causes 
illnesses like typhoid, but also because it makes the brain sick: “People get mentally ill if they 
are always feeling sick”.  
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Image 31: Pupils in classroom 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Baka, male, 34 years) (PV 17) 
The picture was taken by a Baka farmer in Dioula. He values education a lot: "Our children go 
to school and they can become anything, even president". At home, the children can even 
teach their parents what they have learnt. School fees are XAF 3.000 annually, which he 
thinks is ok. Schools are mixed with Baka and Bantu children, and he thinks that helps to 
reduce discrimination and stereotypes. 
5.4 Conflicts 
Conflicts between park management and local communities (so- called park–
people conflicts) are some of the most pervasive problems troubling PAs around 
the globe and can be extremely destructive (De Pourq et al., 2015). This study 
identified four main conflicts in LNP. These conflicts are not only a result of a 
competition over scarce resources, but involve differences in values, antagonistic 
attitudes, negative perceptions and feelings of mistrust and fear.  
The overarching conflict concerns the local population’s understanding of 
conservation as an antidote to pro-people development (Conflict 1: Conservation 
and Development). This perceived conflict of interest impedes local support for 
conservation efforts. The conflict is strongly related to a high-risk perception for 
Human Wildlife- conflicts, which thwart local endorsement of wildlife protection 
(Conflict 2: Humans and wildlife).  
A key conflict that has received prominent media coverage concerns the 
relationship of eco-guards and local population (Conflict 3: Law enforcement and 
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Local Population). Accounts of direct violence and insecure usage rights have 
resulted into a toxic atmosphere of fear and mistrust, thwarting effective and just 
law enforcement.  
A conflict that is highly relevant for understanding the needs and problems of 
the local population, yet often kept out of the spotlights, concerns the 
relationship of Baka and Bantu groups (Conflict 4: ‘Forest people’ and ‘Villagers’). 
While not a park- people conflict as such, this latent inner- community conflict 
affects the needs and aspirations of indigenous people and threatens equitable 
participation and revenue- sharing. 
 
 
Figure 11: Conflict Map of actors involved in the governance of Lobéké 
National Park and its buffer zone 
Source: own illustration58 
 
5.4.1 Conflict 1: Conservation and Development 
A striking finding of the research is the shared negative perception of 
conservation, cutting across all controlled social categories (gender, ethnicity, and 
age). This is worrisome, as a negative perception of conservation by the local 
population has adverse effects on the success of conservation projects, and fuels 
                                                        
58 The depicted conflict within the park management has been described in Chapter 5.1.7 
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conflicts (Bennett 2016). Perceptions determine compliance with rules, support by 
local constituents, levels of participation, and volunteer engagement. Therefore, 
it is important to understand the main drivers behind the negative perception of 
LNP’s conservation efforts. 
While the local population appears to acknowledge that conservation efforts 
preserve the forest for future generations, it simultaneously assumes an 
antagonist relationship between “conservation” and “the people”, as clearly 
expressed by statements such as “conservation does not like the people” (C1). 
During interviews and focus group discussions, conservation was frequently linked 
to a restriction of freedom and the impairment of living conditions. Consequently, 
words often associated with conservation were “repression”, “fear”, and 
“sufferance”. 
The negative rating of conservation appears to be influenced by two dynamics: 
(1) Well-being and identity needs59 not addressed: 
The local population appears to understand and value the advantages of 
conservation (protection of the forest and wildlife). This is reflected in statements 
such as “The park, it is good, it conserves for tomorrow” (F17) or “It helps to preserve 
the forest and the animals for our children” (F15). However, research participants 
fault the lack of concrete social benefits and care. They criticize that animals 
destroy their farm (see Conflict 2: Humans and Wildlife) and appear to be of more 
value than humans - even though “elephants never go to vote” (C8). 
The expression of feelings of neglect go along with demands for coverage of 
people’s basic needs. The local population expects conservation to provide basic 
infrastructure and alternative income strategies. The participants often referred 
to DSNP and NNNP as best- practice examples, where rice and manioc are 
allegedly shared with the people, and where the park management provided 
schools, hospitals, and work opportunities for the local population. They are 
heavily disappointed by the failure of the park management to keep its alleged 
development promises: “They said they would help us, with micro-projects, 
livestock keeping and aquaculture… there are many who died in prison because there 
is no work… where are the accompanying measures?” (TWS1). As socio-economic 
development is lacking, the local population confronts conservation with well-
                                                        
59 Galtung (1990) identifies four universal basic human needs: 1. Survival needs (i.e. protection from 
violence); 2. Well- being needs (i.e. food, nutrition, movement), 3. Identity needs (i.e. belonging, 
include. political activity); 4. Freedom needs (i.e. freedom to choose) 
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being needs, threatening to destroy the forest if not taken care of: “We will 
destroy the environment because there are no alternatives [to hunting]” (C8). 
The demands for coverage of basic needs are not only based on well-being 
needs, but also informed by participants’ self-identification as Cameroonian 
citizens. As one participant put it: “The state, that is us. If humans do not have 
value anymore, the forest has no value either” (TWS1). One female participant 
succinctly made clear that the lack of socio-economic support made her feel 
alienated: “I do not know in which Republic we are living; if we are living in 
Cameroon? We are always put aside… What happens? » (C9). This reference to 
state belongingness occurred frequently, hinting at the assertion of citizenship- 
rights and identity needs. 
(2) Lack of involvement of the local population: 
Participants’ criticism often included demands for active participation and 
benefit-sharing. This started with participants’ complaints about not being 
informed a priori about the establishment of the park and cumulated into 
demands for active involvement:  
▪ “We want conservation, but we need benefits, we must be integrated in the 
management » (C9) 
▪ "We want that the population is in charge, [we want] to earn money from 
conservation” (C2) 
These political demands are coupled with feelings of exclusion and 
estrangement. Correspondingly, conservation is often portrayed as a project of 
outsiders, thwarting economic development:  
“The climate convention wants Africa to reduce CO2, to protect its forest. You 
impose that, but what is our benefit? In America, in Brazil, forests are cut down to 
give room to industries, you have work and you are rich. But in Africa, people must 
protect the forest. However, they do not benefit from protection. We stay under the 
tree (“nous restons sous l’arbre”)” (C9).  
Support for LNP on the brink? 
While the park management advocates that conservation can support people’s 
socio-economic development and was not it’s antidote, the lack of socio- 
economic development and participation leads to resentment on behalf of the 
local population. Ultimately, it fuels a negative perception of conservation- 
efforts, understood as a “foreign” project imposed by outsiders. Alarmingly, this 
negative perception of conservation is not only impeding local support for 
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conservation, but also fuels other park- people conflicts. While the park is not 
primarily responsible for the socio-economic development of the local population, 
it is clear that conservation efforts can only be effective if their basic needs are 
met. 
 
 
Figure 12: PIN – Tool_ Conflict Conservation and Development 
Description: The position of the local population is that conservation has a negative social 
impact and halts socio-economic development. Their interests are to secure income 
generation and the improvement of their living conditions. In addition, the local population 
has an interest in being implied in the management and in benefitting from conservation at 
large. They base their interests in well-being and identity needs. 
Source: own illustration 
 
5.4.2 Conflict 2: Humans and wildlife 
Human-Wildlife Conflicts (following: HWC) are commonly understood as 
actions by humans or wildlife that have an adverse effect on the other. Following 
Nyhus, HWC can also be based on the perception that wildlife threatens human 
safety, health, food, and property (Nyhus, 2016:145). 
HWC pose a serious challenge to conservation efforts: first, perceived threats 
by wildlife can hamper local support for conservation efforts (Lamarque et 
al.,2009). Second, crop raiding can fuel retaliatory killings of animals (ibidem). 
HWC also compromises poverty alleviation: its ‘visible’ impacts threaten 
Position: 
“Conservation 
does not 
like the people”
Interest: Secure income, 
improvement of living 
conditions; participation in 
management
Needs: Well- being needs; Identity needs
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agricultural output and local food security. Furthermore, its ‘hidden’ impacts, such 
as high opportunity and transaction costs as well as the transmission of infectious 
diseases (‘zoonosis’), have adverse effects on the well-being of the rural poor 
(Barua et al., 2013). 
High risk perception of HWC  
The risk perception for HWC in communities around LNP is very high. 
Correspondingly, HWC is the predominant concern of the local population, and 
has been brought to the study team’s attention in every village visited. 
Participants stated that their crops were damaged by elephants (F7; C7), 
chimpanzees and gorillas (C11; F11; PV16), or smaller monkeys such as gueneons 
or mangabeys (C2). But not only crops are concerned: fishermen in Libongo said 
caimans were eating their bait (F11). 
The research team was presented with evidence of crop-raiding by primates on 
numerous cacao farms but was not able to verify the claims systematically (i.e. by 
matching the risk perception with the actual risk). Notwithstanding, the many 
references to HWC and the shared high-risk perception underline the significance 
of HWC for the local population in LNP’s buffer zone. 
 
 
Image 32: A cacao- farm destroyed by monkeys 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, female) (PV3) 
The participant took this picture to show the destruction of a cocoa farm caused by monkeys. 
“We are sick of animals destroying our fields” 
Reported incidents of wildlife impact have fuelled anxiety and anger among 
the local population. Following one participant, people were “sick of […] animals 
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destroying [the] fields” (SW1). It takes up to nine months to regrow damaged 
crops. As most people depend on a single livelihood strategy and lack alternative 
assets, they are highly vulnerable to resource destruction, and perceive wildlife 
impact as an existential threat. Especially elephants are feared for their 
destructive potential (C10).  
In addition, participants reported to feel helpless and left alone in dealing with 
wildlife impact, aggravating the perceived menace. As a result, the protection of 
forest animals is not fully understood and supported: "Elephants are more 
protected than humans; when a person is killed by an elephant, nothing happens" 
(F11). This quote further underlines that HWC is not only a concern related to crop 
damage, but also involves feelings of neglect and underlying tensions from 
human- human conflicts over conservation at large (Dickman, 2010; Nyhus, 2016).  
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Figure 13: ABC triangle Human-Wildlife-Conflict 
Source: own illustration based on Galtung 1990 
Following Galtung, a conflict consists of three basic interrelated elements: [A] the attitudes of 
the conflict parties, [B] their conflict behaviour (violent or non- violent), and [C] the 
contradiction (often also referred to as “context”) central to the conflict, i.e. seemingly 
incompatible goals. The triangle draws attention not only to "spectacular" evidence of 
conflict (i.e. persecution of animals) but also to the attitudes and structural inequalities that 
lie underneath - the “catalysators” of evident conflict (i.e. feelings of neglect and competing 
resource use). Without addressing all three angles of conflict, it cannot be transformed 
(Galtung 1990) 
 
The conflict is aggravated by the following factors:  
a) Little knowledge on nonlethal prevention methods: Participants 
reported to have limited means (e.g. sling shots) and techniques to protect 
their crops without harming wildlife (PV4, F6). While some participants 
stated to use drums and loud noise to chase away animals (PV3), the 
shooting and killing of animals were perceived the most effective 
prevention methods (F11). However, both are forbidden under the Forestry 
Law if not used in direct self-defence (Art. 83, Loi N°94/01) 60. MINFOF can 
                                                        
60 Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994 
Behaviour: 
Persecution; Habitat Destruction; 
Complaints 
Attitude: 
Hostility towards conservation efforts; 
Feelings of neglect 
Contradiction/Context: 
Competing resource use; High 
opportunity and transaction costs of 
living with wildlife 
 
HWC-
Conflict 
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give the permission to kill an animal if found in the fields. Following 
participants’ accounts, however, the villagers’ requests for permission are 
seldomly responded to (SW1). Furthermore, it was difficult to surprise 
animals in the fields, as they ran off into the forest as soon as humans 
approach (F9). Consequently, participants expressed feelings of 
powerlessness to prevent HWC: "When [elephants] arrive, we are not 
allowed to kill them. So how do we defend us against them?" (C10). 
 
 
Image 33: Hut by the fields 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, female, 60 years) (PV3) 
The participant says that she stays in the hut to chase away wild animals. She uses the drum: 
“I hit it so hard that it scares the animals away. When we are sick, we don't have strength to do 
that because it is very stressful “ 
 
b) Compensation Mechanism is inapt and ineffective: Despite its existence, 
many participants are not aware of a compensation mechanism. This might 
be due to its cumbersome procedure that involves three different 
ministries61. Working the files is a long process, increasing the transaction 
costs for the local population, as one villager explains: “Until you are 
                                                        
61 Following the account of a WWF- officer, the determination of compensation is under the aegis of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MINADER) (“parrain de compensation”); MINFOF is supporting the 
compensation process in evaluating the destruction on the fields, i.e. by determining the animal that 
has caused it (responsible is the respective Chef de Poste), and the Ministry for Territorial 
Administration (MINATD), represented via the Sous-Prefect, has a fund for natural disasters ("fond 
catastrophe"), which finally provides the compensation (SW1) 
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through your field is destroyed, sometimes it takes 9 months until there is 
help” (SW1). Furthermore, participants fault the lack of response by the 
ministries, stating that the damages on their fields are not evaluated when 
lodging a complaint (SW1; F14; C1). Following participants in Bela, villagers’ 
requests for compensation are not taken seriously: the local government 
official (“chef de poste”) always inquired the names of the animals that 
destroyed their fields (C8). Another farmer reported that he was asked by 
WWF- staff of LNP to directly complain to the gorilla when he sought help 
(P44).  
c) More animals coming to villages: Following participants, elephants and 
gorillas approach villages more frequently than in the past. Local 
employees of a safari company close to Koumela also report that elephants 
are seen more often in the village than a couple of years ago (I13) – even 
though elephant numbers are declining (see Figure 7). According to one 
participant, a possible explanation for higher elephant numbers in certain 
areas was the use of salt by safari companies trying to attract them (F11). 
An eco-guard assumes that the animals come closer to the villages as “they 
are secure, they are not threatened and can do what they want” (PV1). A 
reason for increased violent disruption by elephants might be that old, 
socially experienced long- tuskers have all been shot, so that hyper 
aggressive and hostile behaviour of young elephants is uncontrolled for 
(Breuer, 2016). Additional reasons for increased animal encroachment 
might be that (1) there are more fields than 20 years ago, and that (2) fields 
are now closer to the LNP core zone and on animal migration routes.  
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Image 34: Monkey in kitchen 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, male, 26 years) (PV4) 
According to the participant, monkeys often enter the houses of people in the village: they 
go into the kitchens, steal food, destroy things, defecate. This happens about once a week. 
People chase them away, but they come back. Through conservation, monkeys have become 
less afraid of humans - it is forbidden to kill or shoot at them. His grandparents used bow and 
arrow to chase them away. NGOs should find ways to keep them from the village as there are 
currently no measures in place. 
 
d) Lack of appropriate measures by the park management: The park 
management is only starting to work on the issue of HWC, and no holistic 
response strategy is in place yet. In interviews, however, park employees 
appeared to be highly aware of the extent and seriousness of HWC. Some 
eco-guards are themselves victims of crop damage by animals (PV1). 
Following a senior eco-guard, a student will be engaged next year to 
generate data on HWC and to test different prevention methods (SW1). 
The conservator stated that a colleague from the park management was 
currently based in Kenya to study elephant behaviour (I38). In addition, 
MINFOF was planning to address the economic costs of HWC through the 
development of an insurance mechanism and the creation of a national 
compensation fund (ibidem). However, these ideas are not concrete yet, 
and the budget specifically earmarked for HWC in the annual plan 2018 is 
negligible (SW1; Parc National de Lobéké, 2017). 
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Image 35: Fields of Eco- Guards 
Photo: PhotoVoice- Participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, male) (PV2) 
The picture shows the fields of the eco- guards: “Everyone plants plantains. But the animals 
that we protect destroy them". He says that reparations should be paid. "The animals come to 
the village because they are secure, they are not threatened, they can do what they want. One 
should start threatening them with firearms. The people also have to eat" 
 
Towards co-existence? 
The vast literature on HWC suggests that a peaceful coexistence of humans 
and wildlife is possible – provided that appropriate management tools, public 
policies and societal support are present (Nyhus, 2016). Appropriate responses to 
HWC might include lethal (i.e. traps, shootings, pesticides) and non-lethal control 
(i.e. monitoring, deterrents, fertility control, barriers, buffer crops), as well as 
economic (i.e. compensation, insurance, alternative income, revenue sharing) and 
social interventions (i.e. education, training) (ibidem). 
Before appropriate prevention methods and mitigation tools can be identified, 
HWC in LNP must be studied in more depth. There is much evidence of mismatch 
between risk perception and actual risk of HWC around the globe – in many cases, 
rodents and invertebrates cause more damage than protected species (Dickman 
2010: 461). It is often social factors that determine antagonistic attitudes towards 
wild animals. Consequently, persecution will continue even if wildlife damage is 
entirely mitigated (ibidem). 
To design appropriate responses for LNP’s buffer zone, it is necessary to 
determine whether the high-risk perception of HWC is politically linked to a 
negative attitude towards wild animals and/or conservation, or whether there is 
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an actual risk. This also involves the evaluation of the extent of wildlife impact on 
local food security and farming, providing details on animal species, frequency, 
locality, and people’s vulnerability. 
In a second step, HWC- approaches should be co-jointly developed with the 
local population. Evidence suggests that decentralised strategies involving 
affected communities are more successful (Hockings and Humle, 2009:8). 
5.4.3 Conflict 3: Law enforcement and Local Population 
A conflict prominently discussed in international media is that between eco- 
guards and the local population. It first received international attention in 2016, 
when Survival International submitted a formal complaint to the OECD, in which it 
accused WWF of having failed to adhere to the principle of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC) and reproached LNP’s eco-guards with Human Rights 
abuses against Baka (Survival International, 2016). To substantiate their claims, 
Survival International forwarded several English letters signed by local Baka. 
While neither Baka nor Bantu participants spoke about Survival International 
directly or appeared to know the exact content of the letters62 (F2, C7), the 
conflict-laden relationship to law enforcement agents was regularly discussed in 
community meetings and focus group discussions. Essentially, the conflict 
revolves around the interpretation and application of usage rights and is fuelled by 
feelings of mistrust, the lack of an accessible, effective and equitable complaint 
mechanism, and violent law enforcement by private companies.  
Position of Conflict Parties  
The research revealed the positions of the two conflict parties. On the one 
hand, the local population claims their usage rights are drastically curtailed by 
conservation forces and lives in fear of the eco-guards. During interviews and 
focus group discussions, people stated that eco-guards routinely confiscate their 
hunting and fishing equipment, NTFPs they have collected or animals they have 
hunted (C3; C8; F3; F10; F15). Makeshift camps, which people use to overnight in 
the forest for several days, are destroyed and burned down (F14). Furthermore, 
members of the local communities complained about physical abuse at the hands 
                                                        
62 : While local Baka NGOs like OKANI appreciate Survival International’s involvement for drawing 
international attention to problems related to conservation (I1), a representative of CEFAID criticized 
its involvement for its single- handed approach without collaboration with local NGOs (EI2). FTNS 
suspects that SI made locals to sign the letters by giving false promises (EI9). Indeed, representatives 
of the Human Rights in Bayanga (CAR) doubt that Baka were able to read the letters; a concern that is 
equally shared by a representative of CEFAID and WWF (EI2; EI7).  
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of the law enforcement agents: beatings and other acts of humiliation (e.g. a 
woman forced to undress) (F2; F3; F13). According to focus group participants and 
interviewees, eco-guards are unreasonable during encounters and do not respect 
their usage rights: even when people comply with the regulations of subsistence 
hunting, eco-guards deter them from entering the forest altogether (F14; C12). 
While these accounts were consistent, with minor variations, in all communities 
adjacent to LNP irrespective of their ethnic compositions, the theatres enacted by 
Baka participants displayed a more violent behaviour.  
On the other hand, eco-guards and other staff of the park management paint a 
different picture: their primary task is to apply Cameroonian law (M3). Given the 
high levels of poaching in the area and the increased militarisation of actors, eco-
guards need to be armed for protection (F20). When eco-guards encounter 
individuals who are in breach of the law and do not comply with the regulations of 
subsistence hunting, it is their duty to confiscate any meat or hunting equipment. 
In more severe cases, those suspected of poaching need to be brought to the 
headquarters for questioning and detention (I39). Top-level representatives of 
FTNS, WWF and MINFOF assured the research team that Human Rights violations 
and physical abuses are a thing of the past (EI17; EI19; I39): eco-guards underwent 
trainings on Human Rights and there was a WWF manual on Human Rights as well 
as a code of ethics issued by the park management. In an interview the 
Conservator of LNP stated that: “In three years I have not had a single complaint 
about Human Rights abuses” (I39).  
The claims of either side are impossible to verify within the scope of this study. 
Nonetheless, the research identified four factors influencing the conflict’s 
dynamics. It should be noted that these considerations are based on the research 
team’s interpretations and hence do not claim to establish an unequivocal truth: 
(1) The experience of direct violence creates an atmosphere of mistrust that 
hinders potential reconciliation between the two sides 
The issue of physical violence is central to this conflict. Not all interviewees, 
who claimed that eco-guards beat or physically abuse villagers, had experienced 
such abuse themselves. Some Baka community members in Dioula even stated 
that interactions with the eco-guards are becoming friendlier (TWS1). What is 
striking, however, is that the vast majority of interviewees in villages perceived 
the eco-guards as violent and reported to be afraid of them. When asked to act 
out a typical encounter between villagers and eco-guards in the Theater of the 
Oppressed, most actors chose to portray eco-guards as unreasonable and violent 
(T1; T4; T7). This goes to show that even though incidents of direct violence might 
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have occurred in the past63 or to a person other than oneself, they have a strong 
impact on the collective perception held by communities in LNP’s buffer zone (see 
Table 8).  
There also have been cases of violence against eco-guards: in 2016, an eco-
guard was killed by a local Baka man who had been hired as a poacher. Eco-guards 
reported feeling insecure when interacting with the local population on patrols 
(M3). They expressed their concerns about the life-threatening nature of their job, 
describing encounters with large-scale poachers as a potential matter of life and 
death (PV1; PV2). As one eco-guard phrased it when talking about seizing illegal 
weapons: “If I have taken a weapon today, it is not the weapon that will kill me 
tomorrow” (F16). 
 
 
Image 36: Burial ceremony of an eco-guard 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, male) (PV1) 
The person in the coffin is his former colleague, who died on a mission in 2016, when he was 
shot by a local Baka man. This photo represents the dangers that eco-guards face during 
their work: “We die like this for the world heritage." 
 
These experiences on both sides have created an atmosphere of fear and 
mistrust. In the current climate, cooperation between eco-guards and the local 
                                                        
63 From 2008-2010, the Cameroonian Army was present in LNP to fight rebels from CAR hiding in the 
forest. Following a WWF employee in Yaoundé, the Baka attribute many abuses conducted by the 
Cameroonian army to eco- guards, as both troops are uniformed and not easily distinguishable (EI7) 
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population remains elusive. The lack of cooperation hinders the effective 
implementation and monitoring of usage rights. Yet, the research also uncovered 
some degree of empathy between the two sides, signalling potential for 
reconciliation. 
The Theater of the Oppressed in Dioula revealed the desire of people to enter 
into a dialogue with eco-guards and the park management, giving them the 
opportunity to explain their concerns and needs (TWS1; TWS2; see Table 9). A 
participant of the stakeholder workshop in Mambélé remarked that a dialogue 
with eco-guards could help them understand that most poaching is done out of 
the local population’s necessity to feed their families (SW1). Indeed, some eco-
guards seem to be well aware of the underlying reasons for poaching: “If you want 
to keep them from hunting, you have to give them another road” (F16). At the same 
time, women from the village of Koumela explained that eco-guards were simply 
doing their job in the area, which could not be a reason for them to hold a grudge 
against them (F6). 
These are encouraging signs of reconciliation that should be capitalized on. 
Given the experiences of both local communities and eco-guards with direct 
violence, efforts should be made to further “humanize” the other side. Following 
the “contact-hypothesis” by Allport, interpersonal contact between two conflict 
parties allows for communication and interaction, which reduces prejudice by 
developing empathy for the other side’s position (Allport, 1954). If eco-guards and 
people from local communities interact and cooperate more frequently, they may 
develop an even better understanding of the other side’s interests and needs that 
do not fundamentally differ from their own. In this scenario, the potential for 
conflict and violence is likely to decrease significantly. 
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Image 37: Baka Woman 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, male, 58 years) (PV5) 
The participant took a picture of a Baka woman. She told a story about eco- guards. She once 
came back from the forest with wild mangoes. The eco- guards took [the wild mangoes] by 
force. They only took the mangoes, but they did not hit her “because she is old”. She has not 
returned to the forest ever since.. 
 
In practical terms, forums for dialogue should be created to allow for more 
open exchange between eco-guards and the local population. These forums 
should be moderated by licensed mediators to address contentious issues that 
arise from everyday interactions and instances from the past. The park 
management and an organization trusted by local people (e.g. CEFAID and/or 
CED) should jointly initiate the dialogue and create additional incentives for 
participation of both groups. Moreover, people from the local communities should 
be integrated into the daily activities of conservation services to increase contact 
points between them and the eco-guards, e.g. on anti-poaching efforts (also see 
Chapter 5 ). Additionally, local recruitment of eco-guards would create a stronger 
link to the local communities and change the perception of eco-guards as 
“foreigners”. 
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Table 8: Theatre - Workshop Dioula 1 
Scene instruction: “You are in the forest. Then two eco-guards arrive. What happens?” 
Theatre-
Workshop 
Baka Participants (TWS1) 
Language: Baka 
Bantu Participants (TWS2) 
Language: French 
Description of 
Play 
Two Baka women and one Baka man 
act out collecting items from the 
forest. Two Baka men act as Eco 
Guards and sneak up on the Baka in 
the forest. The eco guards beat the 
Baka and destroy their possessions. 
The Baka are arrested, threatened, 
beaten more. 
The three men in the forest take 
some time to set up their props on 
the stage. One of the props used by 
the men in the forest (the drum on 
stage) seemed to be some sort of a 
machine. They then go about their 
activities. At some point two “eco-
guards” enter the scene and sneak up 
on the men. They jump onto the 
stage and start shouting. The men 
try to flee, but the eco-guards catch 
them and hit them on the head. The 
actors portray the eco-guards as 
violent and unreasonable (they arrest 
them without questioning them 
first). The eco-guards sit the men on 
the floor, put their hands together 
behind their back and finally lead 
them off the stage. 
Reflection 
Interviews  
Having watched the scene, 
participants say "that is not good", 
shake their heads. When asked if 
that happens often, N. [an outspoken 
"representative" of the group] 
replies: "Before, it was like this. Now, 
it has changed. We have already 
eaten together. There is a little 
change. Only when Baka do things 
that are not allowed, they will be 
attacked". Another participant 
agrees: "Today, they do not disturb 
us. But when we do things that are 
not allowed, what will happen?". N. 
adds: « The MoU has to be signed. If 
the eco-guards threaten us, they will 
have problems because they have 
signed [it]". He also says that the 
Baka should have more benefits from 
conservation, "something that the 
Having watched the scene, the 
participants tell us that GTZ used to 
work closely with them until some 
years ago. They view the 
collaboration positively. GTZ 
mapped the forest and the different 
zones with them. When WWF took 
over, things changed. 
Simultaneously, Pepe Safari arrived 
in the forest with B.I.R. forces. Since 
then, people could not do anything in 
the forest anymore; they experience 
violence and repression when they 
are found in the forest: “The military 
has come to torture the people”. The 
camps in which they stay when 
collecting NTFPs are often burned by 
security forces. They claim that WWF 
was “dominated” by the interests of 
Safari companies. When asked about 
possible solutions to these problems, 
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Baka like". When asked what that 
would be, a woman replies: "One has 
to support the children to go to 
school". Another woman adds: “One 
has to do something like livestock 
keeping so that [we] do not go too 
much into the forest". 
participants say that they want to 
enter into a dialogue with the 
conservation service. The state has 
apparently promised them livestock 
and farming support, but not yet 
delivered. If those programs were 
implemented, it could help them 
become less dependent on the forest 
and thus minimize the tensions with 
eco-guards.  
Quotes:  
- "Why don't they use the money 
they spend on guns to change the 
lives of people?"; 
- “The military has come to torture 
the people” 
-  “They said they would help us, 
with micro-projects, livestock 
keeping and aquaculture… there 
are many who died in prison 
because there is no work… where 
are the accompanying 
measures?”;  
- The state, that is us. If humans do 
not have value anymore, the 
forest has no value either” 
Interpretation 
by Conflict 
Team 
While the theatre depicts direct 
violence used by the eco- guards, 
during reflection Baka participants 
emphasize that they have noticed a 
positive change in the behaviour of 
eco-guards, and even state that they 
have shared a meal with them.  
During the reflection, people make 
clear that they expect the park 
management to offer them 
alternative livelihood strategies 
(livestock, farming inputs). Quotes 
such as "the military has come to 
torture the people” and " The state, 
that is us. If humans do not have value 
anymore, the forest has no value 
either” reveal a certain level of 
mistrust against state forces and 
express a feeling of state- neglect. 
They also reveal that people feel 
violated and abused by the executive 
forces of "their" state. 
Source: own data 
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Table 9: Theatre - Workshop Dioula 2 
Scene instruction: “You are in the forest and Eco Guards come, what would you like to 
happen?” 
Theatre-
Workshop 
Baka Participants (TWS1) 
Language: Baka 
Bantu Participants (TWS2) 
Language: French 
Description of 
Play 
All Baka reset scene from beginning. 
t When approached by Eco Guards, 
they share food and the Eco Guards 
leave them unharmed. As soon as 
the eco-guards are gone, one Baka 
woman starts gathering their things, 
and shouts at the man. They then 
leave quickly, look around in fear. 
Two men are in the forest preparing 
meat over a fire. After about a 
minute, two eco-guards arrive. They 
ask them what they are doing. The 
men explain that they are in the 
process of a mourning ritual that 
takes two days and they are currently 
preparing a meal for their family. The 
eco-guard asks what they are 
cooking and one of the men 
responds. The second eco-guard 
continues to tell them that they are 
in the zone of the forest which they 
are not allowed to access ("zone 
interdite"). The men tell him that 
they were not aware of that. The 
eco-guard tells them to continue 
with their ritual but to leave the zone 
immediately after and clean up their 
camp. The men agree and thank him 
passionately for allowing them to 
stay. They offer the eco-guards some 
food before they leave. 
Reflection 
Interviews  
The Baka are asked to describe what 
happens in this scene. One woman 
says that the eco-guards came and 
questioned them about their 
whereabouts, then they sat down to 
eat together: “The feeling is good". 
Another man adds: "That happened 
this year in Dioula, we ate fish 
together". When asked what 
happened at the end of the scene 
and why they left so quickly, one 
man says: "They are afraid that the 
eco-guards will come back and 
threaten them". They confirm that 
they still do not trust the eco-guards; 
one man states: “There is not trust". 
People state that they would like to 
enter into dialogue with the park 
management, at eye level; they want 
the management to know what the 
people do: “One has to know what 
the people do”. They are not 
interested in conflict and feel a lot of 
pressure; they do not feel at peace 
with the current situation. One 
woman says: « We have to have a 
dialogue…between brothers and 
brothers. We want peace”. 
Participants also say that the current 
entrance fee of 2500 CFA (valid for 
one week) to enter the park was too 
high. 
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Interpretation 
by Conflict 
Team 
In this ideal situation, the guards sit 
down with the Baka and share their 
food. They are portrayed as equals 
and treat the Baka as equals (by 
sitting down, sharing their food). 
Perhaps this is what the Baka would 
like to express: the desire to be 
treated as equals. However, quite 
telling that the Baka quickly leave at 
the end of the scene: they do not yet 
trust the guards' apparent indulgent 
intentions and said so themselves 
("there is no trust"). 
In this ideal vision of how villagers 
would like the eco-guards to treat 
them, the eco-guards are portrayed 
as very understanding of the 
population and their cultural needs 
(mourning ritual). They give them an 
opportunity to explain what they are 
doing and find a pragmatic solution 
to the problem. From this scene it 
can be inferred that it is two 
elements in the current interaction 
that participants would like to 
change: the violent treatment and 
the lack of understanding/empathy 
for the needs of the local population.  
Source: own data 
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(2) The current complaint mechanism is not working effectively 
In talks with WWF staff and CEFAID in Yaoundé the research team was 
informed about a complaint mechanism for Human Rights abuses in Lobéké 
National Park (EI2; EI7; EI8). The WWF-financed mechanism was created in 
cooperation with the NGO CEFAID in 2014. It is supposed to work as follows: in 
case of abuse, people can file a complaint at CEFAID’s main office, which 
documents and investigates the cases and decides to take further action if 
required, e.g. reports incidents to the police (EI12).  
In practice, however, the mechanism does not function as envisioned. To begin 
with, none of the interviewees from the villages was aware of its existence. 
Furthermore, the WWF country manager Dr. Njiforti acknowledged that the main 
issue of the complaint mechanism is its accessibility: the office, where complaints 
can be made, is located in Yokadouma, which is a day’s journey away from Lobéké 
National Park. Theoretically, CEFAID focal points should be available in several 
locations in the park’s buffer zone, but neither WWF nor CEFAID have the 
resources to maintain a constant presence in the villages (EI12). 
The idea behind a complaint mechanism is laudable and worth pursuing 
further. The research showed that people from the localities around Lobéké 
National Park feel helpless as they have nowhere to turn to with their complaints 
and grievances (C9).  
Accessing the Cameroonian justice system to file a complaint is not an option 
for most villagers: they are scarcely spread in the area and hard to reach. In 
addition, many interviewees claimed that police officers only agree to work on 
cases in exchange for bribes (TWS1; TWS2). On top of that, villagers told the 
research team that they are afraid of repercussions from the park management if 
they report any incident to local authorities (F14). 
For the complaint mechanism to be effective it needs to assure that people can 
access it without difficulties and fear. The lead organization ought to drastically 
increase its presence and visibility in the periphery of LNP: focal points should be 
established in major towns around the park (e.g. Mambélé, Salapoumbé, Libongo, 
Socambo, Moloundou) and outreach teams should make regular visits to smaller 
and more remote localities.  
Procedures for filing a complaint should be manageable even for individuals 
who are illiterate, and anonymity should be guaranteed. Furthermore, it is 
essential for the responsible organization to inform people about the existence 
and procedures of the complaint mechanism – something that CEFAID and WWF 
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have clearly failed to do hitherto. Inspiration for technical and operational details 
of a complaint mechanism could be drawn from the Human Rights Center in 
Bayanga (Centre Droits de l'Homme de Bayanga) that has been established by 
WWF in the TNS-park DSNN in the Central African Republic.  
 
 
Image 38: Informational poster about Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
(FPIC) by the Human Rights Center in Bayanga 
Source: Ndima Kali – Association de Jeunes BaAka et Sangha-Sangha 
 
Finally, it is advisable to increase efforts to set up a more neutral complaint 
mechanism. If WWF continues being co- responsible for handling complaints, 
local people might raise doubts about its neutrality (EI7). A more neutral 
mechanism could be supported by NGOs such as Centre pour le Développement 
et l’Environnement, CED, or Rainforest Foundation UK, or by a Cameroonian state 
institution. In an interview, a representative of MINAS expressed the desire for 
increased and more meaningful involvement in conservation around LNP that is 
currently not possible due to a lack of financing (EI11). This would help to provide 
a more people-focused perspective on conservation and a counterweight to 
MINFOF as the only dominant ministry present in the area. 
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(3) The frustration of eco-guards is a driver for conflict 
Eco-guards are one of the conflict parties, yet their needs and interests are too 
often disregarded. Local, national and international NGOs have continuously 
advocated for the rights of the local population, in particular the Baka. However, 
from a conflict resolution perspective, it is essential to give importance to the 
interests and needs of both parties. Chapter 5.1.3 describes the dire working and 
living conditions of eco-guards in Lobéké National Park. Eco-guards stated they 
feel unappreciated for their work and are demotivated by these conditions (F1; 
F16, F20). 
Experiences from law enforcement agencies globally have shown that a 
betterment of the working and living conditions of law enforcement agents tends 
to lead to improved professional performance (Jonyo, 2015; Tengpongsthorn, 
2017). Vice-versa it is plausible to assume that the eco- guards’ frustration and lack 
of motivation may be a cause for inefficient work (e.g. not applying usage rights) 
and even violent behaviour (Breuer and Elson, 2017). Satisfying their needs for 
better living and working conditions will thus have a mitigating effect on the 
conflict. 
Current plans by FTNS for reconstructing the park headquarters in Mambélé 
include a new base camp for eco-guards. The new base camp offers the eco-
guards improved infrastructure (single housing units, electricity, laundry rooms, 
work spaces) and space for leisure activities (gym, football pitch, community hall). 
The research team strongly encourages the KfW to provide the necessary funding 
for these building plans so that they can be implemented within the envisioned 
time-frame (2019-2021). 
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Image 39: Eco-guard housing 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, male) (PV2) 
This picture shows the accommodation of the park’s eco-guards. There is hardly any privacy. 
The houses are too small to host their families during visits: “We should be able to live and 
sleep well." 
 
(4) Safari companies increasingly take over the role of law enforcement 
Eco-guards are the primary law enforcement agents in Lobéké National Park 
and its buffer zone. They have the mandate to enforce Cameroonian wildlife- and 
conservation law and are experts on the matter. However, the research team 
learnt that Faro Lobeke, a company which offers hunting safaris, has begun to 
patrol their concessions close to Libongo without the support of eco-guards and 
acts as quasi law enforcement. Faro Lobeke has made arrangements with 
MINDEF and MINFOF to circumvent regular anti-poaching mechanisms and to 
carry out joint patrols with the military. The local MINFOF authorities expressed 
regret about this situation claiming that in the absence of eco-guards, military 
personnel are not aware of usage rights of the local population and poaching 
regulations, e.g. what animal belongs to which class and whether it is allowed to 
be hunted (I22).  
Indeed, community members have described the behaviour of the patrols 
headed by safari company staff as aggressive. In interviews people claimed that 
there had been instances of physical abuse and that the patrols kept people from 
entering the forest and doing subsistence hunting (F11; C8). One Baka man 
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remarked: “The safari company has taken over the forest” (C7). Interviewees 
complained that they could not even enter the agro-forestry zones close to their 
homesteads anymore (C8). This can possibly be explained by the fact that the 
hunting concession and the agro-forestry zone geographically overlap, creating 
legal uncertainty about which zoning rights take precedence. In this scenario, the 
existing power relations clearly favour the safari companies. The feeling of 
antagonism is intensified by the circumstance that Faro Lobeke does not share 
the meat of shot animals with the local community as agreed upon in the 
Mambélé convention.  
It seems that in the absence of efficient anti-poaching patrols and fast 
response mechanisms by eco-guards, safari companies have begun to take law 
enforcement into their own hands in order to protect their commercial interests – 
often with low tolerance for the usage rights of the local population. This holds 
true foremost for Faro Lobeke in Libongo, but similar claims, though less severe, 
were made about the company “Pepe Safari” in Zega and Dioula (F14; TWS2).  
The Cameroonian state holds monopoly on the use of force, including any 
form of law enforcement. Therefore, MINFOF should review these activities and 
ensure that safari companies act within Cameroonian law. Increasing the 
accountability of safari companies for their anti-poaching efforts is crucial for 
effectively safeguarding the usage rights and Human Rights of the local 
population and guaranteeing a uniform standard of law enforcement around the 
national park. 
5.4.4 Conflict 4: ‘Forest people’ and ‘Villagers’ 
The villages surrounding LNP are made up by both Baka and Bantu groups, 
with the former often being described as “indigenous”, and the latter as 
“agriculturalist” or “villagers” (for a critique see Lueong, 2017; Rupp, 2011). The 
Baka appear to be significantly poorer than their Bantu neighbours, and many 
NGOs have ascribed to their cause (i.e. OKANI, CEFAID, Survival International). 
Following the conservator, the relationship of the two groups is defined by a 
historically developed “master-servant”- dynamic and characterised by both 
domination and subordination (I39).  
Without understanding the nature of the relationship between Baka and 
Bantu, as well as their respective needs, many problems of conservation 
governance of LNP cannot be recognised or are wrongly addressed. First, the 
conflict is central to understand the local population’s needs and problems. 
Following a WWF- employee, the most severe Human Rights violations happened 
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within the villages (SW1), and CEFAID reported that most Human Rights 
complaints concern relations among Baka and Bantu (EI2). Second, the 
relationship adversely affects the implementation of participatory processes and 
equitable benefit-sharing. Third, it is often claimed that the dynamics of the 
relationship influenced illegal poaching activities, as the subordinate Baka are 
easily exploited for their intimate knowledge of the forest (I31). Finally, the 
relationship harbours considerable conflict potential that can potentially 
jeopardise peaceful conservation efforts.  
Perceptions by Baka and Bantu participants on the nature of their 
relationship64 
(1) Baka participants  
The Baka describe a paradoxical relationship to Bantu: on the one hand, they 
label Bantu their “protectors” and “guardians” and appear to hold admiration for 
them. On the other hand, they criticize their treatment by Bantu, who were 
threatening them: “Baka among Bantu cannot talk” (F17). 
Baka participants depicted a picture of everyday discrimination, stating that 
they were other villagers’ scapegoats, and i.e. blamed for village thefts. At times, 
other villagers and local authorities forced them to hunt “big animals” and put all 
the blame on the Baka when caught by conservation forces: “By giving the Baka 
weapons. When the Baka go to the forest, one arrests them. The Bantu put the Baka 
into prison” (F17). The relation to the Bantu was primarily predicated on exchange 
of Baka labour for money and goods: the Baka frequently work for the more 
affluent Bantu villagers doing day-wage jobs (i.e. washing clothes, clearing fields). 
However, they are paid only little, and reported to be beaten up if failing to fulfil 
the work as required (TWS1, see Table 10). Unfair working conditions have 
cultivated anger and sadness among the Baka. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
64 A thorough ethnographic analysis of what the conflict and frictions between the two groups entail is not 
in the scope of this study. The analysis is limited by the time spent in the villages as well as by the 
selection of the research participants.  
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Image 40: Finding Work in the village 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Student, Baka, female,15 years) (PV10) 
The participant says that she finds work in the village, i.e. washing dishes or clothes for 
Bantu, to earn money to buy food. "I do not like working for Bantu, it is hard. We earn little 
money.” 
 
Furthermore, Baka participants raised concerns regarding their treatment by 
local Bantu authorities. Following Baka, Bantu village chiefs occasionally forced 
them off their fields and disallowed them to do farming. Disputes between Baka 
and Bantu were often decided in favour of Bantu by the local gendarmerie, as «the 
Bantu use wine or money to corrupt authorities so that they decide in their favour” 
(TWS1). Baka also claim that doctors in public hospitals would favour Bantu 
patients, which was why they preferred Baka-only- hospitals. The lack of a Baka 
chief was felt to be especially problematic, as the Baka “are not considered people 
like everyone else” (C12). Most Baka lack birth certificates and identity cards and 
have tremendous difficulties to access official institutions and formal 
employment. When blamed by a Bantu to “hide in the forest” and being “difficult 
to integrate”, a Baka participant responded that the Baka did not hide, but that 
the lack of official documents and difficulties in obtaining them prevented Baka 
from sending their children to school or getting employment (SW1).  
The discrimination of Baka has led to feelings of inferiority and resentment. 
For example, when Baka participants expressed their concern about unequal living 
conditions, they stated that the Bantu wanted them to “stay back” and “in the 
forest”: "The Bantu do not want that the Baka become like them; they want the 
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Baka to stay behind, that they stay in the forest” (C7). The self-portrayal as “staying 
behind” indicate ingrained feelings of inferiority. However, the Baka do not 
express feelings of a “cultural cringe”: they often said they were proud of their 
cultural traditions, were highly attached to the forest and expressed regret about 
younger generations’ perceived loss of Baka- knowledge. “Staying backwards” 
appears not to be related to a cultural inferiority complex, but rather to a socio- 
economic one. Correspondingly, one participant described the difference between 
Baka and Bantu as such: “He has money and you don’t” (TWS1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Manifest  
 
Latent  
Figure 14: ABC triangle Baka  
Source: own illustration based on Galtung 1990 
 
(2) Bantu participants  
When asked about their relationship to the Baka, Bantu participants painted a 
picture of both togetherness and difference. They frequently referred to the Baka 
as their “brothers”, stating that they were “together”. There was a “culture- mix” 
between Baka and Bantu, as the number of inter-ethnic marriages had increased, 
and the two groups shared their daily lives and problems: “[…] today, the Baka live 
in harmony with the Bantu.” (TWS2). The difference between the two ethnic 
groups was above all a matter of appearance: “If an individual identifies as Baka or 
Behaviour: 
Keep to themselves; Subservience; 
Alcoholism 
Attitude: 
Feelings of socio-economic 
inferiority; Frustration; Fear 
Contradiction/Context: 
Extreme poverty; Lack of political 
representation and recognition; 
Little socio- economic integration 
into villages 
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Bantu, it is not discrimination but a manner of matching the individual’s appearance 
to an ethnic group » (ibidem).  
 
 
Image 41: Joint celebration of Baka and Bantu 
Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, male, 42 years) (PV11) 
The participant took a picture of a celebration in his village. “Celebrations are always good to 
forget problems, to laugh and talk and exchange. Baka and Bantu celebrate together”  
 
Simultaneously, however, they described the Baka as guardians of the forest 
who did not truly belong to the village: « The forest, that’s them […] When the Baka 
is in the village, he is not feeling comfortable, he is not like us” (F10). It was the 
Bantu that brought the Baka “out of the forest”, and the Baka were not fully 
adapted to “modern” village life yet. Following Bantu participants, the Baka were 
not “modern” for the following reasons: they preferred traditional medicine over 
hospital examinations; they did not change their clothes after working in the fields 
and lacked normal hygiene standards, and they were not able to plan ahead, living 
in the present moment instead (F15; TWS2). However, the “modernisation” of the 
Baka was only a matter of time, since they were already interested in Western 
education and clothing (TWS2). 
The assumed cultural superiority leads the Bantu to position themselves as 
spokesmen of the Baka. Bantu would frequently speak for Baka during 
community meetings and mixed focus groups discussions– often with apparently 
benevolent intentions, but at times in derogatory manner by belittling the Baka’s 
alleged lack of knowledge, i.e. “He [a Baka man] cannot even write his own name” 
(C11).  
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In general, the Bantu argued that the Baka’s apparent socio-economic 
disadvantages and behavioural inferiority was a result of the Baka’s own attitudes 
and specifics: the Baka always sat behind them during discussions as this was their 
“nature” (F15). The economic « backlog » (“rétard”) of the Baka was mainly due to 
their « laziness »: « The Baka are very lazy, which makes it difficult to improve their 
living conditions» (TWS2). Furthermore, the Bakas’ “nomadic” way of life did not 
allow them to sustain income generating activities over a longer period. In sum, 
the Bantu ascribe the Baka’s marginalisation to their lack of assimilation: “We do 
not marginalise the Baka, but it is their way of life that marginalises them” (ibidem). 
 
 
 
 
 
Manifest  
 
Latent  
Figure 15: ABC triangle Bantu  
Source: own illustration based on Galtung 1990 
 
 
Behaviour: 
Exert power and control; Paternalism 
Attitude: 
Feelings of socio-cultural 
superiority; “modern villagers” 
as opposed to “forest people” 
 
Contradiction/Context: 
 
Relative wealth; Hold political 
power in villages 
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Table 10: Theatre - Workshop Dioula 3 
Scene instructions: “Two Baka meet two Bantu. What happens?” 
Theatre-
Workshop 
Baka Participants (TWS1) 
Language: Baka 
Bantu Participants (TWS2) 
Language: French 
Description of 
Play 
Two Baka men act as Bantu who 
from the beginning belittle the Baka 
actors. The Bantu actors tell the Baka 
actors to sit somewhere else and take 
their seats. The Baka then sit on the 
ground. The Bantu tell the Baka that 
they will give them XAF 1.000 if they 
carried out some work for them. The 
Bantu leave, and the Baka start 
working. A woman arrives, selling 
food. The Baka go to her and sit 
down. Suddenly, the Bantu return. 
Realising that the Baka are not 
working, they start shouting and 
threaten them with wooden sticks. 
They force the Baka to work hard 
labour and don’t allow them to stop 
even when hot, thirsty, and tired. 
They beat and scream at them. 
Two Bantu men are sitting together 
in a bar drinking and smoking. Two 
Baka men enter the scene and are 
immediately offered seats. The two 
Bantu move away a few meters and 
discuss among themselves. When 
they come back they offer the Baka 
drinks. They drink together, dance 
and joyfully hug each other. One of 
the Baka gets very drunk and bumps 
into one of the Bantu. The others 
sustain him and seem to be walking 
him home.  
Reflection 
Interviews  
One male participant tears up while 
watching the scene. When inquired 
how they feel watching the scene, 
another participant says "”it is not 
good”. A young man describes the 
scene as follows: two young Baka 
men had to work for Bantu but 
stopped when it started raining. The 
Bantu then forced them to continue 
working. Many participants start 
discussing and say: "That happens all 
the time”. When asked how to 
improve the situation, one 
participant replies: "We Baka have to 
get along with each other; we have to 
do our own work, and not work for 
the Bantu". Another participant says 
that there are problems with Bantu: 
"He has money, and you don’t". 
When asked if their relation to the 
Bantu has always been like this, one 
According to the participants the 
difference between Baka and Bantu 
has mostly withered away: "Before 
they used to work for us, but now we 
are together". Baka and Bantu 
interact, inter-marry and share the 
same problems. However, during the 
conversation participants 
increasingly focus on the differences 
between Bantu and Baka and 
portray the Baka as essentially 
"backwards": "The Baka don't want 
to live like us, they want to stick to 
their traditions". They also argue 
that the Baka themselves are to 
blame for their own socio-economic 
problems: they move around a lot; 
when a Baka person dies, the rest of 
the family abandons the homestead, 
"you need to be more stable to 
improve your socio-economic 
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participant replies: "It has always 
been like that... They refuse to give 
you money if you do not work as they 
want". Another participant stands up 
and adds: “The Bantu are above 
Baka; they are always there for us". 
He criticizes that the Baka always go 
to the Bantu and behave like slaves; 
they should stop doing that. He 
states that the Baka turn the Bantu in 
what he is. He criticizes that the Baka 
are not holding together, and that 
there are disagreements within the 
Baka community as to how and if to 
work for the Bantu. 
situation"; “We do not marginalise 
them, it is their way of life that 
marginalises them".  
They give more examples to stress 
these points: 1) During harvest 
season Baka demand daily up-front 
payments for working on the fields 
of Bantu, that Bantu cannot make 
these payments, because they only 
earn money from selling their crops 
at the end of the season, the Baka do 
not understand this; 2) Baka never 
change their clothes after working in 
the fields, they lack normal hygiene 
standards. 
Interpretation 
by Conflict 
Team 
The portrayal of the Bantu as 
aggressors who chase the Baka away 
from their chairs, forcing them to sit 
on the ground (as unequal’s), and 
who beat and threaten them, is 
telling. Obviously, the Baka perceive, 
and want others to perceive, the 
Bantu as authoritative oppressors; 
they enact a slave- master 
relationship. Why did they choose to 
look at their relationship to the Bantu 
from that perspective? Most probably 
because they feel suppressed and 
inferior. However, no relationship is 
as simple and black and white as a 
master-slave dichotomy might 
suggest, and one participant’s 
statement ("the Baka turn the Bantu 
in what he is") points to the complex 
dialectics of that relationship. 
The friendly interaction in the scene 
strongly contradicts the impressions 
from the theatre and interviews with 
Baka participants. During the scene, 
the team’s research assistant 
whispers: "They are lying". It could 
be that the participants are very 
aware of the unfair discrimination 
towards the Baka, which they might 
partially sustain through their 
behaviour, but equally aware of the 
interest NGOs take in Baka's rights 
and therefore try to portray 
themselves in a good light in the 
team’s presence - after all, they 
asked at the beginning of the 
reflection interview whether the 
team was only there for the Baka.  
Whatever the reasons, the scene in 
the larger context of the theatre 
clearly reveals a pronounced 
structural divide between the two 
ethnic groups in Dioula, in social, 
economic and cultural terms. This 
confirms previous findings of 
prescribed stereotypes and 
narratives of the Baka as traditional 
and backwards and their alleged 
unwillingness and inability to 
integrate into modern life. 
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Participants seem to believe that it's 
"their own fault" that they live in 
poverty. 
A more benevolent interpretation 
could be that Bantu participants 
indeed viewtheir Baka neighbours as 
their equals and have no 
reservations against them, but they 
are unable to change the underlying 
structural divisions. This may 
frustrate them and lead them to 
make statements as during the 
reflection, i.e. blaming the Baka for 
their problems. 
Source: own data 
 
Indigenous people: villagers or forest- people? 
It is obvious to any visitor to LNP that the Baka have less socio-economic 
resources than their Bantu neighbours: their houses are of lower quality, their 
average life- expectancy is low and they appear to suffer from numerous health 
issues. The Baka have no legal representation, as local authorities are, without 
exception, all non-Baka. In addition, Baka appear to encounter problems to lobby 
for their needs within participatory processes of LNPs’ buffer zones (also see 
Chapter 5.2.6).  
Baka’s widespread alcoholism is often exploited for cheap labour or illegal 
poaching (EI4; EI2; EI7). As an activist in Bayanga’s Human Rights Centre put it: “It 
is considerably easy to abuse them; they work all day if you promise them one glass 
of alcohol” (I30). The Baka’s marginalisation is also expressed in spatial terms: 
most Baka houses are situated at village outskirts. 
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Image 42: Fight at Funeral 
PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Baka, male, 45 years) (PV 18) 
The participant took this picture during a funeral. The picture has a negative connotation: it 
shows people that are drunk. “They are drunk and got into a fight”. When asked if there are 
problems with alcohol in his village, he says: “Women and men have too many problems with 
alcohol”.  
 
 
Image 43: Drinking Alcohol 
Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Student, Baka, female, 15 years) (PV10) 
The participant took a picture of her uncle and her father drinking alcohol. The picture has a 
positive connotation: they are drinking right next to their family house. She does not like it 
when they drink outside in the village, as they will attract problems, and get into fights. 
“When they drink at home, there are no problems”..  
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What life is best for the Baka appears to be a contentious issue for all 
stakeholders, who ascribe them different needs and aspirations. On the one hand, 
Baka are depicted as marginalised hunter- gatherers, whose lifestyle and 
aspirations differ substantially from Bantu- “villagers”, but who are forcefully 
assimilated into village-life. Following this view, Baka are dependent on forest 
resources, and cannot engage in activities such as livestock- keeping and 
agriculture; Baka did not even like non-bushmeat (EI2). At times, this depiction is 
tinged with an ideological notion: following an anthropologist, the Baka are 
“unconsciously resisting the capitalist system and mindset” (EI4). According to 
this view, the Baka need special support and Baka- only development programs. 
This portrayal sits surprisingly well with Bantu- accounts of the Bakas’ alleged 
“non-modernity” and their difficulties to be integrated into village- life. 
On the other hand, the Baka are represented as assimilated villagers with 
similar interests as their Bantu neighbours. This depiction is in line with accounts 
of most Baka participants. At odds with the common portrayal of the Baka as 
“forest-people”, Baka participants told us they preferred living in the village over 
living in the forest, as “we are not animals” (C10). While holding great value for the 
forest, their “original habitat”, the Baka emphasized that they have left the forest 
as their permanent home and were now interested in farming and livestock. 
Unlimited access to the forest is desired for a few months a year to “do rituals, 
such as the Jengi65, to do little activities… to educate the children” (F17). During 
PhotoVoice interviews, it became apparent what the Baka value about village life: 
wooden houses, water wells, access to hospitals and schools. While one must 
keep in mind that only a fraction of Baka habitants in LNP’s buffer-zone were 
interviewed, this account allows for a different assessment of Baka needs and 
aspirations. Here, the Baka advocate for equal opportunities and living standards 
within the village and express a desire for integration. 
This report will not engage in debates if these accounts of Baka are already a 
sign of Baka being the victims of “cultural dominance” or if they only said so 
because researchers where present. Rather, it assumes that the “truth” moves in 
between these two accounts: it might be that there are Baka who prefer living in 
the forest, while others prefer living in the village, and others like to do both. 
Confronted with different development programmes, it is also highly likely that 
Baka individuals try to “fit” themselves into different development- frames 
                                                        
65 The „Jengi“- ceremony honours the chief forest spirit to the Baka, the Jengi. It involves singing, dancing, 
and hunting.  
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(Lueong, 2016). To address Baka needs, it is imperative to look beyond ideological 
accounts relating to common binaries, such as “indigenous people vs. villagers” or 
“modern – traditional”, and to allow for contradictions within Baka communities, 
as individuals might hold divergent views and aspirations.  
It is also important to note that the popular framing and marketing of Baka as 
indigenous people whose “home” lies in the forest might further exacerbate the 
conflict between Baka and Bantu groups and hamper the Baka’s integration into 
village- life. While this popular framing might help the cause of other indigenous 
people around the globe, “using the same technique for the Baka, who have 
already been permanently displaced from the forest and are now struggling to 
make a home on the roadsides […], is not so helpful […] [and instead] helps to 
amplify new conflicts” (Lueong, 2017: 167). Indeed, it appears as if the depiction of 
Baka as “non-modern forest- people” allows Bantu to paternalize the Baka and to 
turn a blind eye to inequality and marginalisation. 
To counter political marginalization, it is vital to recognize and formally 
acknowledge Baka settlements and traditional authorities. This demand was also 
brought forward by Baka representatives during the stakeholder workshop (SW1, 
Annex 12).  
A holistic approach to the conflict must equally consider the needs and 
aspirations of Bantu groups. Bantu participants often lamented the perceived 
preferential treatment of the Baka by NGOs, even though “the park concerns 
everybody” (TWS2). While most Bantu are also dependent on forest resources, 
their needs are often neglected, and they receive little outside support. This is a 
problem, as the privilege of Baka needs harbours the potential to reinforce social 
distinctions aka “us vs. them” (Rupp 2011) and the perceived ‘positive 
discrimination’ of the Baka is a source of conflict between the two groups (Rupp, 
2011; Lueong, 2016). 
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6 Recommendations 
Following Baynham-Herd et al. (2018: 181), policy interventions targeted at 
conservation conflicts can be broadly categorised into three types: “technical”, 
“cognitive”, and “structural”. Technical interventions attempt to influence the 
external environment. They may include the placement of billboards or the 
erection of fences. Cognitive interventions target behavioural change. They may 
include information dissemination, livelihood education, or conservation 
awareness campaigns. Structural interventions, by contrast, attempt to change 
the entire context itself. These may include financial instruments (i.e. insurances, 
compensations), alternative livelihoods or the creation of new rules. Commonly, 
they also target the social dimension of conflicts, i.e. stakeholder engagement, 
mediation programmes and conflict transformation efforts. 
The recommendations of this report include all three types of interventions. 
The latter are considered a conditio sine qua non for effective conservation efforts 
and poverty alleviation. No billboard will be efficient if adjacent communities do 
not at least accept the park and its rules.  
All recommendations given in the following table refer to explicit standards, 
such as basic human needs and basic human rights. These standards are non- 
negotiable and must be met. The recommendations have been derived from the 
analysis of the gathered data in the field and the evidence is provided in the 
respective chapters. Certain parts of the recommendations were developed 
during stakeholder workshops on the local and the national level (for full overview 
of the workshop results, see Annex 12).  
The recommendations are categorised into three different priority levels:  
▪ Category A: High Priority – Critical requirement (‘Must- have’). An 
essential intervention to improve the park’s governance  
▪ Category B: Medium Priority – Conditional requirement (‘Should- have’). 
An important intervention to improve the park’s governance, but not 
urgent  
▪ Category C: Low Priority – Optional requirement (‘Could- have’). A 
desirable enhancement to the park’s governance  
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Table 11: Overview of recommendations 
Priority levels 
A: High; Critical; ‘Must- have’ B: Medium; Conditional; ‘Should-have’ C: Low; Optional; ‘Could-have’ 
 
Theme Recommended Activity(-ies) Priority No. 
Aim 1: LNP’s park management is more efficient, effective, and profitable 
Improve Lobéké PA management Improvement of living situation and working conditions of park employees A 1.1 
Establishment of a direct line of communication between FTNS and park management B 1.2 
Revision of MoUs between FTNS, MINFOF and WWF A 1.3 
Employment of additional and more suitable personnel A 1.4 
Improve trinational cooperation of TNS parks Regular exchange and harmonised approaches of TNS parks B 1.5 
Improve attraction of LNP for tourists Reconstruction of Djembe B 1.6 
Creation of a website for Lobéké National Park C 1.7 
Signature of the agreement on trans-boundary visas for TNS-visitors  C 1.8 
Provision of trans-boundary touristic circuits C 1.9 
Aim 2: Conservation efforts involve the local population and do not harm, but support local people’s livelihoods 
Benefits through effective revenue sharing mechanisms Revision of existing revenue sharing mechanisms A 2.1 
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Theme Recommended Activity(-ies) Priority No. 
Benefits through direct employment Training and employment of local “conservation champions” B 2.2 
Employment of unarmed assistant eco-guards from the villages to work in buffer-zone B 2.3 
Benefits from alternative livelihood strategies (ALS) Provision of alternative livelihood strategies for local population (ALS) A 2.4 
Establishment of NTFP value chains C 2.5 
Improved livelihoods through 
governmental support 
Provision of basic infrastructure  A 2.6 
Improved benefits of community forests Provision of financial and administrational assistance to community forests B 2.7 
Revision of the ‘Carbon Zone’ approach C 2.8 
Adaptation of number, size and location of community forests C 2.9 
Improved access to natural resources Revision of rules for community zone within LNP  B 2.10 
Improvement of land use planning B 2.11 
Lobbying for inclusive and participatory forest law A 2.12 
Aim 3: Conflicts surrounding LNP are decreased and sustainably manage 
Human wildlife co-existence Risk- and damage analysis of Human-Wildlife Conflicts  A 3.1 
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Theme Recommended Activity(-ies) Priority No. 
Establishment of a functioning Human-Wildlife Conflict compensation mechanism  B 3.2 
Improved communication between stakeholders Institutionalisation of a constant dialogue between eco-guards and the local population B 3.3 
Creation of a forum for dialogue and cultural exchange between Baka and Bantu groups B 3.4 
Inclusion of Bantu in development programmes  B 3.5 
Respect and protection of Human Rights  Revision of complaint mechanism against Human Rights violations A 3.6 
Provide Human Rights trainings for eco- guards and local population A 3.7 
Empowerment of Indigenous  
Population  
Provision of Identity Cards and Birth Certificates for Baka A 3.8 
Equal employment opportunities and affirmative action for Baka B 3.9 
Legal recognition of Baka settlements as villages B 3.10 
Review of law enforcement 
practices 
Supervision of law enforcement practices of private sector in buffer zone A 3.11 
Termination of bush meat auctions B 3.12 
Aim 4: The buffer zone of LNP is sustainably managed and respects and protects the usage- rights of the local population 
Impact of natural resource 
extraction in buffer zone on 
conservation efforts  
Impact- analysis of legal and illegal logging and mining as well as bush meat trade on 
biodiversity in the buffer zone  
B 4.1 
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Theme Recommended Activity(-ies) Priority No. 
Secure and transparent usage rights  Ensure that private sector respects traditional usage rights in LNP’s buffer zone A 4.2 
Management and Microzoning of UFAs and ZICGCs A 4.3 
Restructuring of Lobéké landscape platforms and 
consultative forums 
Re-organize and re-structure Lobéké landscape platforms and consultative forums B 4.4 
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7 Conclusion 
Almost twenty years ago, Lobéké National Park was set up to provide 
protection to its spectacular biodiversity, including critically endangered species 
such as forest elephants, lowland gorillas, chimpanzees, sitatungas and bongo. 
Due to its exceptional natural value, the park has been declared World Heritage by 
UNESCO in 2012.  
However, LNP has made international headlines for alleged Human Rights 
abuses against park residents. Its unique biodiversity is in decline, and levels of 
poaching have not decreased. Most park residents are living in conditions of 
extreme poverty: the PhotoVoice- images included in this report elucidate the 
severe deprivation of basic human needs. The majority of local communities 
depends on forest resources to eke out a living, as there is no other alternative to 
survive. Clearly, the park management plan’s promise of “integrating 
conservation and poverty alleviation” (MINFOF, 2014) has not materialised yet.  
This research indicates that the failure to provide both effective conservation 
and poverty alleviation is, on the one hand, “park- made” and due to management 
shortcomings. On the other, it is due to structural problems that exceed the park’s 
direct responsibility and are related to the deficient management of its buffer- 
zone.  
“Park- made”: Management shortcomings 
The park management has troubles fulfilling its primary responsibility, namely 
rule enforcement and monitoring. Both are critical components of effective 
conservation. Rules must be enforced to prevent overexploitation – that’s almost 
a tautology, as Gibson et al. remark (Gibson, William and Ostrom, 2005: 275; also 
see Hayer and Ostrom, 2005; Bruner et al., 2001; Bruner et al., 2004; McShane and 
Wells, 2004). Wildlife trafficking is a roaring global business and the economic 
incentives for illegal exploitation of LNP’s valuable resources, e.g. ivory, are 
extremely high.  
However, LNP’s park management does not have the necessary administrative 
and financial capacities to protect its flora and fauna (Chapter 5.1) it is severely 
understaffed and underfunded. Expertise in effective conservation management 
is found wanting, yet inadequate working conditions hardly attract qualified 
personnel. The eco- guards appear to be largely dissatisfied with their working 
and living conditions and perceive employment in LNP as a “punishment”. 
Conflicts over responsibilities and mandates in the park’s managerial set- up 
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cripple decision- making processes and contribute to the park’s inefficiency 
(Chapter 5.1).  
Furthermore, residents are not involved in the management of the resources 
they depend on (Chapter 5.2). This is not only noteworthy as it fails to fulfil 
normative requirements by Cameroonian forest law, international and national 
Human Rights conventions (e.g. UNDRIP), and Germany’s Human Rights 
guideline (BMZ, 2013).  
More importantly, it also constitutes a grave governance defect. Following 
Common Pool Resource Governance- theory and numerous empirical studies, 
local involvement is instrumental for effective conservation (Ostrom, 1990; Wells 
and Brandon, 1992; Hayer and Ostrom, 2005; Watson et al., 2014; Twinamatsiko 
et al., 2014). Involving park residents in enforcement and monitoring has shown to 
be a significant factor in protecting vegetation density and forest cover across the 
globe (Ostrom and Hayer, 2005: 616). In addition, it is assumed that local 
knowledge is better equipped to design institutions meant to solve local problems 
such as overexploitation, and that participation will result in use-rules that are 
considered legitimate – in contrast to external rule-impositions: “Those who have 
relied on the resources for their own livelihoods for long periods of time, or perceive it 
to be their right to exploit the natural resource system, may continue their old 
practices and engage in violent protests when officials are sent to enforce a law that 
is not perceived locally as legitimate” (Ostrom and Hayer, 2005: 600).  
While LNP’s management plan harbours great instruments to involve local 
communities in park management, this research shows that the bulk of 
participatory mechanisms is not working (Chapter 5.2.5): local communities are 
not involved in patrols or monitoring, employment opportunities by the park 
management are sporadic and short- term, and the “community zone” inside the 
park is largely unheard of. Locals do not even have access to the park’s touristic 
attractions, and it is likely that none of them has ever been to the Mirador 
(touristic viewing platform).66 
There is strong evidence that the lack of participation obstructs conservation 
efforts: continuous levels of poaching clearly show that rules are not adhered to 
(Chapter 5.1.5). It appeared that many locals are not even aware of the exact 
content of use-rules and hunting quotas. Furthermore, interviews and focus group 
discussions revealed that residents perceive the park as an alien construct which 
                                                        
66 A woman in Zega found that particularly disappointing: “Only tourists can enter the park, but we 
[villagers] would also like to go and see the wild animals” (F15)  
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was forced onto them by external actors and the park’s primary objective is not 
understood. As a result, the park is perceived as an antagonist to development, 
and constraints on forest use are neither considered legitimate nor fair. As a 
young agitated man in Socambo summed it up: “The climate convention wants 
Africa to reduce CO2, to protect its forests. You impose that, but what is our benefit?” 
(C9). 
The negative perception of conservation provides a breeding ground for 
conflicts (Chapter 5.4). This research identified two main conflicts directly linked 
to LNP’s conservation efforts: the conflict between eco-guards and local 
communities, and between wildlife and humans. Both are insufficiently responded 
to by the park management. The complaint mechanism against Human Rights 
abuses is ineffective: it is difficult to access, and many residents do not even know 
of its existence. Conflict transformation also requires spaces for dialogue between 
eco- guards and residents, but there are none. As a result, mutual mistrust and 
fear prevail. While wildlife- encroachment is perceived as an existential threat by 
all villagers, the park does little to mitigate its risks. Advices by park authorities to 
“complain to the gorilla directly” illustrate either a lack of concern or administrative 
overload. Whatever the reasons, research participants feel a lack of support on 
crop raiding and bear grudge: "Elephants are more protected than humans” (F11).  
Context matters: the park’s buffer zone  
While there is significant room for improvement in the park’s overall 
management performance, some of the challenges exceed its direct control and 
responsibility. They are, however, related to the management of the “landscape” 
the park is situated in: its 5,959 km2 large buffer zone. The buffer zone is meant to 
integrate conservation and development objectives. However, its management is 
characterized by lack of investment in basic infrastructure, weak integration of 
local livelihood needs, conflicting government policies, and lack of control. 
First, the extreme poverty prevailing in local communities (Chapter 5.3) is not 
caused (and cannot be solved) by the park itself. It is rather due to the lack of 
provision of basic infrastructure in the entire buffer zone, where most 
communities are situated (in fact, only few families live near or inside the park). 
While the park can address this lack through isolated community projects (and 
indeed allocates financial means to few (not yet implemented) initiatives), the 
extensive provision of schools, health- care centres, sanitary facilities and roads 
clearly exceed its objective, mandate, and capacity.  
Second, many of the land use restrictions that trouble local communities are 
directly linked to the various concessions of private companies. Following local 
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accounts, logging and safari companies aggressively defend their interests against 
local resource- users (Chapter 5.3.5). Participatory mapping indicates that the 
gazetting and zoning process of the buffer zone did not consider local livelihood 
needs (Chapter 5.2.3). 
Furthermore, commercial activities by private companies pose serious threats 
against biodiversity and likely have a greater impact on its decline than local 
resource use. Reportedly, logging companies harvest more timber within their 
concessions than allowed. Mining explorations in proximity to the park are 
actively encouraged by the government– in disregard of the fact that mining 
damages flora and fauna. Both logging and mining companies attract skilled 
workers from other areas of Cameroon, who actively engage in bushmeat hunting 
(Chapter 5.1.6). 
Third, the political and financial integration of local stakeholders via revenue 
sharing and community managed zones is troubled by elite- capture, corruption, 
and lack of transparency (Chapter 5.2.6). Instruments such as community hunting 
zones and community forests are based upon unrealistic assumptions of the social 
equity of local “communities”: neither women nor Baka needs are sufficiently 
represented, and the needs of the latter are too often disregarded. The 
discrimination and marginalisation of Baka by their Bantu neighbours is both 
cause and effect of a widely construed binary of “villagers” and “forest people” 
that does not do the Baka any favours.  
Conservation as Social Intervention in a Complicated Setting  
Brandon convincingly argued 20 years ago that “a park cannot be held 
responsible for curing structural problems such as unequal resource allocation, 
corruption, economic injustice, and market failures” (Brandon, 1998: 418). 
However, parks are not isolated “islands” but part of a wider “landscape”. This is 
acknowledged in LNP’s management plan, and for good reason: a mismatch 
between socio- economic context and park hamper the identification of 
proximate and root causes of biodiversity threats (ibidem: 415ff; also see 
Maginnis, Jackson and Dudley, 2004; World Resources Institute, 2019).  
There should not be any illusion that conservation is a “social intervention in 
complicated settings” (ibidem: 417), and this report has highlighted some of the 
variables of this setting in Lobéké. It puts forth a total of 37 recommendations for 
improving the governance of Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone (Chapter 
6). These recommendations are based in the realisation that “context matters”, 
and, following insights of CPRG- theory, address questions of equity, capacity 
building, and conflict- resolution. Furthermore, these recommendations 
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underscore the importance of stakeholder- involvement. While acknowledging 
that the integration of conservation and development objectives is important, 
there are going to be trade- offs. These trade- offs ought to be negotiated by all 
stakeholders, particularly by those that are most affected by them: local 
communities.  
In order to implement these recommendations and to respond to the 
identified challenges, long- term political and financial commitment is imperative. 
As a park is not a source of revenue (and should not be), financial support is 
required. Conservation is a global objective with primarily local costs, and 
Germany and other donors ought to significantly contribute to improve the 
governance of Lobéké National Park.  
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Annex 2 Ethical guidelines 
1. Protecting research participants and honouring trust: We endeavour to 
protect the physical, social and psychological well-being of those whom we 
study and to respect their rights, interests, sensitivities and privacy; 
2. Anticipating harms: We are sensitive to the possible consequences of our 
work and endeavour to guard against predictably harmful effects. Consent 
from subjects does not absolve us from our obligation to protect research 
participants as far as possible against the potentially harmful effects of 
research; 
3. Avoiding undue intrusion: We are aware of the intrusive potential of some 
of our enquiries and methods; 
4. Negotiating informed consent: We inform the subjects of our study about: 
the purpose(s) of the study, and the anticipated consequences of the 
research; the identity of funders and sponsors; the anticipated uses of the 
data; possible benefits of the study and possible harm or discomfort that 
might affect participants; issues relating to data storage and security; and 
the degree of anonymity and confidentiality which may be afforded to 
informants and subjects; 
5. Fair return for assistance: There should be no economic exploitation of 
individual informants, translators and research participants; fair return 
should be made for their help and services; 
6. Participants' intellectual property rights: It should be recognised that 
research participants have contractual and/or legal, interests and rights in 
data, recordings and publications, although rights will vary according to 
agreements and legal jurisdiction. 
7. Participants' involvement in research: As far as is possible we try and 
involve the people being studied in the planning and execution of our 
research projects, and we recognise that their obligations to the 
participants or the host community may not end. 
Statement: Information for Participants/Stakeholders/Others 
We are students from the Seminar für Ländliche Entwicklung (SLE) of the 
Humboldt- University of Berlin. We have come to the Lobéké- National Park to 
study the social and ecological impact of its current management, to analyse 
potential conflicts surrounding the park and to study how a participatory 
management could be put into practice. The study is co- financed by KfW 
development bank.  
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We do the study to the best of our knowledge and belief and none of our 
partner organisations impinges upon our study, data analysis, or findings. We are 
not here to solve conflicts and we are not here to solve problems pertaining to 
poverty. We hope that our study will lead to an improved participatory 
management of the National Park and that all stakeholders will benefit from its 
existence. While doing research, we follow do no harm -principles and ethical 
guidelines for good research practice. We always work for the greatest possible 
benefit of our target groups. There are no adverse consequences if participation in 
our research is declined. The primary data obtained will be kept safe and secure. 
We promise anonymity and confidentiality to all participants. The data analysis 
and the study report will be made public and shared with KfW, WWF, the SLE and 
other stakeholders. Anyone interested in the study will have free access to it. 
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Annex 3 Work schedule 
Tasks  
& 
Activities 
Week 
1 
Week 
2 
Week 
3 
Week 
4 
Week 
5 
Week 
6 
Week 
7 
Week 
8 
Week 
9 
Week 
10 
Week 
11 
Week 
12 
Week 
13 
Location 
30.07-
03.08. 
06.-10. 
08. 
13.-17. 
08. 
20.-24. 
08. 
27.-31. 
08 
03.-07. 
09. 
10.-14. 
09. 
17.-21. 
09. 
24.-28. 
09. 
01.-05. 
10. 
08.-12. 
10. 
15.-19. 
10. 
22.-26. 
10. 
Preparation, Stakeholder 
interviews 
             Yaoundé 
Data  
Collection  
             LNP 
Visit of other TNS parks              
other TNS 
parks 
Data Analysis              Yaoundé 
Presentation of Results              Yaoundé 
Excursion              - 
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Annex 4 Citation code 
Citation 
Code 
Method 
Resource of 
Information/ 
Interviewee 
Organization/ 
Village 
Position/ 
Characteristic 
Location 
Date of 
Interview 
C1 Community Meeting 
cooperative 
members 
Women's Cooperative 29 women, and 2 men; 5 Baka 
Mambélé carrefour, House 
of Women's Coopérative 
28.08.2018 
C2 Community Meeting Villagers Mambélé chefferie 35, mostly Bantu Mambélé chefferie 31.08.2018 
C3 Community Meeting Baka Mambélé carrefour About 40 Baka 
Mambélé Carrefour, École 
Primaire 
31.08.2018 
C4 Community Meeting Villagers Mambélé carrefour 
Villagers; mostly who works with LNP, 
mostly Bantu men 
Mambélé Carrefour, bar 28.08.2018 
C5 Community Meeting Villagers Koumela 
About 50 Bantu; ~ 30 men and 20 
women 
Koumela, Community Hall 03.09.2018 
C6 Community Meeting 
Villagers and 
representatives 
Libongo Baka and Bantu Libongo, Community Hall 07.09.2018 
C7 Community Meeting Baka Aviation (Pk 59), Libongo 8 Baka (8 Men; aged 40-60) 
Aviation (Pk 59), Libongo, 
House of the Baka chief 
08.09.2018 
C8 Community Meeting Villagers Bela 
Baka (5 Men, 5 Women) and Bantu 
(around 65 Men and 12 women), 
Refugees from Central African 
Republic 
Bela, Primary School 08.09.2018 
C9 Community Meeting Villagers Socambo Bantu (27 men, 9 women), one Baka Socambo, Carrefour 16.09.2018 
C10 Community Meeting Baka Mambélé carrefour 20-30 Baka (15 men and 15 women) 
Mambélé Carrefour, Baka 
Campement (around 1km 
away) 
17.09.2018 
C11 Community Meeting Villagers Zega (PK14) 
40, mostly Bantu, but several Baka 
present; Mix of men and women 
Zega (Pk14), Community 
hut/space of the village 
21.09.2018 
C12 Community Meeting Villagers Dioula Baka (20), Bantu (5); mainly men 
Dioula, Communiy 
hut/space of the village 
23.09.2018 
F1 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Eco-Guards MINFOF Lobéké 7 men; 1 woman HQ Mambélé 29.08.2018 
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Citation 
Code 
Method 
Resource of 
Information/ 
Interviewee 
Organization/ 
Village 
Position/ 
Characteristic 
Location 
Date of 
Interview 
F2 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Baka, Focus 
Group Nr.1 
Mambélé Carrefour 
2 women, 3 men;  
30-50 years old 
Mambélé Carrefour 01.09.2018 
F3 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Baka, Focus 
Group Nr.2 
Mambélé Carrefour 
3 men, 2 women 
30-50 years old 
Mambélé Carrefour, 
Campement Nkoulou 
01.09.2018 
F4 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Baka, Focus 
Group Nr. 3 
Mambélé Carrefour 4 men, 12 women 
Mambélé Carrefour, 
Campement Ndeboh 
01.09.2018 
F5 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Villagers, Focus 
Group Nr. 1 
Mambélé Chefferie Bantu and Baka, mostly male Membélé Chefferie 02.09.2018 
F6 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Villagers, Focus 
Group Nr. 1 
Koumela 21 Women, various ages Koumela, Community Hall 03.09.2018 
F7 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Villagers, Focus 
Group Nr. 2 
Koumela Mostly Bantu men Koumela, Community Hall 04.09.2018 
F8 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Baka, Focus 
Group Nr.1 
Ndongo 
Men and women; mostly over 30 years 
old 
Ndongo, Primary School 
Building 
05.09.2018 
F9 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Baka, Focus 
Group Nr.2 
Ndongo 
3 men, 2 women 
 16-25 years old 
Ndongo, Primary School 
Building 
05.09.2018 
F10 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Villagers, Focus 
Group Nr.1 
Libongo 
15 Representatives and notables of 
Libongo, both Baka (4) and Bantu (11) 
Libongo, House of the 
Chefferie 
07.09.2018 
F11 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Villagers, Focus 
Group Nr.2 
Libongo 
15 Producers, Farmers and fishermen, 
all male 
Libongo, House of the 
Chefferie 
07.09.2018 
F12 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
SEFAC-workers Libongo/ SEFAC 
3 workers and around 4 other villagers 
(some notables) 
Libongo, House of the 
Chefferie 
08.09.2018 
F13 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Baka Socambo 20 people: men, women, children Socambo, Baka village 17.09.2018 
F14 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Baka Zega (PK14) Baka (10 men, 5 women) 
Zega (Pk 14), Open space 
in the village 
21.09.2018 
F15 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Bantu Zega (PK14) 20 Bantu, 7 Women, 13 Men Zega (Pk 14) 21.09.2018 
F16 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Eco-Guards, FGD 
1 
MINFOF Lobéké 
All male; 3 francophones, one 
anglophone 
HQ Mambélé, Case de 
Passage 
21.09.2018 
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F17 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Baka Dioula 14 men Dioula, Church 23.09.2018 
F18 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Bantu Dioula Mostly men Dioula, Pavillon/hut 23.09.2018 
F19 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
association 
members 
WHCS (Women, health and 
conservation society) 
19 members of the association 
(female) 
Mambélé chefferie 24.09.2018 
F20 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Eco-guards, FGD 
2 
MINFOF Lobéké 4 Ecoguards, all male 
HQ Mambélé, Case de 
Passage 
26.09.2018 
F21 
Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) 
Cacao cooperative 
members 
GIC - Molisso 6 members, all male 
Mambélé, at the house of a 
farmer 
26.09.2018 
EI1 Expert Interview Dr. Guy Merlin GIZ 
ProPSFE, GIZ Forest and Environment 
Support Program, Regional 
Coordinator East Cameroon 
Yaoundé 07.08.2018 
EI2 Expert Interview Victor Amougou CEFAID Head of CEFAID 
Yaoundé, our 
accomodation 
10.08.2018 
EI3 Expert Interview Joseph Lekealem MINFOF 
Director of Wildlife and Protected 
Areas 
Yaoundé 10.08.2018 
EI4 Expert Interview Prof. Martin Eluga University of Yaounde I 
Head of Department of Arts and 
Archeology 
Yaoundé, University 
Campus 
10.08.2018 
EI5 Expert Interview Roger Fotso WCS Country Director Cameroon Yaoundé 13.08.2018 
EI6 Expert Interview Jackson Amouko UNDP / Yaoundé 14.08.2018 
EI7 Expert Interview Moise Kono WWF Cameroon Indigenous People responsible Yaoundé 14.08.2018 
EI8 Expert Interview Hanson Njiforti WWF Cameroon Country Director Cameroon Yaoundé 16.08.2018 
EI9 Expert Interview Romain Kana FTNS Program Officer Yaoundé 22.08.2018 
EI10 Expert Interview Alain Tsobeng 
World Agroforestry Centre 
(ICRAF) 
Assistant Scientist/ Tree Improvement 
Yaoundé, ICRAF West and 
Central Africa Regional 
Office 
12.10.2018 
EI11 Expert Interview Lydie Ella MINAS 
Deputy Director of the Fight against 
Social Inclusion 
Yaoundé, MINAS office 18.10.2018 
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EI12 Expert Interview 
Hanson Njiforti, 
Moise 
Kono,Zacharie 
Nzooh and others 
WWF Cameroon National WWF staff Yaoundé, WWF HQ 24.10.2019 
EI13 Expert Interview 
Dr. Théophile 
Zognou, Romain 
Kana, Alix 
Noiraud 
FTNS 
FTNS staff (Executive Director 
 Program Officer, Consultant) 
Yaoundé, FTNS Office 24.10.2018 
EI14 Expert Interview 
Samuel Makon 
Wehiong 
FTNS Chair of Board of Directors FTNS Yaoundé 14.08.2018 
EI15 Expert Interview 
Christelle 
Domyou 
Itoumbou 
KfW Project Coordinator KfW Office Yaoundé 16.08.2018 
I1 Interview Messe Venant OKANI Head of OKANI Bertoua catholic center 22.08.2018 
I2 Interview Governor East Region Governor East Region Bertoua, Governor's office 22.08.2018 
I3 Interview 
Alphonse Ngniado 
Wouala 
WWF UTO-SE Senior Forest Officer Yokadouma, WWF office 24.08.2018 
I4 Interview 
Bruno Bisse Bell 
Bisse 
Salapoumbé Sub-division Sub-Prefect/ Head of Sub-Division 
Salapoumbé, Sub-
prefecture 
27.08.2018 
I5 Interview 
Nathalie 
Megezine 
COVAREF N°3 
President of COVAREF No 3; Also 
present are 5 COVAREF delegates (incl 
3 Baka representatives) 
Kika, Open Hall on the 
compound of CTSC 
29.08.2018 
I6 Interview Staff 
CTSC (Habitat 2000) 
logging company 
Technical Staff Kika, CTSC Office 29.08.2018 
I7 Interview Jean Richard Allo Moloundou's Council Mayor of the Moloundou Council Moloundou, bar 29.08.2018 
I8 Interview Staff Pepe Safari Chef de Personnel 
Kika, Open Hall on the 
compound of CTSC 
29.08.2018 
I9 Interview 
Jean Baptiste 
Nste Andjolo 
Moloundou Sub-division Sub-Prefect/ Head of Sub-Division 
Moloundou, Sub-
Prefecture 
29.08.2018 
I10 Interview Philippe Ambata COVAREF N°2 Vice president Mbatika 30.08.2018 
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I11 Interview 
President CF 
To'okpwassi 
Community Forest 
To'okpwassi 
President of the Communit Forest Mbatika 30.08.18 
I12 Interview Brice Poka 
SAB, CIBC, SEBC 
(Vicwood-Thanry-Group) 
logging company 
Social Mediator 
Lokomo, Office at the 
Sawmill 
31.08.2018 
I13 Interview Staff Mayo Oldiri safari Driver, Pisteur, Chef de Personnel 
Koumela, Mayol Safari 
Camp 
31.08.2018 
I14 Interview 
Member of the 
association 
ASBABUK Baka representative Dissassoué, his house 03.09.2018 
I15 Interview 
Tabi Dieudonné 
Bessong 
MINFOF Lobéké 
Unity Head Finance and 
Administration 
HQ Mambélé 04.09.2018 
I16 Interview 
Joseph Eben 
Penkem 
MINFOF Lobéké 
Chef Service Protection et Suivi 
Ecologique 
HQ Mambélé 04.09.2018 
I17 Interview WWF Volunteer WWF Lobéké Volunteer 
HQ Mambélé, in front of 
the building 
04.09.2018 
I18 Interview Essombe MINFOF Lobéké Head of Tourism Unit 
HQ Mambélé, Essembe's 
house 
05.09.2018 
I19 Interview 
Olivier Njounan 
Njounan Tegomo  
WWF Lobéké 
Technical Advisor Ips, Community 
Coordination Officer 
HQ Mambélé, Salle de 
Réunion 
05.09.2018 
I20 Interview WWF Volunteer WWF Lobéké Volunteer HQ Mambélé 05.09.2018 
I21 Interview Djibrilla Hessana WWF Lobéké 
Programme Manager (PM) WWF 
Yengi TNS 
HQ Mambélé, WWF office 06.09.2018 
I22 Interview Chef de Poste MINFOF Libongo Chef de Poste Koumela Libongo, MINFOF Office 07.09.2018 
I23 Interview 
Achilles Goué 
Mengamenya 
MINFOF Lobéké Conservator of Lobéké National Park HQ Mambélé 07.09.2018 
I24 Interview Staff Faro Lobeke Safari LAB Responsible Camp Loupondji 08.09.2018 
I25 Interview 
Francesco 
Falcucci 
SEFAC logging company Chef de Site Libongo, SEFAC office 08.09.2018 
I26 Interview Terrance Fuh WWF CAR Primate habitation and Tourism 
HQ Bayanga, CAR, WWF 
office 
10.09.2018 
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I27 Interview 
Franck Barrel 
Mavinga 
WWF CAR 
Community Development responsible 
APDS 
HQ Bayanga, CAR 11.09.2018 
I28 Interview Martial Betoulet 
Youth Association Ndima-
Kali 
Agent de Development Bayanga, CAR, Doli-Lodge 12.09.2018 
I29 Interview Jean Richard Allo Moloundou's Council Mayor of the Moloundou Council Moloundou 12.09.2018 
I30 Interview 
Guillaume 
Duboscq 
WWF CAR 
Technical advisor LAB to the 
conservateur 
HQ Bayanga, CAR, LAB 
office 
12.09.2018 
I31 Interview 
Martial- Yvon 
Amolet (1) 
Saint- Jérôme 
Sitamon (2) 
Human Rights Centre 
Bayanga 
(1) Juriste, ONG Maison de l'Enfant  
et de la femme Pygmées (MEFP)  
(2) Coordonnateur de MEFP 
Bayanga, CAR, Human 
Rights Centre 
13.09.2018 
I32 Interview Luis Aranz WWF CAR Principal Technical Advisor 
HQ Bayanga, CAR, his 
office 
13.09.2018 
I33 Interview Terry Brincic WCS Head of research HQ Bomassa, Congo 15.09.2018 
I34 Interview President CF 
Community Forest 
Socambo 
President CF Socambo at our hotel 17.09.2018 
I35 Interview 
Former Adjoint du 
Maire 
Socambo Hotel Owner Pavillon Socambo 17.09.2018 
I36 Interview 
Representative of 
CPF Socambo-
Mongokélé 
Comité Paysan Foret 
Socambo-Mongokele 
RAGE (responsable des Affaires 
Generales de la CPF Socambo) 
Pavillon Socambo  18.09.18 
I37 Interview Cyril Tchoudja 
Mongokole Mining 
Company 
Patron of MMC 
Mbongoli, 70 km from 
Socambo 
18.9.2018 
I38 Interview Joseph Etoundi MINFOF Lobéké Unity Head Research His office, HQ Mambélé 22.09.2018 
I39 Interview 
Achilles Goué 
Mengamegna 
MINFOF Lobéké Conservator of Lobéké National Park HQ Mambélé 27.09.2018 
I40 Interview Jerome Lewis UCL ExCiteS Co- Director / 15.12.2018 
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M1 Meeting 
MoU Conference 
on Lobéké and 
Boumba-Bek 
Meeting with Baka, society 
and state representatives 
ASBABUK, CEFAID, OKANI, FPP, 
WWF, State officials (MINAS, Justice), 
conservators of Boumba-Bek/Nki and 
Lobéké National Parks 
Bertouá Catholic Center 22.08.2018 
M2 Meeting 
Kick-off meeting 
at LNP 
WWF and MINFOF Lobéké 
WWF- PM; Head of surveillance unit; 
Head of eco-tourism unit, senior staff 
HQ Mambélé 27.08.2018 
M3 Meeting Ecoguards MINFOF Lobéké Head of units and ~20 ecoguards HQ Mambélé 28.08.2018 
M4 Meeting 
Conservateur 
Nganggoue (1); 
Black (2) 
WCS 
Technical advisor anti-poaching, WCS 
(1) Controlleur communication 
monitoring (2) 
HQ Bomassa, Congo 15.09.2018 
M5 Meeting 
Aymard Ebag 
Tsiokame 
WCS 
SMART expert; focal point for SMART 
data 
HQ Bomassa, Congo 16.09.2018 
M6 Meeting 
18 members Or-
Vert + 2 
employees of the 
NGO AFEBEM 
Or-Vert, AFEBEM Or-Vert is an association for NTFPs 
Mambélé Carrefour, house 
of the President of Or-Vert 
26.09.2018 
M7 Meeting 
Indigenous 
people’s 
workshop  
CEFAID, CED, ministries, 
IP-representatives 
NGO leaders, state officials, and IP-
representatives 
Hotel Mt. Fébé, Yaoundé 08.08.2018 
P1 
Participant 
Observations 
GIS meeting with 
Arnaud Choumele 
FTNS External consultant Yaoundé 13.08.2018 
P2 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat in the car FTNS Research assistants and FTNS-driver 
On the road between 
Yaoundé and Bertoua 
21.08.2018 
P3 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
MoU Conference 
on Lobéké and 
Boumba-Bek 
Meeting with Baka, society 
and state representatives 
ASBABUK, CEFAID, OKANI, FPP, 
WWF, State officials (MINAS, Justice), 
conservators of Boumba-Bek/Nki and 
Lobéké National Parks 
Bertouá catholic center 22.08.2018 
P4 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
MoU Conference 
on Lobéké and 
Boumba-Bek 
Meeting with Baka, society 
and state representatives 
ASBABUK, CEFAID, OKANI, FPP, 
WWF, State officials (MINAS, Justice), 
conservators of Boumba-Bek/Nki and 
Lobéké National Parks 
Bertouá catholic center 22.08.2018 
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P5 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with 
Alphonse Ngniado 
Wouala 
WWF UTO-SE Senior Forest Officer Yokadouma, WWF office 24.08.2018 
P6 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with a local 
cacao farmer 
Cocoa farm Farmer Mambélé carrefour 24.08.2018 
P7 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Chat with Staff WWF Lobéké Logistician 
Mambélé Camp Kombo, 
veranda of our hut 
25.08.2018 
P8 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Chat with Staff WWF Lobéké Logistician 
Mambélé Camp Kombo, 
veranda of our hut 
25.08.2018 
P9 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with WWF 
volunteer 
WWF Lobéké Volunteer HQ Mambélé 25.08.2018 
P10 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with Staff WWF Lobéké Logistician 
HQ Mambélé, WWF 
Accommodation 
25.08.2018 
P11 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Meeting with 
Djibrila Hessana 
WWF Lobéké Park Manager HQ Mambélé, his office 27.08.2018 
P12 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Meeting with 
Djibrila Hessana 
WWF Lobéké Park Manager HQ Mambélé, his office 27.08.2018 
P13 
Participant 
Observations 
Meeting to 
discuss 
approaching of 
communities 
WWF and MINFOF Lobéké Staff HQ Mambélé 27.08.2018 
P14 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with 
ASBABUK vice-
president 
ASBABUK Asbabuk vice-president 
On the road from Mambélé 
to Salapoumbé 
27.08.2018 
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P15 
Participant 
Observations 
Introduction 
(facilitated by 
local PACEBCO 
staff) 
Mambélé chefferie 
Substitute of the chief, local 
PACEBCO staff, Vice-president of 
ASBABUK, local pastor, community 
members (Baka and Bantu) of 
Mambélé village 
Mambélé chefferie, 
Pavillon de la chefferie 
28.08.2018 
P16 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Introduction to 
the President of 
Or Vert 
Or Vert association President of Or Vert 
Mambélé carrefour, her 
house 
28.08.2018 
P17 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Introduction to 
the President of 
Or Vert 
Or Vert association President of Or Vert 
Mambélé carrefour, her 
house 
28.08.2018 
P18 
Participant 
Observations 
WWF volunteer WWF Lobéké Volunteer HQ Mambélé 28.08.2018 
P19 
Participant 
Observations 
Bertrand WWF Lobéké Logistician 
HQ Mambélé, WWF 
Accommodation 
28.08.2018 
P20 
Participant 
Observations 
Small-Talk with 
Eco-guards 
MINFOF Lobéké Eco-Guards 
HQ Mambélé, in front of 
the headquarters 
28.08.2018 
P21 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with 
Members 
COVAREF No 2 / Mbatika 29.08.2018 
P22 
Participant 
Observations 
Observing the 
COVAREF No.3 
COVAREF No 3 / 
Kika, Close to the Forest 
Company CTSC 
29.08.2018 
P23 
Participant 
Observations 
Travel to Kika / / Road Mambélé-Kika 29.08.2018 
P24 
Participant 
Observations 
Travel to 
Moloundou 
/ / 
Road from Mambélé to 
Moloundou 
29.08.2018 
P25 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with Eco- 
Guard 
MINFOF Lobéké / Moloundou, Restaurant 29.08.2018 
P26 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with Eco- 
Guard 
MINFOF Lobéké / 
In the car on the way to 
Kika 
30.08.2018 
P27 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with WWF 
Volunteer 
WWF Lobéké Volunteer Car-ride to Salapoumbé 29.08.2018 
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P28 
Participant 
Observations 
Nsonkali Charles-
Jones 
OKANI Baka, local head OKANI 
Mambélé Carrefour, 
Restaurant 
30.08.2018 
P29 
Participant 
Observations 
XX feeding 
parrots 
/ / 
HQ Mambélé, next to the 
parrot cage 
31.08.2018 
P30 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with 
research 
participants 
/ / villages around LNP 31.08.2018 
P31 
Participant 
Observations 
ASBABUK vice 
president and his 
brother in law 
ASBABUK Baka, ASBABUK Vice-President Mambélé carrefour, bar 31.08.2018 
P32 
Participant 
Observations 
Conversation with 
owner and other 
people 
Lokomo / Lokomo, Restaurant/Store 31.08.2018 
P33 
Participant 
Observations 
Ecoguards MINFOF Lobéké / HQ Mambélé, office 01.09.2018 
P34 
Participant 
Observations 
Ecoguards MINFOF Lobéké / 
HQ Mambélé, Case de 
Passage, living room 
01.09.2018 
P35 
Participant 
Observations 
Local pastor  
Camps inside the 
neighbouring UFAs 
Fields and small camps 
from Mambélé in direction 
LNP 
01.09.2018 
P36 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Ecotourism trip to 
"petite savanne" 
LNP 
with two ecoguards and a guide 
(pisteur) 
HQ Mambélé, Camp pont 
cassé, petite Savanne 
(Mirador), Camp Petite 
Savanne 
01.09.2018 
P37 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Ecotourism trip to 
"petite savanne" 
LNP 
with two ecoguards and a guide 
(pisteur) 
HQ Mambélé, Camp pont 
cassé, petite Savanne 
(Mirador), Camp Petite 
Savanne 
01.09.2018 
P38 
Participant 
Observations 
III 
Ecotourism trip to 
"petite savanne" 
LNP 
with two ecoguards and a guide 
(pisteur) 
HQ Mambélé, Camp pont 
cassé, petite Savanne 
(Mirador), Camp Petite 
Savanne 
01.-
02.09.2018 
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P39 
Participant 
Observations 
IV 
Ecotourism trip to 
"petite savanne" 
LNP 
with two ecoguards and a guide 
(pisteur) 
HQ Mambélé, Camp pont 
cassé, petite Savanne 
(Mirador), Camp Petite 
Savanne 
01.-
02.09.2018 
P40 
Participant 
Observations 
V 
Ecotourism trip to 
"petite savanne" 
LNP 
with two ecoguards and a guide 
(pisteur) 
HQ Mambélé, Camp pont 
cassé, petite Savanne 
(Mirador), Camp Petite 
Savanne 
01.-
02.09.2018 
P41 
Participant 
Observations 
Arrival at the 
headquarters, 
Observation and 
talk with 
Ecoguard on the 
way back from the 
park 
LNP 
with two ecoguards and a guide 
(pisteur) 
HQ Mambélé, Camp pont 
cassé, petite Savanne 
(Mirador), Camp Petite 
Savanne 
02.09.2018 
P42 
Participant 
Observations 
introduction and 
group forming 
Ndongo 
Baka community members and 
ASBABUK vice-president 
Campement Ndongo/ 
Salapoumbé 
03.09.2018 
P43 
Participant 
Observations 
Introduction to 
Salapoumbé und 
Koumela 
/ / 
Salapoumbé and Koumela, 
on the road 
03.09.2018 
P44 
Participant 
Observations 
Harvesting at a 
cacao farm 
Cacao farm Farmers 
close to Mambélé, Camp 
Kombo 
03.09.2018 
P45 
Participant 
Observations 
Conversation and 
farm visit  
with 
cacao farmers 
Cacao farm Farmers 
close to Mambélé, Camp 
Kombo 
03.09.2018 
P46 
Participant 
Observations 
Visit of the 
community forest 
Community forest 
To'okpwassi in Mbatika 
/ 
Mbatika and CF 
To'okpwassi 
04.09.2018 
P47 
Participant 
Observations 
Interview with the 
steering board of 
CF To'okpwassi 
Community forest 
To'okpwassi in Mbatika 
President, ROF, Baka delegates and 
others; several members of the 
community forest's comittee 
Mbatika, COVAREF 
president's pavillon 
04.09.2018 
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P48 
Participant 
Observations 
Observation Mambélé carrefour / Mambélé Carrefour 
05.-
06.09.2018 
P49 
Participant 
Observations 
General 
observation 
/ / HQ Mambélé 
05.-
06.09.2018 
P50 
Participant 
Observations 
Eco-guard MINFOF Lobéké / HQ Mambélé, outside 06.09.2018 
P51 
Participant 
Observations 
Unknown Baka 
woman 
Mambélé carrefour Villager 
On the road from Mambélé 
Camp Kombo to Carrefour 
06.09.2018 
P52 
Participant 
Observations 
meeting at poste 
forestiere 
MINFOF Libongo, Faro 
Safari, Libongo community 
Chef of the poste forestiere, two 
colleagues, Oumar R. Ali (Faro Lobéké 
Safari) and a local notable 
Libongo, poste forestiere 06.09.2018 
P53 
Participant 
Observations 
Observation / / Mambélé, Camp Kombo 07.09.2018 
P54 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Farm visit Farming plot Farmer and Notable 
around 1.5km outside of 
Libongo 
07.09.2018 
P55 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Farm visit Farming plot Farmer and Notable 
around 1.5km outside of 
Libongo 
07.09.2018 
P56 
Participant 
Observations 
Talk with Charcoal 
producers 
Charcoal production site / 
Libongo, in front of the 
SEFAC area 
08.09.2018 
P57 
Participant 
Observations 
Military Officer 
Cameroonian Armed 
Forces 
Head of local military post Bela 08.09.2018 
P58 
Participant 
Observations 
Reflections on 
Tourism and Park 
Management in 
Dzanga-Sangha 
Dzanga-Sangha park / Bayanga, CAR 
09.-
14.09.2018 
P59 
Participant 
Observations 
Drivers and polish 
physician 
/ / 
Monassao, CAR, catholic 
hospital 
10.09.2018 
P60 
Participant 
Observations 
shopping in the 
market 
Bayanga, CAR / Bayanga, CAR 13.09.2018 
Annexes 199 
Citation 
Code 
Method 
Resource of 
Information/ 
Interviewee 
Organization/ 
Village 
Position/ 
Characteristic 
Location 
Date of 
Interview 
P61 
Participant 
Observations 
Reflection on the 
stay at Nouabalé-
Ndoki 
/ / HQ Bomassa, Congo 
14.-
16.09.2018 
P62 
Participant 
Observations 
Vincent WCS PNNN LAB consultant HQ Bomassa, Congo 14.09.2018 
P63 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Vincent WCS PNNN LAB consultant HQ Bomassa, Congo 15.09.2018 
P64 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Vincent WCS PNNN LAB consultant HQ Bomassa, Congo 15.09.2018 
P65 
Participant 
Observations 
Eve WCS PNNN Employee Bomassa village, Congo 15.09.2018 
P66 
Participant 
Observations 
Informal Talks 
with Terry and 
Forest Hogg 
WCS PNNN 
Head of research; technical advisor 
anti-poaching 
HQ Bomassa, Congo 15.09.2018 
P67 
Participant 
Observations 
Forest Hogg and 
Zanne L. 
WCS PNNN Employees 
Kayak tour near Bomassa, 
Congo 
15.09.2018 
P68 
Participant 
Observations 
Forest Hogg WCS PNNN Technical advisor anti-poaching HQ Bomassa, Congo 15.09.2018 
P69 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Zanne L. WCS PNNN Communications 
HQ Bomassa, Congo, 
common room 
15.09.2018 
P70 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Zanne L. WCS PNNN Communications 
HQ Bomassa, Congo, 
common room 
15.09.2018 
P71 
Participant 
Observations 
Chief, notables, 
farmers, CPFs, 
etc. 
Socambo 
chief, notables, farmers, three 
members of CPF, OFR-DPC (?), the 
Baka boatdriver of WWF in Socambo 
(photovoice) 
Socambo 15.09.2018 
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Citation 
Code 
Method 
Resource of 
Information/ 
Interviewee 
Organization/ 
Village 
Position/ 
Characteristic 
Location 
Date of 
Interview 
P72 
Participant 
Observations 
Pangolin hunter Socambo 
Baka hunter/ minion helping out the 
Bantu family that hosts us. 
Socambo 15.09.2018 
P73 
Participant 
Observations 
former Adjoint du 
Maire and his 
friend 
(photovoice) 
Socambo 
Former adjoint du maire or conseille 
municipeaux 
Socambo, Restaurant 15.09.2018 
P74 
Participant 
Observations 
Ecoguards and 
pisteurs 
MINFOF Lobéké, villagers / Djembe 15.09.2018 
P75 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Informal talk with 
the LNP 
ecoguards 
MINFOF Lobéké On mission Djembe 16.09.2018 
P76 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Informal talk with 
the LNP 
ecoguards 
MINFOF Lobéké On mission Djembe 16.09.2018 
P77 
Participant 
Observation 
B.I.R. Officer 
Socambo 
Cameroonian Armed 
Forces 
Soldier stationed at local military post Socambo 
16.-
18.09.2018 
P78 
Participant 
Observations 
Visit of the illegal 
miners 
Mbongoli / 
Mbongoli, Village 1.5 hours 
north of Socombo 
17.09.2018 
P79 
Participant 
Observations 
Chat with 
artisanal miners, 
visit of the mines 
and arrange 
meeting with 
MMC 
Mongokele Mining 
Company, village and 
artisanal mines 
Patron of MMC and Artisanal miners Mbongoli 17.09.2018 
P80 
Participant 
Observations 
Miners Mbongoli 
Illegal goldmine next to Mongokele 
Mining 
Mbongoli 17.09.2018 
P81 
Participant 
Observations 
Driver FTNS / Socambo, in front of hotel 17.09.2018 
P82 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Visit Community 
Forest Socambo 
Community Forest 
Socambo 
/ CF Socambo 17.09.2018 
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Code 
Method 
Resource of 
Information/ 
Interviewee 
Organization/ 
Village 
Position/ 
Characteristic 
Location 
Date of 
Interview 
P83 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Visit Community 
Forest Socambo 
Community Forest 
Socambo 
/ CF Socambo 17.09.2018 
P84 
Participant 
Observations 
Talking to a 
former CTSC 
worker 
Socambo / Socambo 17.09.2018 
P85 
Participant 
Observations 
Baka employees Mayo Oldiri Safari (pisteur and water carrier) 
Lognia Camp, close to 
Dioula 
17.09.2018 
P86 
Participant 
Observations 
I 
Eco-guards MINFOF Lobéké / 
Road from Socambo to 
Mambélé 
18.09.2018 
P87 
Participant 
Observations 
II 
Eco -guards MINFOF Lobéké / 
Road from Socambo to 
Mambélé 
18.09.2018 
P88 
Participant 
Observations 
Visit of the Cacao 
Farm of the 
president of the 
community forest 
near Socambo 
Cacao farm 
President of community forest and 
farmer 
Socambo 18.09.2018 
P89 
Participant 
Observations 
Observation from 
the car 
/ / 
Road from Socambo to 
Mambélé 
18.09.2018 
P90 
Participant 
Observations 
Visit of a Safari 
Camp on the way 
to Mbongoli 
Mayo Oldiri Safari Camp Baka guards and their families 
Between Mbongoli and 
Socambo 
18.09.2018 
P91 
Participant 
Observations 
chat with research 
assistants 
research assistants / On the road 19.09.2018 
P92 
Participant 
Observations 
Report from 
research assistant 
research assistants / Mambélé Camp Kombo 19.09.2018 
P93 
Participant 
Observations 
Police Guard Cameroonian Police Force Check-point at park entry (PK27) 
Entrance LNP, Road to 
PK14 
19.09.2018 
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Code 
Method 
Resource of 
Information/ 
Interviewee 
Organization/ 
Village 
Position/ 
Characteristic 
Location 
Date of 
Interview 
P94 
Participant 
Observations 
Farmer Mambélé / 
Between Mambélé and 
Camp Kombo 
19.09.2018 
P95 
Participant 
Observations 
Farmer Mambélé / 
HQ Mambélé, Main camp 
for LNP staff 
19.09.2018 
P96 
Participant 
Observations 
long chat with 
Germain Ngandjui 
PNUD-GEF, UNDP 
Cameroun 
National expert on management 
strategies and sustainable funding of 
protected areas 
HQ Mambélé 20.09.2018 
P97 
Participant 
Observations 
Farmer Mambélé / 
His farm; between Camp 
Kombo and Carrefour 
21.09.2018 
P98 
Participant 
Observations 
Baka FGD 
Participants 
Zega (Pk 14) / Zega (Pk 14) 21.09.2018 
P99 
Participant 
Observations 
Field walk and 
chat with the chief 
Zega (Pk 14) / Zega (Pk 14) 21.09.2018 
P100 
Participant 
Observations 
Visit of the farms 
in PK27 
PK27 / PK 27 21.09.2018 
P101 
Participant 
Observations 
driver FTNS / Mambélé, Barrière 23.09.2018 
P102 
Participant 
Observations 
observations (with 
Achilles 
Mengamenya) 
MINFOF Lobéké Conservator LNP 
HQ Mambélé, Camp 
Combo 
23.09.2018 
P103 
Participant 
Observations 
two Baka, a 
village notable, 
community forest 
representative 
and other Bantu 
Dioula 
notable, ASBABUK member, forest 
exploiter, farmers and fisher/hunter 
Pavillon/hut 23.09.2018 
P104 
Participant 
Observations 
Achilles 
Mengamenya 
whilst providing 
us with files of 
reports 
MINFOF Lobéké Conservator LNP 
HQ Mambélé, 
conservator's office 
25.09.2018 
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Characteristic 
Location 
Date of 
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P105 
Participant 
Observations 
Eco-guards 
getting weapons 
for patrol 
MINFOF Lobéké / 
HQ Mambélé, office in 
front of the conservator's 
25.09.2018 
P106 
Participant 
Observations 
Responsible 
Person for forest 
operations 
Community Forest Dioula / Dioula 25.09.2018 
P107 
Participant 
Observations 
Short visit of 
Community 
Forest Dioula 
Community Forest Dioula / Dioula 25.09.2018 
P108 
Participant 
Observations 
Observations 
during Preliminary 
Findings-
Workshop 
stakholders around the 
park 
/ 
Mambélé Carrefour , 
PACEBCO 
28.09.2018 
P109 
Participant 
Observations 
Answers to our 
presentation / 
stakeholder 
meeting 
Stakeholders around the 
park 
/ 
Mambélé Carrefour , 
PACEBCO 
28.09.2018 
P110 
Participant 
Observations 
"Pepe" Pepe Safari Owner of Pepe Safari Mambélé Camp Kombo 29.09.2018 
P111 
Participant 
Observations 
Questions on 
COVAREFs and 
participative 
mechanisms 
 Record of questions during FGDs in 
communities around LNP 
HQ Mambélé - 
P112 
Participant 
Observations 
General 
Observation 
 / On the road - 
P113 
Participant 
Observations 
Dr. Theophile 
Zognou 
FTNS Executive Director Yaoundé, in the car to IRIC - 
P114 
Participant 
Observations 
Community 
members 
Bela, Libongo, Socambo, 
Zega (PK 14), etc… 
/ villages around LNP - 
P115 
Participant 
Observations 
Baka Mambélé carrefour / Mambélé Carrefour - 
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Citation 
Code 
Method 
Resource of 
Information/ 
Interviewee 
Organization/ 
Village 
Position/ 
Characteristic 
Location 
Date of 
Interview 
PV 1 Photovoice Participant 1 MINFOF Lobéké Eco- Guard (male), Bantu, 28 years old 
HQ Mambélé, WWF 
Accommodation 
30.08.2018 
PV 2 Photovoice Participant 2 MINFOF Lobéké Eco- Guard (male), Bantu 
HQ Mambélé, WWF 
Accommodation 
01.09.2018 
PV 3 Photovoice Participant 3 Mambélé Chefferie Farmer (female), Bantu, 60 years old 
Next to community 
building 
02.09.2018 
PV 4 Photovoice Participant 4 Mambélé Chefferie Farmer (male), Bantu, 26 years old 
Next to community 
building 
02.09.2018 
PV 5 Photovoice Participant 5 Ndongo Farmer (male), Baka, 58 years old Primary School 05.09.2018 
PV 6 Photovoice Participant 6 Ndongo Farmer (female), Baka, 25 years old Primary School 05.09.2018 
PV 7 Photovoice Participant 7 Ndongo Student (female), Baka, 15 years old Primary School 05.09.2018 
PV 8 Photovoice Participant 8 Ndongo Teacher (male), Baka Primary School 05.09.2018 
PV 9 Photovoice Participant 9 Socambo Boat driver (male), Baka, 39 years old TV Room in front of hotel 18.09.2018 
PV 10 Photovoice Participant 10 Socambo Student (female), Baka, 15 years old At restaurant 18.09.2018 
PV 11 Photovoice Participant 11 Socambo Farmer (male), Bantu, 42 years old TV Room in front of hotel 18.09.2018 
PV 12 Photovoice Participant 12 Socambo Restaurant owner (female), Bantu At restaurant 18.09.2018 
PV 13 Photovoice Participant 13 Zega (PK 14) Farmer (female), , Baka, 21 years old Village 21.09.2018 
PV 14 Photovoice Participant 14 Zega (PK 14)  Farmer (male), Baka, 24 years old, Village 21.09.2018 
PV 15 Photovoice Participant 15 Zega (PK 14) Farmer (male), Bantu, 22 years old, Village 21.09.2018 
PV 16 Photovoice Participant 16 Zega (PK 14) Farmer (female), Bantu, 38 years old Village 21.09.2018 
PV 17 Photovoice Participant 17 Dioula Farmer (male), Baka, 34 years old Church building 25.09.2018 
PV 18 Photovoice Participant 18 Dioula Farmer (male), Baka, 45 years old Church building 25.09.2018 
PV 19 Photovoice Participant 19 Dioula Farmer (female), Baka, 25 years Church building 25.09.2018 
PV 20 Photovoice Participant 20 Dioula Farmer (female), Baka, 20 years old Church building 25.09.2018 
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SW1 Workshop 
About 40 
participants 
Stakeholders  
Representatives of most Cameroonian 
entities and groups worked with 
during research around LNP 
(communities, park management, 
private enterprises) 
Mambélé, PACEBCO-
Office 
28.09.2018 
SW2 Workshop About 30 experts 
MINFOF, WWF, Okani, 
GIZ, FTNS, etc. 
No representatives from LNP but from 
national and regional level 
Yaoundé, Hotel Azure 18.10.2018 
T1 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed 
Villagers (Focus 
Group Nr.1) 
Mambélé carrefour Baka (2 women, 3 men) in front of their houses 01.09.2018 
T2 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed 
Villagers (Focus 
Group Nr.3) 
Mambélé carrefour Baka men in front of their houses 01.09.2018 
T3 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed 
Villagers (Focus 
Group Nr.3) 
Mambélé carrefour Baka women in front of their houses 01.09.2018 
T4 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed 
Villagers (Focus 
Group Nr.2) 
Mambélé carrefour, 
campement Nkoulou 
Baka, 2 men and 2 women 
Next to a participant's 
house 
01.09.2018 
T5 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed 
Villagers Mambélé chefferie Baka next to the community hall 02.09.2018 
T6 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed 
Villagers Mambélé chefferie 9 Bantu women community hall 02.09.2018 
T7 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed 
Villagers Zega (PK 14) All Baka; 2 women, 2 men In front of house 21.09.2018 
T8 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed 
Villagers Zega (PK 14) All Bantu; 1 woman, 3 men Behind house 21.09.2018 
TWS1 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed_ Workshop 
Villagers Dioula 
More than 20 Baka men, women and 
children 
Inside church 
25.09.2018 
and 
26.09.2018 
TWS2 
Theatre of the 
Oppressed_Workshop 
Villagers Dioula 
More than 15 Bantu men, women and 
children 
Inside church 
25.09.2018 
And 26.09. 
2018 
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Annex 5 Conflict Analysis Tools 
ABC – Triangle: 
Following Galtung, a conflict consists of three basic interrelated elements: [A] 
the attitudes of the conflict parties, [B] their conflict behaviour (violent or non- 
violent), and [C] the contradiction central to the conflict (seemingly incompatible 
goals).  
Figure 16: ABC – Triangle as proposed by Johan Galtung 
Source: own illustration 
Attitudes (A) involve the perceptions, presumptions and feelings of the conflict 
parties. Often, they serve as justifying tools (i.e. ‘victim’ and ‘enemy’- 
constructions, accusations). Attitudes cannot be observed directly but are inferred 
from analysis. The behaviour (B) of conflict parties is the most evident aspect of a 
conflict (the "top of the ice-berg"). It can be violent (verbal or physical) or non- 
violent. The contradiction (C) of seemingly incompatible goals (i.e. disagreements 
regarding the distribution of a resource, of power, or the structuring of a political 
system) caused the conflict to arise. Frequently, the incompatible goal is 
forgotten over the course of the conflict, and itself disputed among the conflict 
parties. A conflict can start at any point in the triangle, and its three elements are 
mutually reinforcing. 
This triangle draws our attention not only to "spectacular" evidence of conflict 
(i.e. violent behaviour), but also to the attitudes and structural inequalities that lie 
underneath (the “catalysators” of evident conflict). It also implies that subjective 
meanings and experiences (i.e. ‘enemy’-constructions) are as critical as ‘objective’ 
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contradictions (i.e. access to a limited resource) in conflict. Drawing an ABC- 
triangle for each conflict party can help to elucidate the causes of conflicts, 
conflict parties’ attitudes towards other actors involved, and their behaviour in 
dealing with the conflict.  
PIN- Tool:  
This tool seeks to identify needs (‚what we must have‘), interests (‚what we 
really want‘), and positions (‚what we say we want‘) for each conflict party. It is 
based on the idea that there are universal human needs. In a quest to satisfy these 
needs, people pursue certain interests and positions. For example, a party might 
have the position that a piece of land is “hers” and belongs to her only. Her 
interest is to cultivate fruit and vegetables on the land, and her need is to be fed. 
Following PIN, needs and interests (i.e. the need for food, the interest in land) are 
easier to reconcile than positions (i.e. “this land belongs to me only”).  
But what are universal human needs? Following Galtung, human needs might 
vary over time and space, however there are four basic universal needs that 
“[h]uman beings will continue striving for […] under almost all circumstances 
(Galtung, 2000:35)”: survival-, well-being-, identity- and freedom needs. These 
needs are non- negotiable and are of equal value and importance. When using the 
PIN- Tool, it is highly important to listen to the interlocutors when identifying 
needs or a lack thereof; otherwise, the subjective bias of the researcher might 
hinder a reasonable analysis (i.e. by judging well- being needs as more important 
than identity- needs – despite the fact that people are known to sacrifice their 
lives for their religious and cultural identity (Galtung, 2000: 84) ). 
While not all conflicts revolve around basic human needs, PIN can help to find 
common ground of the conflict parties and to develop strategies to transcend the 
conflict.  
 
  
208 Annexes 
Annex 6 Commitment of honesty (“Engagement sur 
l’honneur”) 
 
Figure 17: Commitment of honesty (“Engagement sur l’honneur”) 
Source: Lobéké National Park 
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Annex 7 Distribution of Central African hunter-gatherer 
groups 
 
Map 11: Distribution of Central African hunter-gatherer groups 
Source: Duda, 2017:50  
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Annex 8 Mapping of the land and resource use of the Baka 
inside and around Boumba-Bek and Nki NPs 
 
 
Map 12: Mapping of the land and resource use of the Baka inside and 
around Boumba-Bek and Nki NPs 
Source: Njounan Tegomo et al., 2012:52 
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Annex 9 Subsistence activities of villagers from Dissassoué - 
participatory mapping 
 
Map 13: Subsistence activities of villagers from Dissassoué - participatory 
mapping 
Source: CEFAID, MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data 
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Annex 10 Area inside LNP that is traditionally used by adjacent 
communities 
 
Map 14: Area inside LNP that is traditionally used by adjacent communities 
Source: CEFAID, MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data 
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Annex 11 Examples of insufficient community lands 
 
Map 15: Examples of insufficient community lands 
Source: CEFAID, MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data 
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Annex 12 Seasonal calendar and description of Non-Timber-Forest-Products 
Table 12: Seasonal calendar for Non-Timber-Forest-Products 
Local Name Koko Mangue Djansang Poivre Mbalaka Tondo Pepeh Rondelle Kanda Ebaye 
English Name 
Gnetum 
leaves 
Bush mango Njangsa Wild pepper 
African Oil 
bean tree 
? 
Calabash 
nutmeg 
? ? ? 
Scientific Name 
Gnetum 
spp. 
Irvingia 
gabonensis 
Ricinodendron 
heudelotii 
Piper 
guineensis 
Pentaclethra 
macrophylla 
Aframomum 
spp. 
Monodora 
myristica 
? ? ? 
January  x  (x)      x  
February  x  (x)  x    x  
March  x          
April  x          
May  x          
June  x x   x  x x   
July  x x   x  x x   
August  x x  x x  x x  x 
September  x  x x  x    x 
October  x  x   x    x 
November  x  x        
December  x  x      x  
Source: Workshop with the NTFP-cooperative Or-Vert in Mambélé (M6) 
 
 = light dry season  = light rainy season 
 = heavy dry season  = heavy rainy season 
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Table 13: Non-Timber-Forest-Products and their processing and utilization 
NTFPs Picture Processing and Utilization 
Koko 
 
Koko is a liana with edible 
leaves. This green leafy 
vegetable can be found 
throughout the year. It is 
mostly used for personal 
consumption. For commercial 
purposes and transportation, 
it is dried. It is sold by the 
NTFP-cooperative to traders 
in Yokadouma. There are not 
many competitors for this 
product. 
Gnetum leaves 
Gnetum spp. 
Mangue 
 
Besides for its flesh, the fruit’s 
dried seed is used as the basis 
of a sauce called “arachide” 
(peanut). Furthermore, the 
seeds contain a lot of oil. 
Theoretically, the tree could 
be domesticated, but people 
collect bush mango in the 
forest during collection 
season.  
The NTFP-cooperative sells 
bush mango in large amounts 
to buyers from Yokadouma 
and even Bertoua, and from 
there, it goes further up to 
Yaoundé and Douala. There is 
high competition for this 
product.  
Bush mango 
Irvingia gabonensis 
Djansang 
 
When the fruits are falling 
from the tree, they are left in 
the shade to rot. The rotten 
fruit is washed off, and the 
seeds are peeled and used as 
spice or as medicine for 
children. The oil from the oil-
rich seeds is used e.g. in 
coffee.  
Njangsa 
Ricinodendron heudelotii 
Poivre 
 
Wild pepper is a liana. The 
kernels need to be dried until 
they turn black. It is used as a 
spice for e.g. sauces. 
Wild pepper 
Piper guineensis 
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Mbalaka 
 
The big “beans”fall out of the 
fruit without further ado and 
are used for oil production. An 
old medical recipe for using 
Mbalaka is to cut the seeds 
into small pieces, boil them for 
a long time, and leave them in 
water for three to four days 
before finally peeling them. If 
consumed,, it can serve as 
snake antidote. It can also be 
put on snake bites as a paste. 
If the entire “bean” is roasted 
on fire and its inner part is 
eaten afterwards, snakes 
reportedly sense it and flee 
from you..  
 
African Oil bean tree 
Pentaclethra macrophylla 
Tondo 
 
Tondo is a shrub-like tree that 
always continues to grow after 
being cut (growth from the 
stump). There are different 
types of Tondo, either sweet 
or spicy as chili. It can be 
eaten, but is also used for 
spiritual or medical purposes . 
Reportedly, itprotects against 
any threats while traveling.  
? 
Aframomum spp. 
Pepeh 
 
The seeds are mainly used as a 
spice for sauces, but Pepeh 
can also be used as medicine 
against stomach ache and to 
help with digestion. It can also 
be rubbed onto children when 
they are sick. 
Calabash nutmeg 
Monodora myristica 
Rondelle 
 
The green fruits fall from the 
tree and crack. The collected 
fruits are used as a spice for 
sauces and resemble wild 
garlic. 
/ 
/ 
Kanda 
 
When fruit falls off the tree its 
seeds are dried, peeled and 
grinded and used as a spice. 
The powder is used to prepare 
creamy sauces. 
/ 
/ 
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Ebaye 
 
 
The fruits of the Ebaye-tree 
are peeled and boiled. It is 
used as medicine against back 
and stomach pains, and 
reportedly protects against 
bad spirits. Ebaye also helps 
women with menstruation 
pain. Furthermore, is used as a 
spice for sauces (Mongojobi) 
or fish. 
/ 
/ 
Source: Workshop with the NTFP-cooperative Or-Vert in Mambélé (M6) 
Photos: Tobias Beyer 
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Annex 13 Recommendations workshops Mambélé & Yaoundé 
The research team facilitated a workshop in Mambélé and in Yaoundé to 
communicate research findings to the study’s key stakeholders, and to jointly 
develop recommendations to tackle identified problems. The study team tried to 
ensure the inclusion of all voices by working in small groups and moderating the 
discussions.  
Mambélé workshop 
 
Table 14: Mambélé Workshop 
Who? ▪ Representatives from Baka and Bantu villages (chiefs, notables, 
mayors, members of COVAREF, farmers) 
▪ LNP park management (MINFOF Conservator, Head of Units and 
Ecoguards)  
▪ Members of associations (Woman Health Group; GIC)  
▪ Representatives of local NGOs (CIFED)  
▪ Private sector representatives (VICWOOD-THANRY GROUP and 
Mongokele Mining Company) 
How? Participants were divided into three groups: Baka, Bantu, and Park 
Management and private sector. Each group was asked to prioritize 
the research findings and to select the three in their view most 
pressing issues. Hereafter, the groups presented their selection to the 
plenum, and the entire plenum decided upon five topics to be further 
explored. These topics were subsequently discussed in randomly 
selected small- groups using the “Carusell”- method: under guidance 
of one to two team moderator(s), each group discussed a topic for 
thirty minutes and then moved on to the next. As a result, every group 
had the opportunity to discuss all five topics. Finally, the small groups 
came together in plenum, and chosen representatives presented the 
main debates and recommendations.  
What? Most pressing issues by group: 
Baka: Ineffective Community Zone; No benefits from eco- tourism; 
Unrecognized villages and settlements  
Bantu: Human- Wildlife Conflicts; Livelihood restrictions without 
alternatives; No benefits from ecotourism 
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Park management: Livelihood restrictions without alternatives; 
Human Rights violations; Ineffective revenue- sharing mechanisms  
Five topics chosen in plenum: 
1. Human-Wildlife Conflicts 
2. Human-Rights violations  
3. Ineffective revenue sharing mechanisms (including revenues from 
eco-tourism) 
4. Restrictions on livelihood activities and ineffective community 
zone (merged) 
5. Unrecognized villages and settlements 
Source: Stakeholder- Workshop Mambélé, 28.09.2018 
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Table 15: Recommendations developed during workshop in Mambélé 
Recommendations What? How? Who? 
1. Human-Wildlife 
Conflicts 
▪ Compensation 
mechanism (indemnity 
payments) 
▪ Rapid response to 
chase off animals 
▪ Preventive techniques 
▪ Mapping of wildlife 
incidences and 
planning of new farms 
accordingly 
▪ Fund with MINFOF 
▪ Establish agency 
▪ Establish a 
decentralized fund 
▪ Park 
▪ MINFOF 
▪ Private actors 
▪ NGOs 
2. Human-Rights 
violations 
▪ Encourage a dialogue 
between eco-guards 
and the local 
population  
▪ Alternative livelihood 
support 
▪ Clearly demarcate the 
limits of the zones of 
the park 
▪ Establish a seasonal 
calendar of NTFPs 
▪ Involve people in the 
management of 
resources (fauna and 
flora)  
▪ Implement the 
Mambélé convention  
▪ Monitoring and 
denunciation 
system  
▪ Sensitization and 
education of the 
local population 
and the eco-guards 
▪ Dialogue and 
Empathy 
▪ Permanent 
assistance of 
Human Rights-
NGOs in all villages  
▪ Eco-guards 
▪ Local 
population 
▪ NGOs 
▪ Park 
Management 
3. Revenue 
sharing 
mechanisms 
▪ Establishment of an 
information and 
monitoring system for 
revenue sharing 
▪ Capacity building and 
support for the 
management of the 
revenues (evaluation, 
financing and 
monitoring) 
▪ Enable micro financing 
of projects 
▪ Community forests 
should start forest 
operations without 
waiting for partners 
 
▪ 100% of community 
forest revenues 
should stay in the 
community 
▪ The town hall 
should manage the 
revenues from 
forest operations 
(40% to 
communities) and 
from ZIC (taxe 
d’abbatage) 
▪ COVAREF should 
manage the taxes 
from the ZICGC 
(abbatage, 
affermage) 
▪ State 
▪ COVAREF 
▪ UFA 
▪ Communities 
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4. Restrictions 
on livelihood 
activities by  
different actors 
▪ Training and technical 
assistance for: fishing, 
farming, livestock 
raising, fish ponds, 
bee-keeping / snail 
keeping and artisanal 
mining 
▪ Special rights and 
support for Baka 
▪ Awareness- raising on 
and demarcation of 
community zone 
▪ Social integration of 
Baka women 
▪ Support for 
administrative village 
structures 
▪ Representation of all 
villages in park 
management council 
▪ Signing and 
implementation of 
MoU 
▪ Permanent 
consultation of 
communities in order 
to develop alternative 
livelihood 
opportunities 
▪ Provision of animal 
protein (other than 
bushmeat) 
▪ Cultural centre  
▪ Implement and 
respect the 
decisions taken by 
stakeholders with 
regards to 
alternative 
livelihoods 
▪ Meetings to inform 
people about best 
practices of fishing, 
farming, etc. 
▪ Vocational training 
▪ Provision of 
equipment 
▪ Training for trainers  
▪ State 
▪ WWF 
▪ FTNS 
▪ Private 
companies 
 
5. Communities  
without  
official 
recognition 
▪ Implement an 
independent 
representation of Baka 
vis-à-vis the authorities 
and external actors:  
▪ Inclusion of Baka 
camps in official maps 
and communal 
development plans 
▪ Adapt territorial 
administration to the 
status quo to reflect 
the current reality and 
manage it accordingly 
▪ Designation of 
notables 
▪ Recognition of 
Baka settlements 
as villages 
▪ Recognition of 
Baka chiefs (this 
recommendation 
was opposed by 
traditional 
Bangando and 
Bakwélé chiefs) 
▪ Revision of 
communal 
development plans 
▪ MINADT 
▪ Communes of 
Salapoumbé 
and 
Moloundou 
▪ Baka 
representativ
es (e.g. 
ASBABUK)  
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▪ Creation of a 
second chéfferie 
between Nguilili 
and Kika and at 
Mbongoli 
▪ Disincorporation of 
Libongo from Bela 
and of Socambo 
from Mongokélé  
Source: Stakeholder- Workshop Mambélé, 28.09.2018 
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Table 16: Yaoundé Workshop 
Who? ▪ Research organisations (ICRAF, University)  
▪ Ministries (MINFOF and MINAS)  
▪ NGOs (CEFAID, OKANI, WWF) 
▪ FTNS 
▪ GIZ  
How? Participants were randomly divided into four different groups. 
Under guidance of two team moderators, the small groups 
discussed four topics chosen by local stakeholders in Mambélé. 
After one hour, the small groups came together in plenum, and 
chosen representatives presented the main debates and 
recommendations.  
What? 1. Human-Wildlife Conflicts 
2. Human-Rights violations  
3. Ineffective revenue sharing mechanisms (including revenues from 
eco-tourism) 
4. Restrictions on livelihood activities and ineffective community zone 
(merged) 
Source: Stakeholder Workshop Yaoudé, 17.10.2018 
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Table 17: Recommendations developed during workshop in Yaoundé 
Recommendations What? How? Who? 
1. Human-Wildlife 
Conflicts 
▪ Creation of buffer 
zone between the 
park and agricultural 
fields 
▪ Relocating the 
agroforestry zone 
further away from the 
park 
▪ Increase livestock 
raising  
▪ Decentralized 
complaint and 
compensation 
mechanism 
▪ Land-use planning 
with integrated space 
for wildlife 
▪ Financing of the 
mechanisms through 
revenues from forest 
operations; should 
not go through 
Yaoundé 
▪ State 
▪ Park 
▪ Private sector 
▪ Communities 
▪ Local and 
national 
NGOs 
2. Human-Rights 
violations 
▪ Mapping and analysis 
of actors 
▪ Finding convergent 
and divergent 
interests 
▪ Sustaining divergent 
interests and win-win 
scenarios 
▪ Managing divergent 
interests  
▪ Complaint 
mechanism 
▪ Human rights 
trainings for all 
actors 
▪ Mediation by neutral 
party agreed upon by 
both conflict parties 
▪ Put in place a follow-
up and evaluation 
mechanism, e.g. 
platform 
▪ State 
▪ International 
organisations 
▪ Local NGOs 
▪ Private sector 
▪ Farmer 
associations 
▪ Collectivités 
Territoriales 
Décentralisée
s (CTD) 
▪ Communities 
▪ Investors (of 
the 
foundation) 
▪ Churches 
▪ Traditional 
authorities 
3. Revenue  
sharing 
mechanisms 
▪ Monitoring platform 
for the revenues 
coming from forest 
exploitations including 
a complaint 
mechanism 
▪ Building capacities in 
the management of 
revenues 
▪ Local structure for the 
management of 
▪ Revenues for the 
communities go 
through the 
municipality 
(“maire”) 
▪ COVAREF get the 
revenues to a bureau 
in Bertoua and it is 
designated to LAB, 
microprojects and 
running costs 
▪ Community Forests 
▪ State 
▪ Private sector 
▪ Park 
▪ COVAREF 
▪ Local NGOs 
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touristic activities receive 100 % of the 
revenues generated 
by them (10% for 
management, 90% 
for development) 
▪ Distribution of 
ecotourism 
revenues: 20% to the 
state, 40% to the 
communities, 20% to 
the park, 20% for Eco 
touristic 
programmes  
4. Restrictions on 
livelihood 
activities by 
different actors 
▪ Implement the 
Mambélé Convention  
▪ Dialogue between the 
local population 
(exclusively Baka) and 
the companies 
▪ Provide a guarantee 
for investors  
▪ Signing the MoU and 
integrate a 
monitoring system 
▪ Creation of a 
permanent dialogue 
platform between 
companies and the 
population 
▪ State 
▪ Park 
▪ Private sector 
▪ Neutral 
Mediator 
Source: Stakeholder-Workshop Yaoundé, 17.10.2018 
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Annex 14 Detailed recommendations of the study 
Table 18: Detailed recommendations of the study 
High priority Moderate priority Low priority 
 
No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
1.1 Improve living 
situation and working 
conditions of park 
employees 
▪ Trainings include the offer to accompany eco-guards 
to learn about LNP and surveillance missions 
▪ Development of conflict-sensitive way to determine 
who the champions and participating 
▪ Adapt length of leaves to travel time 
▪ Provide funding for improved housing of eco-guards 
▪ Ensure that current plans of FTNS to improve housing 
are put into practice 
▪ Ensure regular payment of bonuses (“prime de saisi”) 
that are limited to objects that are illegal in every 
context (cable snares, war weapons, protected 
species) and do not exceed the value of the 
confiscated object to avoid the incentive of fraud 
Short term:  
▪ The basic needs of park employees are met 
Long term:  
▪ Park employees have a high work motivation and 
positive attitude towards LNP 
▪ Working in LNP becomes more attractive.  
/ ▪ LNP PM 
▪ FTNS  
▪ KfW 
1.2 Improve 
communication 
between FTNS and 
park management 
▪ Install a permanent FTNS representative in LNP park 
management 
 
Short term:  
▪ FTNS and park management communicate 
directly and can take decisions on time 
Long term: 
▪ Cooperation between FTNS, MINFOF and WWF is 
improved  
▪ The park management is more efficient and 
effective 
/ ▪ LNP PM 
▪ FTNS 
Annexes 227 
No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
1.3 Revise MoUs 
between FTNS, 
MINFOF and WWF 
▪ Organise joint meetings and workshops of both staff 
from the local and the national level to identify issues 
that cause uncertainty and conflict  
▪ Adjust MoUs where necessary based on the topics 
identified in the workshops 
Short term: 
▪ All actors have a clear awareness of each other’s 
responsibilities and mandate 
▪ The risk for misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations of contractual obligations and 
mandates is decreased 
Long term: 
▪ Cooperation between FTNS, MINFOF and WWF is 
improved  
▪ The park management is more efficient and 
effective  
/ ▪ FTNS 
▪ WWF 
▪ MINFOF 
1.4 Employ additional or 
more suitable 
personnel 
In accordance with the management plan: 
▪ Employ more WWF senior staff  
▪ Employ people with expertise suitable to the different 
units  
▪ Support the Participation Unit with MINFOF personnel 
Long term: 
▪ Suitable and experienced technical advisors 
improve park management capacities in 
conservation, research, monitoring of infectious 
diseases and community work 
▪ The coordination of research and monitoring is 
facilitated and networking with research 
centres/universities and scientists interested in 
working in the park is improved 
As a guide, see:  
Appleton M.R. 
(2016) 67 
▪ LNP PM 
1.5 Regular exchange ▪ Establish a newsletter to inform NNNP and DSNP (and Long term: Newsletter ▪ PM 
                                                        
67 Appleton M.R. (2016): Competences for Personnel of Protected Areas and Other Conservation Sites: A Global Register and User Guide. IUCN: Gland, Switzerland. Available 
online: https://www.iucn.org/content/a-global-register-competencies-protected-area-practitioners 
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No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
and harmonised 
approaches of TNS 
parks  
donors) about activities, newly filled positions, tourist 
numbers etc.  
▪ Harmonize approaches and strategies on anti-
poaching efforts, management strategies, human 
rights, paramilitary field missions and use of 
technologies 
▪ Establish regular eco-guard exchanges – in the 
framework of the Protocole d’Accord sur la Circulation 
du personnel TNS – between staff of the TNS parks to 
strengthen both information exchange, harmonization 
of approaches and team-spirit within TNS 
▪ Assess how the BLAB management can be 
restructured so it is less dependent on the 
conservators and more capable of acting 
▪ Jointly invest in equipment, housing, boats and team 
building measures 
▪ TNS cooperation is improved in terms of research, 
tourism, staff performance and anti-poaching 
measures  
NNNP ▪ TNS parks 
▪ FTNS 
1.6 Reconstruct Djembé  ▪ Renovate housing for tourists in Djembé and establish 
an office for the payment of the park entrance fee  
▪ Build adequate housing for eco-guards in line with the 
construction work planned for the headquarters 
▪ Rebuild the bridges to enable land access to Djembe 
and install telecommunication networks 
 
Short term:  
▪ Cross-boundary tourism is strengthened as 
tourists coming from CAR or Congo can access 
LNP at Djembe 
▪ Housing of eco- guards is improved  
Long term: 
▪ The improved accessibility of Djembe and 
simplified information exchange between eco-
guards and LNP headquarters improve anti-
poaching measures 
▪ The well-being of eco-guards is fostered, 
increasing their motivation to work  
/ ▪ LNP PM 
▪ FTNS 
▪ KfW 
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No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
1.7 Website for LNP ▪ Create a website for LNP that informs potential 
tourists, donors, researchers and others about LNP 
and its activities 
Short term: 
▪ LNP’s public profile is heightened. 
Long term: 
▪ Easily accessible, reliable presentation of 
information attracts more tourists and researchers 
See website of 
DSNP 68  
▪ FTNS  
1.8 Sign the agreement 
on trans-boundary 
visas for TNS-visitors 
▪ Lobby for the signature of the agreement on 
transboundary visas for TNS- visitors by Cameroon on 
national level  
Long term: 
▪ Tourist exchange within the TNS landscape is 
enabled and tourists from CAR and CG are 
encouraged to visit LNP 
/ ▪ BMZ 
▪ KfW 
▪ German 
Embassy  
▪ WWF 
Cameroon. 
1.9 Provide trans-
boundary touristic 
circuits 
▪ Offer travels by boat from Bayanga or Bomassa to 
Djembe  
Long term:  
▪ Better advertisement and touristic offers bring 
additional benefits to all three parks of TNS 
/  
2.1 Revise existing 
revenue sharing 
mechanisms 
 
▪ Simplify the revenue sharing guidelines and 
procedures. Identify an appropriate mechanism to 
directly distribute revenues from ecotourism and from 
private companies (logging and safari) to communities 
(confer CIFOR, 2015) 
Short term:  
▪ Revenues arrive at the local level and are shared in 
a transparent way 
▪ Local communities can manage revenues and 
▪ UWA Revenue 
Sharing 
Programme, 
Bwindi 
Impenetrable 
▪ MINFOF  
▪ MINFI 
▪ Private sector 
▪ LNP PM 
▪ Local NGOs 
                                                        
68 http://www.dzanga-sangha.org/ 
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No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
▪ Establish a participative information and monitoring 
system for revenue sharing, e.g. COVAREFs should 
present their cash flows to the communities on a 
frequent basis and the Communal development plans 
should be kept up to date 
▪ Develop capacities of local population for managing 
revenues (administrative, evaluation, financing and 
monitoring) 
▪ Renegotiate the Mambélé convention and consider all 
private, state and civil society actors in the area 
establish and monitor development projects 
Long term:  
▪ LNP and conservation demonstrate economic 
value to local communities 
▪ Local communities accept and support 
conservation and LNP 
National Park, 
Uganda 69 
 
▪ COVAREF 
▪ CPF 
▪ Communities 
2.2 Train and employ 
local “conservation 
champions” 
▪ Employ locals from villages around LNP’s buffer zone 
(Baka and Bantu including women) with regular salary 
and cultural-sensitive work contracts for peer-to-peer 
awareness raising on conservation and law 
enforcement  
▪ Start with two to three pilot villages to train two 
“conservation champions” per village with the 
following responsibilities:  
a) Help develop tools for peer-to-peer awareness 
raising in communities 
b) b) Accompany eco-guards to learn about LNP and 
surveillance missions 
Short term: 
▪ Awareness raising on conservation and anti-
poaching is more effective due to peer-to-peer 
format 
▪ Formal employment linked to conservation is 
offered  
Long term: 
▪ Park rules and forestry law are known and 
understood by local communities  
▪ Support from local communities for conservation 
efforts 
▪ Contact points between community members and 
park employees mitigate conflict potential 
For contracts, 
follow best 
practice of BaAka 
contracts in 
Bayanga, e.g. 
regarding flexible 
work days per 
month (I25) 
WWF 
                                                        
69 UWA Revenue Sharing Programme: http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/case-studies/lessons-learnt-20-years-revenue-sharing-bwindi-impenetrable-national-park-
uganda 
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No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
2.3 Employ unarmed, 
local village rangers 
to work in the buffer 
zone 
▪ Employ locals (Baka and Bantu include. women) from 
pilot villages with regular salary and cultural-sensitive 
work contracts for assistance of eco-guards  
▪ Train assistant eco- guards together with MINFOF 
eco-guards where possible on (1) monitoring tasks to 
support eco-guards, (2) other surveillance tasks that 
are suitable for non-literate people, e.g. dismantling of 
snares 
▪ Use COVILAB members (Baka participation to be 
ensured) as starting point 
▪ Provide conflict mediation and team- building 
measures  
▪ Ensure that village rangers’ employment is 
coordinated with MINFOF and in close cooperation 
with MINFOF eco-guards 
 
Short term:  
▪ Locals participate in conservation and contact 
points between villagers and eco-guards mitigate 
conflict potentials  
▪ A small number of locals benefit in terms of 
employment and training 
Long term: 
▪ Buy-in from local communities for conservation 
efforts is strengthened 
▪ Surveillance missions are enhanced due to 
additional conservation staff for the LNP buffer 
zone 
UCL Extreme 
Citizen Science 
around the Dja 
reserve70  
WWF or another 
NGO with 
international 
financial support 
2.4 Identify and provide 
alternative livelihood 
strategies (ALS) for 
local population in 
LNP’s buffer zone 
▪ Identify appropriate ALS in a participatory manner to 
ensure the population’s buy-in and suitability of ALS to 
local needs 
▪ Engage a third party (e.g. international development 
organisation, national institution or NGO) with 
expertise in rural development and establishment of 
ALS to guide the development of ALS 
Short term: 
▪ Appropriate ALS for the local population are 
identified 
Long term: 
▪ The local population has adequate alternatives to 
entering the forest and generates additional 
income 
▪ The local population’s attitude towards the park 
improves 
Facilitate 
exchange on best 
practices with 
DSNP  
▪ LNP PM 
▪ FTNS  
▪ Third party 
                                                        
70 https://uclexcites.blog/category/cameroon/ 
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No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
2.5 Establish NTFP value 
chains 
 
▪ Identify suitable NTFPS for the establishment of NTFP 
value chains with the help of ICRAF, AFDEBEM and an 
interested private company based on criteria such as: 
abundancy, market potential (national and 
international), preservability, and domestication 
potential 
▪ Conduct an environmental impact assessment on the 
increased utilization of the proposed NTFPs  
▪ Guarantee fixed prices and purchase quantities for the 
farmers (contract farming) and provide training on 
sustainable collection and preservation for quality 
control 
▪ Improve market access for NTFPs by forming 
cooperatives to increase number of marketable 
products. Already existing cooperatives should receive 
proper support with marketing of products and 
organisation of sales 
▪ Grant access for the population to NTFP sources in 
community and buffer zone  
Long term: 
▪ The local population has additional income 
sources 
▪ Natural resources are sustainably valorised 
▪ NTFP are domesticated within agro-forestry 
systems  
Timorganic, a 
private company 
in Timor-Leste, 
supports 
smallholder 
farms to produce 
marketable 
products with 
trainings on 
quality 
standards, etc. 
and buys from 
them.71 
▪ LNP PM 
▪ FTNS 
▪ Private sector 
▪ Potential 
partner like 
ICRAF or 
AFDEBEM 
2.6 Provide Basic 
Infrastructure in 
Buffer Zone  
▪ Assess and prioritise existing and required 
infrastructure according to the needs of the different 
communities with a focus on clean drinking water, 
medical care and education 
▪ Develop a roadmap in strong collaboration with the 
local population, MINAS and a third actor 
Short term: 
▪ Local population stops feeling neglected and the 
attitude towards conservation improves.  
Long term: 
▪ The living conditions of the local population 
/ ▪ MINFOF 
▪ MINFI 
▪ MINAS 
▪ MINEDUB 
▪ WWF  
▪ LNP PM 
                                                        
71 http://www.timorganic.com 
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No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
▪ Create a sustainable financing mechanism (including 
local private sector, see Forest Law N°94/01 Art. 66) 
that is dedicated to development projects in the LNP 
buffer zone  
▪ Install a responsible unit and an independent 
monitoring committee (by MINAS and communities) 
to distribute the funds and control the financing 
▪ Provide vocational training of the local population - 
especially teachers and doctors but also technicians 
for well- maintenance  
▪ Abolish school fees for economically weak groups to 
incentivise education (MINEDUB)  
improve significantly.  ▪ FTNS 
▪ Consultancy/ 
NGO  
▪ Local 
Communities 
2.7 Provide financial and 
administrative 
assistance to 
community forests 
▪ Train local forest communities on (sustainable) 
logging, certification and equipment 
▪ Assist the community forest steering boards with the 
setting up of logging contracts and general 
accountancy 
▪ Ensure that revenues and spending are published and 
controlled regularly. 
▪ Organise timber sale and help to establish stable 
partnerships with consumers (preferably supporting 
the 'Reseau des forets communautaires de Boumba-
Ngoko’); properly fund this network and its office 
▪ Determine contact person for community forests 
inside the LNP park management that can be 
approached by villagers in case of mismanagement 
Long term:  
▪ The community forests are better managed and 
economically empowered. 
▪ 100% of the revenues from community forest stay 
in the community of concern in line with Forest 
Law N°94/01 Art. 54 & Art. 66.  
/ ▪ WWF  
▪ MINFOF 
▪ UTO SE  
▪ FTNS 
▪ REDEFOC 
▪ LNP PM 
2.8 Revise the ‘Carbon 
zone’ approach 
▪ Ensure that subsistence hunting and harvesting of 
NTFPs are not restricted by carbon zones, i.e. abolish 
the need for permissions 
Short term: 
▪ Usage rights are ensured 
/  
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No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
▪ Clarify imponderability linked with REDD+ and the 
carbon zones (e.g. uncertainty of payments for 
certificates) and provide alternative sources of 
payments 
▪ Long term: 
▪ Informed consent on the installation of carbon 
zones 
2.9 Adapt number, size 
and location of 
community forests 
▪ Support the establishment of community forests in 
Zega, Kika, Bela and Libongo 
▪ Adapt community forest areas (size and sites) to 
ensure economic profitability for small scale logging 
Long term: 
▪ The economic empowerment and participation of 
local population in forest management is 
improved 
/ ▪ LNP PM 
▪ UTO SE  
▪ FTNS  
▪ Community 
forests 
2.10 Revise rules for 
community zone 
within LNP 
▪ Abolish (unofficial) payments for the use of the 
community zone by local population and prolong the 
permission to enter the community zone to 30 days 
▪ Ensure that permission for access to the community 
zone can be obtained at all Chef du Poste in LNP’s 
buffer zone 
▪ Reassess current limitations of possible usage period 
▪ Improve access of the community zone for villagers 
from Libongo, Mbongoli, Zega and PK27, Molindo, i.e. 
by changing its geographic scope or by establishing a 
second community zone in the East 
Short term:  
▪ The community zone can be accessed by all 
adjacent communities  
Long term:  
▪ Less conflicts between Mambélé and other 
villages 
▪ Local communities can meet their livelihoods 
needs  
▪ The local population’s attitude towards the park 
improves 
For the adapted 
zoning confer the 
community zone 
at Boumba Bek 
National Park 
 
2.11 Improve land use 
planning  
▪ Establish an own ZICGC and COVAREF for Libongo. 
Parts of ZIC 30 and 29 neighboring the communities 
should be cut out, joined and established as a ZICGC, 
with a new COVAREF taking care of 
▪ Recognize Libongo and Socambo as distinct 
settlements, e.g. with an independent MINFOF chef 
de poste 
Short term: 
▪ Participation of the concerned communities in 
natural resource management is increased 
▪ Allows for a just distribution of timber and hunting 
revenues between communities 
/ ▪ MINFOF 
▪ MINADT 
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No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
▪ Create a second “chefferie” between Nguilili and Kika. 
Ensure representation of Mbongoli 
2.12 Lobby for inclusive 
and participatory 
forest law 
▪ Ensure national and international standards on human 
rights, participatory conservation and Indigenous 
People are integrated in the ongoing reform of the 
forestry law  
▪ Elaborate legal regulation of (traditional) usage rights 
and participatory resource governance 
▪ Ensure coherence and legal clarity 
Long term: 
▪ Conservation, exploitation of natural resources 
and participation are balanced, and the law 
complies with international obligations 
/ ▪ BMZ  
▪ KfW  
▪ WWF 
international 
3.1 Analyse risk 
perception and actual 
risk for Human 
Wildlife Conflicts in 
LNP’s buffer zone 
▪ Employ scientists to carry out an in- depth analysis on 
risk perception and actual risk of HWC in LNP’s buffer 
zone 
▪ Use study data to design prevention and mitigation 
responses to wildlife impact in LNP’s buffer zone  
▪ Risk analysis of HWC enables to design 
appropriate prevention and mitigation responses 
to (perceived) wildlife impact 
SAFE WWF ▪ FTNS 
▪ WWF 
3.2 Establish a 
functioning Human-
Wildlife Conflict 
compensation 
mechanism  
▪ Devolve assessment and payment responsibility to the 
park management  
▪ Increase administrative capacity of the park 
management to deal with complaints 
▪ Install focal points around LNP that can deal with 
complaints  
▪ Create a fund dedicated to Human-Wildlife Conflict 
compensation 
▪ Implement a verbal complaint mechanism  
▪ Raise local population’s awareness and provide 
trainings on evidence- preservation and compensation 
procedure  
Short term: 
▪ The assessment of damage is accurate and quick  
▪ The compensation process is fair, transparent, and 
prompt 
▪ The transaction costs for lodging a complaint have 
significantly decreased 
▪ The compensation mechanism is accessible for 
the poor and illiterate 
Long term: 
▪ The local population’s attitude towards the park 
and conservation improves. 
/ ▪ LNP PM 
▪ FTNS  
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3.3 Institutionalise a 
constant dialogue 
between eco-guards 
and the local 
population  
▪ Create solution- oriented dialogue forums (suggested 
frequency: every second month) with the purpose of 
discussing current technical issues that require 
collaboration between eco-guards and the local 
population (e.g. poaching) 
▪ Park management, CEFAID (NGO trusted by the 
marginalized Baka population) and CED (a more 
neutral actor that is approachable for all sections of 
the local population) organize these dialogues 
collaboratively  
▪ Consider: Incentives for both sides to participate; 
representation of the local population by popularly 
appointed spokesperson 
Short term: 
▪ Open exchange on technical issues and improved 
cooperation 
▪ Increased contact leads to a better understanding 
of each other’s problems and needs 
Long term: 
▪ Reconciliation between local population and eco-
guards 
/ ▪ LNP PM 
▪ CEFAID  
▪ CED 
3.4 Establish a forum for 
dialogue and cultural 
exchange between 
Baka and Bantu 
groups 
▪ Organise workshops, excursions, field campaigns and 
activities relating to conservation, indigenous 
knowledge and civic education 
Short term:  
▪ Regular exchange between groups  
Long term:  
▪ Conflict between groups is decreased and 
mitigated.  
Youth 
Association 
Ndima-Kali, 
Central African 
Republic72 
▪ LNP PM 
3.5 Include Bantu in 
development 
programmes 
▪ Address the needs and concerns of Baka and Bantu 
communities 
▪ Include Bantu in development programmes addressing 
Baka  
Long term:  
▪ Baka and Bantu both profit from support by (inter-
) national NGOs and from development 
programmes. 
/ ▪ LNP PM 
▪ FTNS 
▪ KfW 
                                                        
72 http://www.ndimakali.org 
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▪ Bantu needs and concerns are considered in Baka-
only development programmes.  
3.6 Revise complaint 
mechanism against 
Human Rights 
violations 
▪ Put new lead organisation in charge of the complaint 
mechanism (i.e. MINAS as ministry or RFUK / CED as 
NGO – possibilities to be evaluated by WWF) with 
WWF providing funding 
▪ Increase presence of new lead organization through 
focal points in major towns and do regular field visits 
to inform local communities about the mechanism, 
their rights and how to file complaints 
▪ Set up procedures that cater to the needs and means 
of all people by guaranteeing accessibility (legal 
assistance for illiterate; translators Baka-French, etc.) 
Short term: 
▪ Local residents are able to file complaints 
▪ Complaints are registered and investigated. 
Long term: 
▪ Local population has access to justice 
Human Rights 
Center Bayanga 
(DSNP) 
▪ LNP PM 
▪ Third actor: 
MINAS, RFUK 
or CED 
3.7 Provide Human 
Rights trainings for 
eco- guards and local 
population 
▪ The LNP park management continues to provide 
Human Rights trainings to eco-guards on a regular 
basis. 
▪ The training is extended to residents of local towns 
and villages in the form of awareness-raising 
campaigns. 
▪ Trainings focus on the implementation of usage rights 
and the difference between Human Rights violations 
and lawful law enforcement practices. 
Short term:  
▪ Local residents and eco-guards can distinguish 
between lawful and unlawful practices of law 
enforcement. 
Long term:  
▪ Eco-guards do not commit any Human Rights 
violations. 
▪ Conflicts around usage rights are reduced. 
Human Rights 
trainings for eco-
guards in DSNP 
and NNNP 
▪ LNP PM 
3.8 Issue identity cards 
and birth certificates 
for Baka 
▪ Issue birth certificates and identity Cards for Baka in 
LNP’s buffer zone, free of charge 
▪ Educate Baka communities on the procedural of 
acquiring birth certificates and identity cards 
▪ Enable the provision of birth certificates and identity 
Short term: 
▪ Baka have access to formal institutions and to 
legal employment opportunities 
Long term: 
Universal Birth 
Registration 
Campaign”, Plan 
International, 
Cameroon 
▪ Local 
Authorities 
▪ MINAS 
▪ MINADT 
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cards in villages around LNP 
▪ Baka enjoy same rights and privileges as their 
Bantu neighbours. 
3.9 Provide equal 
employment 
opportunities and 
affirmative action for 
Baka 
▪ Provide vocational Training for Baka (to work i.e. in 
police, hospitals, schools, companies)  
▪ Establish a Baka- quota for employment in companies 
around the park and for representation in COVAREF 
▪ Provide free access to basic infrastructure, i.e. 
hospitals 
Long term: 
▪ Baka are enabled to assume their legal rights  
▪ Baka needs and concerns are represented in 
COVAREF 
▪ Baka are enabled to partake in public life  
▪ Baka have free access to basic infrastructure 
/ ▪ MINAS 
▪ MINFOF  
3.10  Recognize Baka 
settlements as 
villages 
▪ Legally recognize Baka settlements as villages and 
install Baka chiefs to enable an independent 
representation of Baka vis-à-vis the authorities and 
external actors 
▪ Include Baka settlements in the maps (used by 
MINFOF and WWF) and in the communal 
development plans 
Long term: 
▪ Legal certainty for Baka villagers is established 
/  
3.11 Supervise the safari 
companies active in 
LNP’s buffer zone 
 
▪ Establish a MoU between MINFOF, MINDEF and safari 
companies including these points: 
▪ Quotas for eco-guards as part of patrols by safari 
companies (25%)Quarterly patrol reports of safari 
companies to park management 
▪ Obligatory Human Rights trainings for safari and 
military personnel 
Short term:  
▪ Safari companies comply with Human Rights  
Long term: 
▪ The level of law enforcement is standardised in 
LNP’s buffer zone 
/ ▪ MINFOF  
▪ MINDEF  
▪ Safari 
companies 
3.12 End bush meat 
auctions 
▪ The park management abandons its practice to 
auction confiscated bush meat and instead eliminates 
it 
Short term: 
▪ Health risks due to partly decomposed bush meat 
are eliminated 
/ MINFOF, 
ecoguards 
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Long term:  
▪ The local population understands that the 
confiscation of bush- meat is not a secondary 
income- source for eco- guards 
4.1  Analyse the impact of 
legal and illegal 
logging and mining as 
well as bush meat 
trade on biodiversity 
in the buffer zone 
▪ Commission studies on impacts from legal and illegal 
logging and mining as well as bush meat trade on 
biodiversity in LNP’s buffer zone and consider socio-
economic trade-offs 
▪ Establish a dialogue between MINFOF and Ministry of 
Mines, Industry and Technological Development 
(MINMIDT) with support from international NGOs, 
donors, German Embassy (BMZ) to bring policies in 
accordance and to minimise adverse effects of mining 
and logging within the protected Lobéké landscape73 
Short term:  
▪ Impacts of illegal and legal logging and mining as 
well as of bush meat trade are analysed and 
inform the park management’s conservation 
efforts and surveillance missions  
Long term: 
▪ Political and financial coherence between natural 
resource extraction and conservation in LNP’s 
buffer zone is ensured 
/ ▪ MINFOF  
▪ MINMIDT  
▪ German 
Embassy  
▪ KfW  
▪ LNP PM 
4.2 Ensure that private 
sector respects 
traditional usage 
rights in LNP’s buffer 
zone 
▪ Private actors’ adherence to Forestry Law of 1994, Art. 
8, 9, 26, 86, LNP management plan, ZICGC 
management plans and UFA management plans is 
supervised to ensure the population’s access rights to 
the forest 
▪ Private actors are obliged to integrate traditional 
usage rights into their management plans 
Long- Tern: 
▪ The level of law enforcement is standardised in 
the Lobéké landscape 
▪ Private actors comply with national laws 
▪ The local population’s access to the forest is 
ensured 
/ ▪ MINFOF 
▪ LNP PM 
▪ Safari and 
logging 
companies 
                                                        
73 Mentioned as priority action by the WWF programme manager (I21) 
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4.3 UFA and ZICGC 
management and 
micro-zoning 
UFA management and micro-zoning:  
▪ Oblige logging companies to publish UFA 
management plans for transparency 
▪ Create a “green belt” around the LNP core zone where 
the only activities allowed are minimal-impact logging 
and NTFP gathering  
▪ Revise zoning within UFAs by means of participatory 
usage-mappings to improve location of agricultural 
usage zones  
▪ Revise usage rights of the population within UFAs in a 
participatory process including private sector MINFOF 
and communities. The latter shall be supported by an 
adequate organisation to ensure a just inclusion of the 
population’s opinion 
ZICGC micro-zoning and management: 
▪ Micro-zoning within all ZICGCs to comply with their 
management plans 
▪ Adapt ZICGC micro-zoning to ensure that micro-zone 
for subsistence hunting does not overlap with micro-
zone for sports hunting 
▪ Create interest groups of subsistence hunters within 
the COVAREF and stepwise transfer management of 
sustainable subsistence hunting to them 
Short term: 
▪ Legal certainty and recognition of farmers’ and 
forest dwellers’ livelihood activities 
▪ Conflicts between private sector, ecoguards and 
local population are reduced 
Long term: 
▪ Ensures that buffer zone serves as buffer for LNP 
and equally satisfies needs of local population as 
foreseen by UNESCO 
/ ▪ MINFOF 
▪ Private sector 
▪ Communities 
▪ LNP PM 
4.4 Restructure Lobéké 
landscape platforms 
and consultative 
forums 
‘Comité de gestion’:  
▪ Ensure meeting once a year (not sporadically, see park 
management plan 4.2.9) to adjust programs and 
elaborate strategy 
▪ Overarching strategy for Lobéké landscape 
development is harmonised 
▪ Participation is increased 
▪ Development and conservation efforts are 
balanced 
/ ▪ LNP PM 
▪ MINFOF 
▪ MINAS  
▪ Communities 
▪  FTNS 
Annexes 241 
No. Recommendation Activities Benefits Best Practice Responsibility 
▪ Officially include regional delegate of MINAS in the 
new management plan 
‘Comité consultatif local’: 
▪ Rally local representatives of concerned ministries 
more often (~ four times a year) to harmonize local 
efforts 
▪ Officially include MINAS social affairs assistants in 
Moloundou and Salapoumbé  
‘Plateforme de concertation communautaire’: 
▪ Annual gathering of representatives of all villages 
(including Baka and Women) within the Lobéké 
buffer-zone in Mambélé  
▪ Disseminate information on community projects, 
changes in administration or law, changes within the 
personnel etc.  
▪ Integrate representatives’ opinion to inform the 
project priority list 
▪ Record and send complaints (on community 
development, resource access) to UNESCO and FTNS 
▪ Include complaints-mechanism-report and revenue-
sharing-report into the information being spread 
▪ Adequate budget must be allocated for transport and 
accommodation of participants 
▪ UNESCO 
Source: Study Team 
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